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1. Introduction 
 
“The history in Kosovo is still alive” is a sentence I have heard many times during 
my one-month stay in Kosovo.  When in Kosovo, you get the feeling that history 
is still alive, because Kosovo’s people relive their own histories every day. They 
act and make judgments according to their histories and as Tim Judah put it:  “As 
always in the Balkans, and elsewhere for that matter, the truth is not what 
matters, it is what people believe it to be. And what people believe can be put to 
everyday use.”1 This “back to the future” mentality surfaces when you talk to 
people and ask them how they feel about certain political issues nowadays and 
the conversation very soon shifts to historical stories. The Kosovo Serbs do not 
forget to mention the famous Battle of Kosovo in 1398 and how barely a few 
generations ago there were no Albanians living in their Kosovo. The Kosovo 
Albanians, on the other hand, like to talk about how their ancestors lived on the 
ground of their Kosovo, before the Slav invasions. Undoubtedly, history in 
Kosovo is as important as the present.      
 
Fast forward to the 20th century, the fact of the matter is that the province of 
Kosovo enjoyed an autonomous status as a part of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia with 80% of its population being ethnic Albanians 
according to a 1991 census. After the dissolution of the SFRY, Kosovo became a 
part of Milošević’s Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and he gradually stripped 
Kosovo of its autonomous status to much disapproval and resistance from its 
Albanian population. Ethnic tensions between the ethnic Albanian and ethnic 
Serbian population continued to worsen and from early 1998 to 1999 it escalated 
to an armed conflict between the Kosovo Liberation Army demanding the 
independence of Kosovo and the Serbian police and the Yugoslav military 
squashing the revolt. After many civilian casualties, the international community, 
still on high alert because of the war in Bosnia, decided to execute a military 
operation against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia after all peaceful 
                                                 
1
 Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, 2002, p.2 
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negotiations had failed. The NATO bombing aka Operation Allied Force lasted 
until June 10, 1999 when the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244, 
beginning the phase of UNMIK, the United Nations Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo, with the OSCE mission in Kosovo (OMIK) representing its 
Pillar III: Democratization and institution building.    
 
I have always had a strong interest in political developments occurring on the 
ground of former Yugoslavia. Although I grew up in Slovenia, the pictures of war-
torn regions in Croatia, bloodshed in Bosnia and Kosovo were for us Slovenians, 
only present on TV. As terrible as it might sound, those horrific pictures were part 
of my everyday evening TV schedule that after some time became normality. 
First it was The Fresh Prince from Bel-Air, then cartoons and then news from 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only as I grew older, it became clear to me that those 
pictures were not from a land far away, but were occurring just some hundreds of 
kilometres away from my hometown. During my studies at the University of 
Vienna, I have taken quite a few classes on former Yugoslavia, because I wanted 
to understand the background and the complexity of the conflicts.  However, I 
have found Kosovo very intriguing because it seems to me like the last battle 
field, the final frontier of Yugoslavia’s dissolution.  
 
From November 2007 until July 2008, I worked as an intern at the Permanent 
Mission of the Republic of Slovenia to the OSCE in Vienna during the Slovenian 
Presidency of the EU Council and every Thursday at the OSCE Permanent 
Council meetings I had the opportunity to follow verbal battles between Serbia 
and Russia, on one side, and the USA on the other, combined with the OSCE 
Secretary General emphasizing the importance of compliance with international 
standards and peaceful mediations. Moreover, as unprofessional and unscientific 
as it may come across, the Republic of Kosovo declared independence on 
February 17, 2008 which happens to be my birthday. After completing my 
internship, I had the interest and motivation to examine in practice what the 
standards before status approach of the OSCE means. I felt that the time was 
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right for me to explore the work of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK). I spent 
September 2008 working as an intern at the OMIK in the Central Coordination 
Unit in Pristina. During that month I had the opportunity to get insider’s 
perspectives on the OSCE’s objectives and commitments in the region, its 
structure, work methodology and everyday tasks.  
 
1.1. The Aim of the Thesis and Research Questions 
The aim of my thesis is not to examine or pass judgements on any historic 
events or political occurrances in Kosovo. My goal is to describe, analyse, 
evaluate and to compare the role of the OSCE in Kosovo in the fields of 
democratization, governance, monitoring, protection and promotion of human 
rights. I want to take a closer look into the sustainable democracy building 
process in Kosovo and I wish to understand the influence, impact and effect the 
presence of the OSCE has had on the process. Therefore, the research 
questions that I seek to answer in this thesis are:  
 
What is the role of the OSCE in Kosovo in the areas of democratization, 
governance, monitoring, protection and promotion of human rights? 
 
What are the key efforts of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo? What are its main 
challenges? 
 
Do the OSCE’s approach, tools and methodology have any advantages or 
disadvantages in comparison to other international actors involved in the 
sustainable democracy building process in Kosovo? 
 
1.2. Methodology of the Research Approach 
For the realization of my project I decided to proceed according to the method of 
qualitative research. John Creswell defines qualitative research as “an inquiry 
process of understanding based on distinct methodological traditions of inquiry 
that explore a social or human problem. The research builds a complex, holistic 
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pictures, analyses words, reports detailed views of informants, and conducted 
the study in natural setting.”2 In brief, I will collect the data, then analyse it and in 
the final stages, I shall write about my findings. 
My investigation shall therefore consist of: 
 seeking answers to my research questions 
 systematically using a predefined set of procedures to answer the 
questions 
 collecting evidence 
 producing findings that were determined in advance 
 producing findings that are applicable beyond the immediate boundaries 
of the study3  
 
I realize that I have to make myself familiar with several forms of literature to 
successfully start with my research, including: 
 methodological literature in order to figure out how to do my research and 
what methods should I use to properly examine the subject matter 
 theoretical literature in order to understand the meaning of the terms I will 
use and to put those terms into an applicable theoretical framework 
 empirical literature to find out what has already been written on my 
research topic 
 theoretical and empirical literature in order to put my theoretical 
knowledge and empirical findings into a suitable context4 
 
If I want to comprehend the role of the OSCE in the fields of democratization, 
governance, monitoring, protection and promotion of human rights, I need to put 
the terms – the OSCE as an international organization, democratization, 
governance and human rights into an analytical and systematic theoretical 
                                                 
2
 John W. CRESWELL, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five 
Traditions, 1998, p.15 
3
 Family Health International, Qualitative Research Methods: A Data Collector's Field Guide  
4
 See Uwe FLICK, In Introduction to Qualitative Research, 2009, p.48 
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framework. Therefore my first step will be reading, examining and analysing texts 
written on democratization, governance and human rights.  
Texts play according to Flick three key roles in the process of qualitative 
research. They are: 
 the essential data on which findings are based 
 the basis of interpretations 
 the central medium for presenting and communication findings5 
 
Therefore my research will be based on “understanding social realities through 
the interpretation of texts.”6 The texts I shall interpret will be both primary and 
secondary sources. However, for my theoretical part I will carefully examine more 
primary sources and as for my empirical part, analysing the role of the OSCE in 
Kosovo, I will need to study more secondary sources – various UNMIK, OSCE 
and OMIK reports, as well as newspaper and magazine articles. Above all, in this 
virtual day and age, I know I will find a lot of material needed for my research on 
the internet.   
Part of my data collection will also be conducting expert interviews, for which I 
will need to acknowledge the principles of interviewing, construct an interview, 
decide on an appropriate interview technique and find the right person for the 
interview. I will use the guided expert interviews, because I will select my 
participants according to their expert status and knowledge. They will have to 
have a professional function at the OSCE mission in Kosovo and consequently 
have expertise in the fields that are the focus of my research. After the interviews 
have been conducted, I will collect the data, transcribe the interviews and make a 
text ready for the interpretation of reality. 
In addition, during the whole process I will follow the traditional research criteria 
of validity, reliability and objectivity.7    
 
 
                                                 
5
 Uwe FLICK, In Introduction to Qualitative Research, 2009, p.75 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Ibid, p.385 
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1.3. Hypothesis 
Based on the knowledge about the OSCE and its activities that I have acquired 
during my internship at the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Slovenia to the 
OSCE in Vienna and my one-month internship at the OMIK, I presuppose that 
the OSCE has well functioning mechanisms and tools, as well as clearly stated 
obligations and commitments for democracy building. My hypothesis is that the 
mission in Kosovo is no exception. The OSCE tries its best efforts, but I know 
that there have been some budgetary and staffing constraints that hinder the 
workflow.  
Since there were practically no democratic institutions before the war, the OSCE 
in Kosovo started to build Kosovo’s democratic structures from scratch. Due to 
this fact, the presence of the OSCE in Kosovo in the fields of democratization, 
governance, monitoring, protection and promotion of human rights has been of 
the utmost importance for the people of Kosovo. But this task certainly did not 
come without its risks. The mission in Kosovo is the OSCE’s largest mission until 
now and this factor must have also played a crucial role.  
 
1.4. Thesis Design 
The thesis is divided into ten chapters, but it is basically combined of two parts. It 
begins with the theoretical framework of the subject matter examined and ends 
with the empirical evaluation of the subject matter. 
Chapter 1 serves as the guide for this thesis and introduces the topic, the aim of 
the thesis, research questions, methodology of the research approach, the 
hypothesis and the thesis design.   
The theoretical framework begins with Chapter 2 that examines the term 
international organization. It summarizes the history of international 
organizations, identifies and classifies the term and explains the theories of three 
major schools of international organizations: the realist, the institutionalist and the 
idealist school. 
Chapter 3 continues with theoretical knowledge on democracy and 
democratization. Such a multilayered and complex notion demands many 
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different approaches and perspectives. For that reason, this chapter gives a brief 
overview on Held’s, Dahl’s, Schiller’s, Diamond’s, Linz’s and Lipset’s thoughts on 
democracy, as well as an introduction into preconditions for democracy, the 
process of democratization and transition to democracy.   
Chapter 4 focuses on the theories on governance from various perspectives, 
such as public administration, international relations, comparative politics and 
international development agencies. It also examines the term good governance. 
Chapter 5 outlines the theoretical and philosophical background of human rights. 
It explains the idea of human rights according to communitarian pragmatists, 
cosmopolitan pragmatists, liberal natural rights theorists and/or universalists and 
traditional communitarianists and/or cultural relativists. In addition, it addresses 
the principles of universal human rights. 
Chapter 6 gives an overview on the OSCE’s history, structure, institutions and 
decision-making bodies. 
Chapter 7 investigates the history of Kosovo. It puts under the microscope the 
events and occurrences prior to the 20th century, the 20th century and recent 
history. 
Chapter 8 provides empirical analysis on the presence of the OSCE in Kosovo. It 
examines the work and deficiencies of the CSCE Mission of Long Duration, the 
incidents that let to the establishment of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, 
as well as the work and challenges of the KVM. Furthermore, it displays an 
extensive overview on the OMIK’s tasks, mandate, structure and activities. 
Chapter 9 presents the objectives, work and efforts of other international players 
such as UNMIK and EULEX on the territory of Kosovo. It also analyses the 
United States’ relations with Kosovo.  
Chapter 10 concludes the thesis with a thorough analysis and evaluation of the 
role of the OSCE in Kosovo in the fields of democratization, governance and 
human rights. My findings are also backed by the judgments of two experts who 
worked at the OMIK, Melissa Stone, former Chief of the Human Rights Section 
and Ambassador Tim Guldimann, former Head of Mission. 
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2. International Organizations 
2.1. The Beginnings of International Organizations 
International organizations are relatively new phenomena in the world’s political 
sphere.8 Although they play a momentous and irrefutable role nowadays, they 
initially emerged in the 19th century and slowly gained in importance in the 20th 
century. The Concert of Europe that stemmed from the Congress in Vienna 
(1814-1815) is generally considered the forerunner of today’s international 
organizations.9 Its members (the Austrian Empire, the Kingdom of Prussia, the 
Russian Empire, the United Kingdom and later France) joined forces to facilitate 
peaceful conflict resolutions, discuss the security of the states and regulate 
international coordination in many areas. It was not a strict international 
organization according to our standards now, but it was involved in status and 
security issues of the states. The Concert existed until the First World War and it 
is now seen as a “prototype of international governmental organization in the 
security field”.10 After the First World War, an intergovernmental organization - 
the League of Nations (LON) emerged from the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 
as a result of the horrors of the War and as a proposal from many non-
governmental peace organizations from several countries to establish a world 
peace organization. These peace organizations advocated peaceful conflict 
management and eventually persuaded governments to realize that war could be 
prevented with the help of international peace mechanisms. The League of 
Nations was established to strengthen international security and peace and to 
prevent major wars. The League did not consist only of the major European 
powers as the Concert of Europe did, but also smaller European states and other 
countries worldwide. The main body of the League was the Council with its 
permanent members – Britain, France, Italy, Japan and later Germany and the 
Soviet Union and non-permanent members elected by the Assembly. Despite its 
                                                 
8
 See Volker Rittberger & Bernhard Zangl, International Organization. Polity, Politics and Policies, 2006,  
p.3 
9
 See Armstrong, Lloyd & Redmond,  From Versailles to Maastricht: International organisation in the 
twentieth century, 1996, p.4 
10
 Jacobson, Networks of Interdependence, in: Volker Rittberger & Bernhard Zangl, International 
Organization. Polity, Politics and Policies, 2006,  p.26 
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improved institutional structure in comparison to the Concert, the League left the 
importance of states’ sovereignty untouched.11 Furthermore, the League did not 
properly respond as member states went to war or exercised their expanding 
ambitions. Evidently its deficient mechanisms could not prevent the Second 
World War, so it was dissolved after the War in 1946. The League’s structural 
problems were solved by introducing a new international organization that should 
prevent potential wars since the governments around the world finally recognized 
that humankind cannot afford yet another war. The time and the mindset of the 
people were right for the establishment of the United Nations. In 1945, the UN 
Charter was signed by 51 states. Today the United Nations is the most significant 
global organization with 192 member states. In addition, “the foundation of the 
United Nations after the Second World War triggered the mushrooming of 
international organizations of the most disparate kinds, and that expansion is still 
continuing today.”12                             
 
2.2. Defining International Organizations 
The term “international organization” was introduced into the vocabulary quite   
recently. The word organization is often used as the word institution, since 
international relations are not random and chaotic, but for the most part 
organized.13 This means that we can identify one form of the organization of 
international relations as international institutions. According to Duverger, 
institutions are “the collective forms or basic structures of social organization as 
established by law or by human tradition.”14 In compliance with this definition, an 
international organization stands for a form of institution with formal rules and 
objectives. It is “a rationalized administrative instrument.”15 It has “a formal 
technical and material organization: constitutions, local chapters, physical 
equipment, machines, emblems, letterhead stationery, a staff, an administrative 
                                                 
11
 See Volker Rittberger & Bernhard Zangl, International Organization. Polity, Politics and 
Policies, 2006,  p.27 
12
 Volker Rittberger & Bernhard Zangl, International Organization. Polity, Politics and Policies, 
2006,  p.4 
13
 See Clive Archer, International Organizations, 1992, p.2 
14
 M. Duverger, The Study of Politics, 1972, p.68 
15
 P. Selznick, Leadership in Administration, 1957, p.8  
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hierarchy and so forth”16 Furthermore, Inis Claude depicted international 
organization as a process, stating that “international organizations are 
representative aspects of the phase of that process which has been reached at a 
given time.”17 In practice, the term international organization was indirectly used 
by the League of Nations. Article 23 of its Covenant suggested an establishment 
of a special “international organization” for the promotion of international 
cooperation. Later on, the ILO was created as a consequence of this article. 
However, a true and comprehensive concept of international organization was 
widely accepted only after the Second World War. Also the organizations 
themselves started to adopt the term “international organization”.18 The Preamble 
of the United Nations Charter states that the signatories “do thereby establish an 
international organization to be known as the United Nations.”19  
According to Rittberger and Zangl, international organizations are “neither the 
continuation of traditional power politics, albeit with new means, nor the 
expression of an evolutionary process leading to the formation of a global or 
regional super state. They simply allow states to broach problems they have in 
common, some uniting them and some dividing them, in a collective decision-
making process.”20  
 
2.3. Classifying International Organizations 
There are three major conceptions of international organizations: that of 
instrument, arena and actor.21 Presumably, the most common image of an 
international organization is that of an instrument with members that strive for 
their own interests and use the organization to pursue their particular ambitions. 
The second image implies that international organizations are seen as arenas or 
forums. According to this conception, an international organization provides a 
                                                 
16
 M. Duverger, The Study of Politics, 1972, p.68 
17
 Inis Claude, Swords into Plowshares, 1964, p.4 
18
 See Volker Rittberger & Bernhard Zangl, International Organization. Polity, Politics and 
Policies, 2006, p.5-6 
19
 Preamble of the United Nations Charter 
20
 Volker Rittberger & Bernhard Zangl, International Organization. Polity, Politics and Policies, 
2006,  p.3 
21
 See Clive Archer, International Organizations, 1992, p.135 
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platform or a meeting place for members to discuss, exchange their ideas, argue 
or disagree on certain issues, coordinate their strategies and condemn or justify 
particular actions. The third role of international organizations is that of an 
independent actor. In this view, members or states “have either pooled or 
delegated their sovereignty so that international organizations themselves 
embody the characteristics of a corporate actor.”22 However, Clive Archer 
emphasized that the crucial word in this conception is “independent”. If the word 
“independent” means that international organizations function without being 
influenced by outside forces then there are not many organizations which can 
fulfil this criterion. If it signifies that they act as autonomous actors, then, as 
postulated by Karl Deutsch, their “responses are not predicated, even from the 
most thorough knowledge of environment” and they “possess a stable and 
coherent decision-making machinery within its boundaries.”23 If we stick with this 
definition of an international organization as an independent actor, then many 
international organizations comply with this description.24    
Perhaps the most common distinction between international organizations is a 
division between intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and international non-
governmental organizations (INGOs). The distinction comes about due to 
different members. IGOs members are states or usually government’s 
representatives of member states, whereas INGOs members are non-
governmental actors. Nevertheless, there are some cases of mixed membership. 
The IGOs are organizations such as the UN, the WTO, the EU or the OSCE. The 
most recognized INGOs are Amnesty International, Greenpeace, etc.25  
Moreover, Rittberger and Zangl constructed two typologies regarding the 
analytical classification of international governmental organizations. For the first 
criteria they took into consideration the membership and competencies of 
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international organizations. Membership can be open or restricted. On one side, 
the UN family certainly stands for universality of membership. Even if universal 
membership is quite rare, a state is not permanently excluded from an 
organization’s activities. On the other side, membership can be restricted on 
account of geographical, economic or cultural specifications. The EU and the 
OSCE have restricted membership. Furthermore, the competencies of 
international organizations outline the second variable. International 
organizations can have comprehensive or rather specific limited competencies. 
Organizations such as the UN and the EU have a multitude of various work 
areas, but some others like the IAEA or OPEC have very issue-specific 
competencies.26 I would suggest that the OSCE stands somewhere in the 
middle. It has a specific goal to ensure and promote security and cooperation in 
Europe, but within this framework it operates in many different issues’ areas. The 
following figure demonstrates a matrix showing the above-mentioned dimensions 
of international organizations.  
 
Figure 1: International organization (typology I) 
 
Source: Adapted from Harold Jacobson, Networks of Interdependence: International 
Organizations and the Global Political System, 1984, p.12 in: Volker Rittberger & Bernhard Zangl, 
International Organization. Polity, Politics and Policies, 2006, p.10 
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Nonetheless, classifying IGOs in regard to membership and competencies is 
considered only the beginning of the analysis since there are other fundamental 
dimensions such as function, decision-making authority and degree of decision-
making authority that also need to be taken into account.27 The functional 
dimension concentrates on the key goal of an international organization and 
divides IGOs into two groups – programme organizations and operational 
organizations.  Programme organizations focus on programme formulation and 
establishment of particular norms and rules. Contrary to programme 
organizations, operational organizations deal with the implementation of certain 
norms and rules, usually monitoring or verifying the compliance with these 
regulations. Rittberger and Zangl suggested that the UN and the OSCE are 
categorized as programme organizations and the IMF, the World Bank and the 
IAEA are examples of operational organizations.28 A further distinction among 
international organizations comes about due to their different decision-making 
authorities. Programme organizations deal primarily with the obligations of their 
members that can be strongly or loosely binding, whereas operational 
organizations are concerned with the members’ capacity for implementation. 
These operational organizations can again have strong or weak implementation 
powers. Lastly, the degree to which member states pool or delegate decision-
making authority also draws a distinction between international organizations. 
For example, an intergovernmental organizations’ task is to support “the 
intergovernmental self-cooperation of national decision-making units.”29 The 
authority of such organization is neither pooled nor delegated while national 
autonomy and sovereignty of its members stay intact. In addition, decisions in 
intergovernmental organizations are made by consensus among all members. 
On the other hand, supranational organizations have centralized and more 
hierarchical decision-making procedures. National governments are still involved 
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in the decision-making process, yet a consensus among participating states is 
not always required. The next table distinctly indicates the second typology of 
international organizations with its three dimensions: function, authority and 
delegation.  
Table 1: International Organizations (typology II) 
Function Authority Delegation Example 
 
 
Programme 
organizations 
Strongly binding 
Intergovernmental United Nations 
Supranational EU 
Loosely binding 
Intergovernmental OSCE 
Supranational IWC 
 
 
Operational 
organizations 
Strong in 
implementation 
Intergovernmental OPEC 
Supranational IMF World Bank 
Weak in 
implementation 
Intergovernmental ICO 
Supranational UNHCR 
Source: Adapted from Volker Rittberger & Bernhard Zangl, International Organization. Polity, 
Politics and Policies, 2006, p.11 
According to this typology, the OSCE is an intergovernmental programme 
organization with a loosely binding authority. 
2.4. Theories of International Organization 
The three dominant schools of international relations have different perceptions 
about the structures and actors in international relations and consequently their 
own assumptions about the causes and impacts of international organizations on 
global politics. The following table demonstrates the three dominant schools of 
thought in international relations and their doctrines. 
  Table 2: Theories of international organizations 
Realist school Institutionalist school Idealist school 
Realism 
 
 
 
 
 
Neo-realism 
Federalism 
Functionalism 
Neo-functionalism 
Transactionalism 
Interdependence analysis 
 
Neo-institutionalism 
Normative idealism 
 
 
 
 
 
Social 
constructivism 
Source: Adapted from Volker Rittberger & Bernhard Zangl, International Organization. Polity, 
Politics and Policies, 2006, p.14 
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2.4.1. The Realist School 
Realists argue that there is “no common authority over and above the sovereign 
state”30 meaning that the state is the key actor in an anarchical international 
system. Since it is in our human nature to strive for power, the states themselves 
also continuously struggle for power. This struggle can sometimes result in the 
use of force or war, but due to the absence of a supranational authority, there is 
nobody stopping the states. Every state takes care of its own security by 
exercising power maximization which signifies that they are caught in a 
permanent struggle of all against all. In the realist view, international 
organizations cannot prevent these clashes as they cannot alter the anarchical 
character of the international system. Realists believe that powerful states take 
advantage of international organizations and used them to pursue their own 
ambitions and self-interests. Therefore international organizations in the eyes of 
realists play rather a modest role in the quest for power and peace in the world. 
Realists claim that international organizations’ contribution should not be 
overstated. 
Neo-realism carries on the legacy of realism, but takes into account the rise of 
new transnational and non-state elements in international relations. Neo-realists 
no longer believe that it is in our human nature to strive for power. The real 
reason for the power maximization of the states lies in the anarchical structure of 
the international system. These circumstances make the states act security-
oriented, because they strive for survival. Like realists, neo-realists believe that 
international organizations are ineffective and their contribution to international 
cooperation is rather meaningless. The states are reluctant to engage in 
international cooperation, because they do not want other states to profit from 
such coordination more than they do. However, international cooperation can 
only function if one of the states involved has superior power and can handle the 
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gains of other states. This state is characterized as a hegemonic power and such 
condition is called a hegemony condition.31           
 
2.4.2. The Institutionalist School 
Institutionalists or liberal institutionalists also perceive the international political 
sphere as an anarchic system. Nevertheless, according to institutionalism, actors 
in international politics act rationally and are not entirely focusing on gaining 
power as realists argue. On the same note, the states’ involvement in 
international cooperation occurs rationally. The states might have different 
interests, so called interest constellations, but they realize that through 
international cooperation they can enjoy collective gains and avoid collective 
losses. However, these interdependent relations are quite complex and cause 
problems that one state alone cannot solve. Even super powers depend on other 
states, a condition that supports an inevitable establishment of cooperative 
relationships within the framework of international organizations.32 
Federalism is the oldest doctrine and places stress on the creation of 
confederate and federal states. Confederations or federations are usually created 
through a rational decision with a view to establish a common order, but still to 
respect the identity of a single state. 
Functionalism, however, does not believe in federalist unions. It argues that due 
to the evolution of modern societies, states have developed unavoidable 
interdependent relationships. Everyday functions of social life are no longer 
carried out within a sovereign state. They cross the borders and frontiers and in 
order to be overseen and to solve problems resulting from these relationships, 
international organizations come into existence. 
Furthermore, neo-functionalism moves away from traditional beliefs of 
functionalism that emphasizes technological progress causing interdependence 
and the state-centric idea of international organizations. The neo-functionalists 
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analysis is focused on European integration and the interdependence of politics 
and economy. They argue that challenges occurring on account of 
interdependence cannot only be solved in the framework of international 
organizations, but they also strengthen political integration. In addition, not only 
specific functions are likely to be carried out beyond the national level, but also 
decisions about these functions are made beyond the national level.      
Transactionalism is largely connected to works of Karl Deutsch and his “security 
community.” Whereas neo-functionalists stress the importance of supranational 
organizations and the elites sustaining them, transactionalism concentrates on 
relations between peoples. People with common values strive for peace and the 
absence of war, hence the existence of security communities that can eliminate 
the use of force and war. Good communication and numerous transactions also 
contribute to functioning security communities that are supported by international 
organizations. 
Interdependence analysis also recognizes the perpetual growth of complex 
interdependent relations and therefore the importance of international 
organizations. However, unlike functionalists, scholars of interdependence 
believe that the creation of international organizations depends greatly on the 
balance of power (in regard to a specific issue area and not military power) and 
the mutual responsiveness of states. 
Within the institutionalist doctrine, neo-institutionalism has become the dominant 
one. It is based on classical liberal institutionalism, but as a matter of course it 
takes into consideration new developments in international politics. Neo-
institutionalism argues that complex interdependent relations do not 
automatically cause the establishment of an international organization, but it 
acknowledges the significant role they play nowadays on the international 
political sphere. International institutions can successfully facilitate the 
20 
 
cooperation between the states regardless of an existing hegemonic power 
state.33              
 
2.4.3. The Idealist School 
The idealist school differs from realism and institutionalism in its concepts of 
action and structure of international organizations. The school believes that 
values and norms dictate the action of actors, their interests as well as an 
ideational structure.  
Normative idealism argues that societies - not states are the key players of 
international politics. The premise of normative idealism states that humans are 
moral actors who not only follow their quest for power, but also follow their ideals, 
values and norms. Thus, a society that consists of moral actors, navigates in 
international politics in accordance with these ideals, values and norms. As 
societies might have different ideals and sometimes competing values, they tend 
to have a common normative ground such as living together in peace. From an 
idealist view point international organizations help promoting common ideals and 
values. They serve as the representative of common values and as the 
advocates of the norms.   
Following the idealist tradition, social constructivism also claims that social actors 
act according to their interests as well as their common values and norms. Social 
actors at the same time take into consideration what they might get from their 
actions and what is applicable with societies’ ideals, values and norms. Just like 
normative idealism, social constructivism also believes that international 
organizations have two roles, that of the representative and that of the advocate 
of shared values. However, social constructivists argue that the establishment of 
an international organization depends on a cognitive agreement, a consensus 
per se. Problems tackled within an international organization can be viewed 
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differently by different societies. If there is no common perception of problems, 
an international organization cannot work effectively.34  
3. Democracy and Democratization 
Democratization is a process towards a more democratic political regime. It is a 
transition to democracy. However, to understand democratization and its 
conditions and measurements, we need to clarify the notion of democracy. What 
is democracy? Abraham Lincoln defined democracy as a government of the 
people, by the people, for the people. In brief, it is a political model of 
government where the power to rule comes from the people. Yet any further 
ascertainments about democracy are debatable and have formed discussions in 
scholars’ circles for centuries. Today we can be certain that democracy depends 
on many complex elements.  
 
3.1. Defining Democracy 
There are two basic conceptions of the term democracy. A narrow concept 
postulated by Joseph Schumpeter and a comprehensive concept represented by 
David Held.  
 
3.1.1. Schumpeter’s Thoughts on Democracy 
Joseph Schumpeter believed that democracy indicates a political system in 
which the people can choose their political leadership. In this sense, democracy 
means having the possibility to elect a political representative. If the citizens are 
not pleased with their choice of political leader, they can replace or vote him/her 
off. Schumpeter claimed that “the democratic method is that institutional 
arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the 
power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.”35 This 
is a procedural definition of democracy. 
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3.1.2. Held’s Thoughts on Democracy 
David Held introduced in contrast to Schumpeter a comprehensive notion of 
democracy. He stated that the principle of autonomy represents the core of 
democracy. He called this principle a democratic autonomy. Democratic 
autonomy presumes that we enjoy equal rights as well as obligations. The 
political framework enables and limits our opportunities. We are free to search 
and determine the conditions of our lives as long as we do not fall out of the 
framework and hurt the rights of others. Democratic autonomy necessitates an 
accountable state and a democratic civil society. This goes beyond the simple 
casting of a vote. It also includes social and economic rights, thus suggesting 
that democracy is also a social and economic system, not only political. “Without 
tough social and economic rights, rights of the state could not be fully enjoyed; 
and without state rights new forms of inequality of power, wealth and statues 
could systematically disrupt the implementation of social and economic 
liberties.”36   
 
3.1.3. Dahl’s Thoughts on Democracy 
Robert A. Dahl was more specific in defining democracy. He categorized 
democracy as a concept of a political system. The democratic government 
according to Dahl treats citizens as political equals. The citizens have 
possibilities to (1), establish their preferences, (2) announce their preferences to 
other citizens and the government either individually or collectively, (3) their 
preferences are equally examined by the government. Nevertheless, the 
following institutional postulates influence our opportunities in a significant 
manner:  
 
1. Elected officials have a constitutional right to exercise power over decision 
and policy making 
2. Free and fair elections are performed frequently and fairly through which 
officials are chosen 
3. Inclusive suffrage for basically all adults  
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4. Basically all adults have the right to run for office although the time of 
holding office is usually limited  
5. All citizens should enjoy freedom of expression without fearing severe 
punishment. All citizens can express their opinion on politics, religion, 
ideology, social and the economic system…  
6. All citizens are entitled to alternative information and the sources of 
alternative information are protected by laws. 
7. All citizens hold the right to associational autonomy, establishing 
independent (political) associations, societies, clubs, unions or 
organizations.37 
 
Once all postulates are respected and well executed, a political democracy has 
been achieved.  
 
3.1.4. Schiller’s Thoughts on Democracy 
Theo Schiller put together a list of five principles of democracy: basic human 
rights, openness of power structure, political equality, transparency and 
rationality, and political efficiency and effectiveness. He delineated an “ideal type” 
of democracy in order for the “real democracies” to measure their 
“democraticness”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37
 Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, 1989, p.221 
24 
 
Table 3: Principles of democracy 
 
Level: 
 
Principles: 
micro: 
individual citizens 
meso: 
social and political 
groups and 
organizations 
macro: 
political system, 
institutions 
Basic human rights 
 
personal rights, legal 
protection, freedom of 
opinion 
 
freedom of 
organization, 
protection of 
minorities 
limited state power, 
independence of 
judiciary, rule of law 
Openness of power 
structure 
 
free access to political 
communication and 
political power, rights 
of control 
organizational 
pluralism, elite 
pluralism 
separation of powers, 
limited terms of office, 
mutual checks and 
balances 
Political equality 
 
equality of voting 
rights, equality of 
political recruitment 
equal opportunity for 
organizational 
recourses 
equal opportunity in 
the electoral system 
Transparency and 
rationality 
 
plurality of sources of 
information, chances 
for political education 
 
independence and 
plurality of the media, 
critical public 
transparency of the 
decision-making 
processes, rational 
discourses, 
documented 
bureaucratic 
procedures  
Political efficiency and 
effectiveness 
political interest, 
political participation, 
civic competence 
effective aggregation 
of interests, 
mobilization of 
political support  
effective decision-
making rules and 
institutional balance, 
sufficient resources 
Source: Adapted from Schiller, 1999, p. 33 in: Dirk Berg-Schlosser, ed., Democratization, State of 
Art, 2004, p.60  
 
Schiller described the principle of political equality as the most democratic one 
since “each citizen is the source of all legitimacy and has the right to participate 
in decision-making.”38 
 
3.1.5. Diamond’s, Linz’s and Lipset’s Thoughts on Democracy 
Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Lipset defined the concept of 
“democracy” in terms of a political system as well. They believed that democracy 
should be examined solely as a governmental structure and be separated from 
economic and social structures. According to Diamond, Linz and Lipset the 
following essential conditions should be applied:  
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1. Purposeful and lengthy competition between individuals and groups such 
as political parties for governmental positions, at established intervals and 
without coercion   
2. A comprehensive political participation when choosing political leaders or 
voting for policies through fair and regular elections. No one should be 
excluded.  
3. Civil and political liberties ranging from the freedom of expression to free 
media, formation of interest groups to joining an organization39 
 
3.2. Preconditions of Democracy 
The majority of scholars argue that democratization itself is influenced by various 
factors, including economic development, social and cultural conditions. Seymour 
Lipset once stated that “the more well-do-to a nation, the greater the chances 
that it will sustain democracy”.40 He suggested that economic wealth positively 
boosts democratization, because it also generates modernization, higher 
education level, literacy rate, establishment of mass media and other democratic 
features. Robert Dahl concurred that “the higher the socioeconomic level of a 
country, the more likely it was to be a democracy”.41 However, there have been 
some examples of countries with authoritarian rule in the past such as Argentina, 
Taiwan and South Korea where massive modernization took place, but the 
regime was not democratic. The economic development is likely to produce 
democracy, but not always. 
Secondly, there must be a certain level of political culture with an advanced 
system of beliefs and values that ascertain meaningful political actions. 
Sometimes embedded ideology encourages democratic progress whereas 
sometimes it works against it. Georg Sørensen wrote that cultures that support 
hierarchy, authority and intolerance tend to impede democracy.   
Thirdly, the social structure of society plays an important role whether a certain 
country encourages democratization or rather hinders it. Some social groups that 
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have normally been associated with favouring democracy are middle or working 
classes and industrial bourgeoisie. Even Barrington Moore’s famous quote says 
"No bourgeois, no democracy"42. Western style democracy indeed sprung from a 
bourgeois revolution, but a large working class that communist/socialist regimes 
produced contradicts his statement.  
In addition, there are also some other factors that determine democratic growth 
in certain countries. Nowadays, geopolitics and economic dependence of 
underdeveloped countries on the international community constitute the 
democratic state of a country. In Kosovo those two elements prevailed as well.43  
 
3.3. Process of Democratization 
Democratization marks the change in a political system towards more democratic 
forms of rule. Dahl distinguishes two crucial paths towards democracy. The first 
path calls for increased participation or inclusiveness and implies that more 
citizens enjoy political rights and liberties. In a democratic system every adult has 
a right to vote and has an equal opportunity to enjoy liberties. A second path, 
competition or liberalization, corresponds to the availability of those rights and 
liberties to citizens. If a political system is increasingly liberalizing, the chances 
for political opposition to compete for power also increase.  
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The subsequent figure by Dahl emphasizes the importance of both, rising 
participation and competition. 
 
 
Figure 2: Dimensions of democratization 
 
Source: Adapted from Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, 1971, p.7 
Dahl used the example of four countries: Burma, South Africa, the USSR and 
Denmark. The military dictatorship of Burma failed to secure participation and 
liberalization for its own citizens. A South African white minority enjoyed all rights 
and liberties, but the black majority was prohibited to participate. Nowadays, in a 
democratic post-apartheid South Africa, the increase followed in terms of 
participation. In the former Soviet Union, all citizens were entitled to vote, but 
there was only the Communist party to choose from. A present enhanced 
liberalization brought a more democratic rule to Russia. Denmark, as any other 
North European country, celebrates internationally the highest level of 
democracy. Every adult citizen enjoys full political rights and liberties.  
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3.4. Transition towards democracy 
The transition process from a non-democracy (or a less democratic regime) to 
democratic rule is a complex development with several phases. It is very difficult 
to determine when a certain phase begins and when it ends. These phases 
usually interweaved or encroached on each other. Generally a transition towards 
democratic rule begins with a “crisis” that leads to a breakdown. If a crisis causes 
a break of an authoritarian regime, the installation of free elections and a new 
government is required. This represents just the origins of democracy. Further 
“democratic deepening” is necessary to overcome the stages of a fragile and 
restricted democracy. It takes time for a country to call itself a sustainable 
democracy. There are many obstacles on the democratic journey and lots of 
setbacks. Democratization is not a linear process. It has its ups and downs and it 
has a rather seesaw motion.  
Figure 3: Transitions toward democracy 
 
Source: Based on Dankwart Rustow, Transitions to Democracy, 1970; in Georg Sørensen, 
Democracy and Democratization, 2008, p.47 
These model sums up the key phases of democratization. Nevertheless, a 
breakdown of a non-democratic regime does not always lead to a democratic 
consolidated democracy. Dankwart Rustow claimed that the basic condition for 
democratization to start its course is national unity. By national unity he meant 
“the vast majority of citizens in a democracy-to-be” that “have no doubt or mental 
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reservations as to which political community they belong to.”44  But if we look at 
an example such as Kosovo, there was no national unity to begin with. Ethic 
cleavage in Kosovo represented an enormous issue. Rustow believed that such 
problems should be resolved beforehand; otherwise a transition towards 
democracy is impossible. He claimed that national unity is the only precondition 
for a democratic process, denying the necessity of advanced social and 
economic preconditions.   
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4. Theory of Governance 
The theoretical and practical concepts of governance have gained in popularity in 
recent years due to a significant change in the organization of political power. In 
general, it is safe to say that governance is a broader notion of government. 
Athur Benz and Yannis Papadopoulos described this transformation “a shift from 
´government´ to ´governance´.” They believe that “governance has become the 
prevailing mode of political regulation in our wealthy, functionally differentiated, 
multicultural and democratic societies.”45 Nevertheless, academics and scholars 
from different disciplines still cannot agree on a single, universal definition of 
governance. 
 
4.1. Defining Governance 
Although there seems to be no generally accepted definition of governance, 
James Rosenau argued that “governance is a set of regulation mechanisms in a 
sphere of activity, which function effectively even though they are not endowed 
with formal authority.”46 Furthermore, Goran Hyden, Julius Court and Kenneth 
Mease implied that all the different concepts can be put together into two 
groupings: a substantive content of governance and governance in practice. 
Along the first grouping, two further distinctions can be made. There are those 
who believe that governance is determined by a set of rules on how to conduct 
public affairs, meaning that it functions within institutional determinants. Others 
claim that governance allegorizes the steering of public affairs and focuses on 
how choices get implemented. Along the second line, academics differ between 
governance as a process and governance as a performance. The former concept 
argues that governance represents an activity that controls the process by which 
the results are achieved. The latter concept reasons that we can see 
governance’s intervention in human intentions and actions.  
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Court, Hyden and Mease noted that from the perspective of public administration 
and international development agencies, governance steers our society. 
However, scholars of public administration believe that governance is process-
related, whereas those who speak in favour of governance from the perspective 
of international development agencies argue that governance is based on 
results. Representatives of international relations and comparative politics both 
claim that governance rests on rules. Nevertheless, scholars of international 
relations characterize governance as a process, while scholars of comparative 
politics perceive it rather as a performance.   
Court, Hyden and Mease postulated a figure defining four major positions on how 
governance has been used.  
 
Figure 4: Different uses of the governance concept 
 
Source: Adapted from Julius Court, Goran Hyden, Kenneth Mease, Making Sense of Governance, 2004, 
p.13 
 
4.1.1. Governance from the Perspective of Public Administration 
Advocates of public administration started to use the concept of governance 
once they realized that formulating and implementing policies have crossed the 
conventional jurisdictional confines of administration. Policy making necessitates 
the cooperation of various organizations. They believe that governance consists 
of measures that steer and control society and that it forms a process influenced 
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by governmental and non-governmental organizations. In short, governance 
represents institutional patterns that arise from the interactions of these 
organizations. 
European scholars, as well as their counterparts in the United States, have 
ascertained that “governance links the values and interest of citizens, legislative 
choice, executive and organizational structures and roles, and a judicial oversight 
in a manner that suggests interrelationships among them that might have 
significant consequences for performance.”47 Thus governance crosses 
conventional boundaries and enables public administrators to function out of the 
normal organizational framework. In addition, from the perspective of public 
administration, collaborative interactions between different organizations bring 
better results.    
 
4.1.2. Governance from the Perspective of International Relations 
The concept of governance first appeared in the international relations literature 
after the collapse of communism and the end of the bipolar world order. 
Governance in international relations is subjected to rules, norms and 
behavioural patterns. Furthermore, it is a process that involves interdependence 
(participation, negotiation and cooperation) of different national and international 
actors at various levels. At least, a constructivist approach seems to support this 
view. Realists and neorealists, on the other hand, tend to emphasize the 
importance of national interest. Constructivists believe that the rules facilitate and 
stabilize international relations. Particularly global governance calls for creating 
new rules in order to ensure collaboration across national borders. Vice versa, 
this international collaboration creates new norms and rules. It is safe to say, that 
governance in international relations embodies a process with different national 
and international players respecting the rules of the game that join their forces to 
tackle global issues.  
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4.1.3. Governance from the Perspective of Comparative Politics 
Just as in international relations, the concept of governance in comparative 
politics came to existence after the collapse of communism. Goran Hyden 
defined governance in comparative politics as the “conscious management of 
regime structures with a view to enhancing the legitimacy of the public realm”.48 
In this perspective, governance follows the rules in order to strengthen 
democracy and enables social and economic development. It indicates a regime 
transition within an institutional framework. In addition, it controls the interactions 
between state and society. Of course, if applied properly, it makes a positive 
difference to relations between citizens and state. Scholars of comparative 
politics claim that governance upholds a performance since the rules affect the 
outcomes. Therefore, the rules need to be carefully chosen and can also be 
subject to revision. They need to meet the demands of the societal system and 
attempt to implement democratic ideals.   
 
4.1.4. Governance from the Perfective of International Development Agencies 
Perhaps the most interesting and differentiated concept of governance emerges 
in discussions of international development agencies. The agencies, 
nonetheless, agree upon defining governance as an activity that steers and 
guides societies. But other than that, the definitions of governance seem to 
correspond to their programmatic agendas.  
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) defines governance as 
“the exercise of economic, political, and administrative authority to manage a 
country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises the mechanisms, processes and 
institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise 
their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences.”49 The 
UNDP’s concept of governance is therefore all-embracing. It incorporates 
economic, political and administrative governance. In general, economic 
governance is linked to decision making processes concerning economic 
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endeavours of a country and its economic relations with other countries or actors. 
Political governance engages in policy formulation, whereas administrative 
governance dictates policy implementation. In this manner, the UNDP and some 
other international development agencies do not distinguish between the 
economic decision making process, policy making and policy implementation.  
On the other hand, the World Bank equals governance with government or public 
administration. Back in the 1980s, however, the World Bank’s concept of 
governance was just a methodological tool, distant from any political issues. 
Governance encompassed effective control and power without judging the 
location or the character of the decision making authority. This approach was 
especially problematic in terms of developing countries that lacked stable state 
structures. Increasing criticism from the Western donors forced the World Bank 
to reformulate its definition of governance. The World Bank’s definition in force 
explains that “governance is the use of political authority and exercise of control 
over a society and the management of its resources for social and economic 
development.”50 With this new definition it is evident that the World Bank 
incorporates in the concept of governance also the political dimension.    
Nonetheless, Court, Hyden and Mease emphasized that the definitions of 
governance used by international agencies fail to make important distinctions 
between governance, policy and administration. The definitions tend to lose their 
political character.  
 
4.1.5. Governance in the Garbage Can 
B. Guy Peters argued that although there has been a lot written and said about 
governance, the term stays mainly descriptive rather than explanatory. He 
suggested that in order to move beyond descriptive treatment of governance, we 
should employ the garbage can model of organizational behaviour. The garbage 
can model of organizational choice was originally formulated in 1972 by Cohen, 
March and Olsen. They claimed that that organizations or institutions behave as 
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“organized anarchies” since decision-making occurs accidentally and is the 
outcome of problems and solutions that are linked randomly. Peters stated that 
“the fundamental assumption driving this model is that rather than being 
programmed or predictable, decisions in many situations are more the result of 
the serendipitous confluence of opportunities, individuals and ideas.”51 The 
garbage can model is primarily used to explain the behaviour of organizations, 
but it can be also applied to “decisions situations”.  
Peters claimed that governance can be better explained in terms of the garbage 
can model due to the fact that our world is less and less evidently governed 
through authority and hierarchy. On account of these changes in contemporary 
governance, the inputs and the processes of decision-making situations have 
become less predictable and less regular. “The outcomes of the policy process 
may represent the confluence of streams of possibilities rather than a rational 
search for the best option.”52  
Down the line, Peters applied the idea of the organized anarchies to the 
situations of the decision-making process. He stated that the organized 
anarchies are characterized by three key features: 
 Problematic preferences: Preferences in the garbage can model are 
inconsistent and hinder decision-making from performing well. 
Nevertheless, individual actors may have consistent preferences, but 
the policy-making system’s structure is designed to encounter 
problems while trying to smooth out varied preferences and making 
them coherent.  
 Unclear technology: The processes of organized anarchies are often 
poorly understood. If there is a simple error or any type of change in 
the system, the structuring of the system occurs rather with adaptation 
than strategic planning from the centre. There is a great lack of activity 
from a central “mind of government” and that results in the accidental 
manifestation of the goals of governing. Despite the wider range of 
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instruments that contemporary governments can use in implementing 
policies, centrally controlled technologies for governing are practically 
non-existent.    
 Fluid participation: The fluidity of participation in government is on 
the rise. The involvement of actors cannot be predicted and it happens 
rather capriciously. Even members of organized anarchies spend 
different amounts of time and effort dealing with situations of decision 
making. Above all, the limits of decision making situations are fluid, 
uncertain and poorly defined.53 
Peters believes that the garbage can model is a reasonable approach to 
comprehending modern governance since the three mentioned characteristics of 
the organized anarchies are to a certain degree also properties of contemporary 
policy making. Peters claimed that the days of rationalist policy-making are gone 
and in this post-authority era decision-making is not structured, not orderly and 
not rational. Decision making appears to happen accidently and it is influenced 
by streams of problems, solutions, opportunities and actors. It is controlled by the 
appearance of opportunities. Still, the goal remains improving governance’s 
performance. In this model the improvement depends rather on political power 
and its quest to demand better efficiency and responsiveness than on rational 
processes that can produce optimal solutions. One of the concerns in the 
garbage can model is also the agenda setting. Due to the loose structure of the 
organized anarchies, the issues that make it on the agenda are decisive for the 
outcomes. Sometimes rationally important issues will not be considered and will 
be simply avoided as a result of problematic preferences and convergent 
streams. According to Peters, avoidance is one of the common outcomes of 
decision making in the garbage can model.54     
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4.2. Traits of Governance 
Arthur Benz and Yannis Papadopoulos delineated certain points concerning 
significant features of policy making that correspond with a systematic profile of 
governance. These points are: 
 Governance has many decision centres meaning that its structure 
betokens a plurality of decision centres. It governs disputes between 
individuals, social groups and organizations without a central regulating 
organ – government. Various decision centres are not subject to any clear 
hierarchical system. They consist of networks with relatively fixed 
connections between the actors.    
 The boundaries of the decision centres are specified rather by functional 
than by territorial terms. There is also a great deal of fluidity when it 
comes to the inclusion or exclusion of actors, as well as the outcome of 
decisions. 
 Actors involved in governance range from experts, government officials, 
and state administrators to representatives of various interests and policy 
areas. Elected politicians, as stated by Benz and Papadopoulos, only play 
a secondary role. 
 While there are also individuals dealing with governance, the greatest 
power lies in the hands of collective actors such as interest groups who 
indeed decide about issues and preferences.   
 Governance contains various control and coordination practices. Even 
though unilateral decisions can be made, the actors, in general, have a 
tendency to come to a certain decision during a negotiating process. 
They are compromise-oriented and even ready to learn from each other. 
However, organizations and collective actors interact with each other in 
both a cooperative and a competitive manner.  
 Governance often goes beyond formal practices of decision-making, 
outside of the official institutions. It is practiced within structures unseen to 
the public. In this case, the parliaments are merely ratifying bodies that do 
not possess control functions.55   
“Due to its network-like, non-hierarchical, flexible, boundary-spanning character, 
governance is often regarded as politics and policy-making outside institutions, 
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as “governance without government".”56 Benz and Papadopoulus, nonetheless, 
argued that this statement is not entirely true. Especially if we are to define 
governance within analytical parameters, informal interactions cannot substitute 
an institutional framework. The institutional framework displays a set of rules that 
clearly define the actors, power and relationships between the actors. The actors 
obey institutional rules when governing their internal structures and processes. 
Still, governance is influenced by formal and informal interactions. Institutions act 
as stabilizers of networks, but the same networks can also work against the 
established institutions. Whatever the case, institutions are of the utmost 
importance for governance since they “define who is authorized to act and to 
make collectively binding decisions, they make actors’ behaviour predictable and 
visible, and they link those who hold power to those who are subject to 
decisions.”57       
 
4.3. Governance from a Broader Perspective 
While carefully examining the concept of governance, Court, Hyden and Mease 
also took into consideration the concepts of democracy and development. When 
dealing with development, a quality of the political system is a pivotal 
determinant. In this sense, governance focuses on constitutive rather than on 
distributive aspects of politics. It concentrates on the rules and process rather 
than on the results and performance. It acts as an activity that influences human 
behaviour and as a process that controls making and implementation of policies. 
Having that in mind, Court, Hyden and Mease stated that “governance refers to 
the formation and stewardship of the formal and informal rules that regulate the 
public realm, the arena in which state as well as economic and societal actors 
interact to make decisions. Governance, then, refers to behavioural dispositions 
rather than technical capacities.”58 It seems that governance in the international 
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arena focuses on how a political system operates and who sets what rules, when 
and how. 
Table 4 shows how governance stands in relation to other concepts that 
international development agencies especially like to fuse together. Certainly, 
from an empirical point of view these different levels, activities and concepts do 
interconnect, but from an analytical point of view they are preferably kept apart.   
  
Table 4: Governance and its relations to other concepts and activities 
Level Activity Concept 
Meta Politics Governance 
Macro Policy Policymaking 
Meso Programme Public Administration 
Micro Project Management 
 
Source: Adapted from Julius Court, Goran Hyden and Kenneth Mease, Making Sense of Governance, 2004, 
p.17 
 
If we assume that governance concentrates on the rules, a legitimate question 
that arises is which rules are significant for forming policy processes and 
subsequently development and democracy outcomes. Development agencies, as 
noted above, tend to focus on the rules that suit their programmatic demands. 
However, governance should be measured in terms of global indicators that can 
go beyond national borders thus focusing on various functional dimensions of the 
political process.    
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Table 5 indicates the important and relevant dimensions of governance, in which 
institutional arena these relevant dimensions are being executed and what is the 
purpose of the rules in these dimensions.  
 
Table 5: The functional dimensions of governance and their institutional arenas 
Process 
Dimension 
Institutional 
Arena 
Purpose of Rules 
Socializing Civil Society To shape the way citizens become aware of and 
raise issues in public 
 
Aggregating Political Society To shape the way issues are combined into policy 
by political institutions 
   
Executive Government To shape the way policies are made by 
government institutions 
Managerial Bureaucracy To shape the way policies are administered and 
implemented by public servants 
 
Regulatory Economic Society To shape the way state and market interact to 
promote development 
 
Adjudicatory Judicial System To shape the setting for resolution of disputes 
and conflicts 
 
Source: Adapted from Julius Court, Goran Hyden and Kenneth Mease, Making Sense of Governance, 2004, 
p.18 
 
Civil society presents an arena where anybody can become familiar with public 
issues and also get acquainted with the rules that affect public interests. Political 
society is the arena where public demands get aggregated into specific policies 
by specific political institutions. Certainly, the rules of aggregating public 
demands into policies vary in different regimes. In the democratic regimes, for 
example, there are two distinctive systems, pluralist and corporatist. A pluralist 
system is competitive, whereas a corporatist system is directed. In the 
authoritarian regimes, however, forming policies within a political society does 
not happen as smoothly as in the democratic regimes since the rules of this 
arena decide who gets to power. The electoral system influences the party 
system and the party system has an influence on the legislature. Government’s 
role is to make policies that set the rules which determine the relation between 
state and society. Citizens should profit from adopted policies and enjoy peace 
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and security. In a bureaucratic arena policies are implemented by public 
servants. If the bureaucratic machinery is well organized, policies are 
implemented more effectively and efficiently. State-market relations also play a 
significant role to governance since the state is actually bound to get involved 
with economic functions through state institutions that regulate the market. This 
arena is called economic society. The last institutional arena postulated by Court, 
Hyden and Mease is a judicial system in which the main function is to resolve 
disputes and conflicts. This arbitrational dimension forms a certain legal culture 
that goes beyond the rule of law. Stability of the judicial system often goes hand 
in hand with the quality of the democratic political system.  
 
4.4. Definitions of Good Governance 
The concept of “good governance” has recently started to occupy a vital place in 
development literature, though it seems that every international actor has a 
slightly different version of its definition. Nevertheless, they all agree that good 
governance comprises effective political bodies and economies that can 
guarantee the respect of human rights and the rule of law. On the other hand, 
bad governance illustrates all the worst aspects of society and is dubbed as the 
source of problems and dysfunctions. Different versions of good governance 
have appeared, partially because international actors want the definition of good 
governance to suit their programmatic requirements and partially, as suggested 
by Sam Agere, because of the new emerging perspectives on the structure of 
good governance. According to Agere the good governance debate can focus on 
any of the following correlations:  
 the relationship between governments and the markets; 
 the relationship between governments and citizens; 
 the relationship between governments and the voluntary or private sector; 
 the relationship between elected (politicians) and appointed (civil 
servants); 
 the relationship between local government institutions and urban and rural 
dwellers; 
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 the relationship between the legislature and the executive; and 
 the relationship between nation states and international institutions.59 
Consequently, good governance represents different things to different 
practitioners and theoreticians. International actors such as international 
organizations have each identified their own principles and assumptions 
regarding good governance and have developed their own procedures and 
processes achieving it.     
 
4.4.1. Good Governance according to the UN 
According to the UN, good governance has eight key characteristics. Good 
governance is “participatory, consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, 
responsive, effective and efficient, equitable and inclusive and follows the rule of 
law. It assures that corruption is minimized, the views of minorities are taken into 
account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in 
decision-making. It is also responsive to the present and future needs of 
society.”60 
The first key cornerstone is participation by men and women. It can be direct 
participation or through representatives or institutions. It should be well informed 
and organized. Participation encompasses freedom of association and also civil 
society. The second requirement of good governance is the respect of the rule of 
law. Society with functioning governance requires a fair and impartial legal 
framework that protects human rights, promotes an independent judiciary and an 
incorruptible police force. The third requirement calls for transparency. Decision-
making processes and the enforcement of decisions should follow rules and 
regulations. Information on decisions needs to be free, easy accessible and 
understandable. The fourth condition for good governance is responsiveness. 
Institutions and processes should serve all stakeholders. Good governance is 
also consensus oriented. With different points of view and interests, good 
governance requires mediation and eventually reaching a broad consensus. 
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Furthermore, governance should try to achieve long-term goals like sustainable 
human development. Additional fundamentals of good governance are equity 
and inclusiveness. All members of society should feel like they can get involved 
and nobody should feel excluded. The penultimate essentials for good 
governance are effectiveness and efficiency. Processes and institutions should 
produce outcomes that serve society and at the same time consider the available 
resources. Efficiency should also play a big role in the use of natural resources 
and environment protection. The eighth requirement of good governance calls for 
accountability. Governmental institutions, the private sector and civil society 
organizations should be accountable to the public and institutional stakeholders.        
 
Figure 5: 8 key characteristics of good governance according to the UN 
 
Source: http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp, 
25.01.2011  
 
4.4.2. Good Governance according to the IMF 
The International Monetary Fund promotes good governance in its member 
countries through many programmes and initiatives. The IMF provides policy 
advice, financial support and technical assistance. Former IMF Managing 
Director Michel Camdessus stated in 1997 in his address to the UNESC that 
“good governance is important for countries at all stages of development (…) Our 
approach is to concentrate on those aspects of good governance that are most 
closely related to our surveillance over macroeconomic policies—namely, the 
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transparency of government accounts, the effectiveness of public resource 
management, and the stability and transparency of the economic and regulatory 
environment for private sector activity.”61 
Furthermore, the IMF is also involved in combating and preventing corruption 
since it believes that corruption is closely linked to bad governance. Corruption is 
defined as the abuse of public authority in order to acquire private benefits. It is 
more possible for corruption to thrive in a poor governance environment. Poor 
governance, according to the IMF, hinders economic activity and welfare. For 
these reasons, the IMF focuses on governance and tackles its issues by 
following the principles of a Guidance Note entitled The Role of the IMF in 
Governance Issues. 
 
4.4.3. Good Governance according to the World Bank 
The World Bank placed strengthening of “good governance” on the top of the 
priority list as early as 1989 due to increasing concerns over the effectiveness of 
aid. Hence promoting good governance has become a pivotal part of the World 
Bank’s development strategy.  
 The World Bank specifies three aspects of governance: 
 the form of political regime 
 the process by which authority is exercised in the management of a 
country’s economic and social resources for development 
 the capacity of governments to design, formulate, and implement policies 
and discharge functions62 
As noted, the World Bank recognizes the importance of both political and 
economic dimensions of governance. It believes that democracy and good 
governance go hand in hand and they cannot exist without each other. 
Democracy refers to the legitimacy of government, while good governance 
displays the effectiveness of government. Thus the quality of a country’s 
governance determines the success of its economic and social development. 
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However, in practice the World Bank’s mandate does not deal with political 
regimes of a certain country, but it rather concentrates on the second and third 
aspects of governance. 
According to the World Bank, "good governance is epitomized by predictable, 
open and enlightened policy-making (that is, transparent processes); a 
bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive arm of government 
accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; 
and all behaving under the rule of law."63 Four major components of good 
governance and points of the World Bank’s interests are public sector 
management, accountability, legal framework for development and transparency, 
and information.    
 
4.4.4. Good Governance according to the OSCE 
The OSCE strongly supports the strengthening of good governance in its 
member countries since it is convinced that good governance, as well as, good 
administration represents the bedrock of a functioning democratic society. 
According to the OSCE, some elements of good governance are: 
 legality and the rule of law; 
 absence of corruption; 
 absence of discrimination; 
 procedural fairness in the decision-making process; 
 substantive fairness in the decision-making process; 
 efficiency; 
 civil service independence; 
 the right to juridical review before an independent and impartial tribunal; 
 access to information; 
 government transparency 
 accountability;64 
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The OSCE promotes international human rights’ standards and its primal 
concern is to establish and support effective mechanisms of implementation and 
accountability in its member countries that ensure the protection of human rights. 
Good governance also includes, according to the OSCE, the establishment of 
monitoring bodies and mechanisms in order to oversee the government’s 
activities, an independent media, a free and active civil society, an independent 
and impartial judiciary, as well as access to judicial review. All these elements 
increase public confidence in the integrity of governance.         
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5. Theory of Human Rights 
In 1948, the General Assembly of the UN adopted the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights marking the beginning of the global human rights regime. The first 
article of the Declaration explains that “all human beings are born free and equal 
in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should 
act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.”65 Our global human rights 
regime is evidently classified as universalistic.  
Many scholars and theorists have argued and continue to argue that we should 
not disavow other dimensions and implications of human rights. According to 
Jack Donnelly, there are three key levels of the theory of human rights: a 
question of the nature, the source and the substance of human rights.66 On 
account of these three levels it is not surprising that many concepts and 
approaches to human rights have come into existence. They all form a part of a 
fierce philosophical debate and criticism.  
5.1. The four metatheoretical positions in the human rights discourse 
According to Daan Bronkhorst, rights are “primarily a legal concept, an 
advantage granted under a certain legal system. As a moral term, they refer to 
what is fair and just.”67 Furthermore, Jeremy Bentham also offered a definition of 
a “right”. He believed that “rights are merely beneficial obligations. It is by 
imposing obligations, or by abstaining from imposing them, that rights are 
established or granted. To assure to individuals the possession of a certain good, 
is to confer a right upon them.”68 Essentially, the idea of a subject possessing a 
right suggests that there is a duty-bearer against whom the right is to be 
enforced. We do not understand a right solely as a normative property, but also 
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as a description of a moral act. In this sense, a right is a moral possession69. 
R. J. Vincent argued that “a right in this sense can be thought of as consisting of 
five elements: a right-holder (the subject of a right), has a claim to some 
substance (the object of a right), which he or she might assert, or demand, or 
enjoy, or enforce (exercising a right), against some individual or group (the 
bearer of the correlative duty), citing in support of his or her claim some particular 
ground (justification of a right).70  
Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler took this definition and scrutinized closely 
“some particular ground” that offers justification of claiming a right. Consequently, 
they sketched a figure representing the four key metatheoretical positions in the 
human rights discourse.   
Figure 6: Key metatheoretical positions in the human rights discourse  
       
     Source: Adapted from Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, Human Rights in Global Politics, 
1999, p.4 
5.1.1. The idea of human rights according to communitarian pragmatists 
Communitarians such as Chris Brown argued that we possess rights by virtue of 
our “ethnical community” and not by “common humanity”. Therefore, they place 
the wellbeing of community above individuals’ self-interests. They also believe 
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that our morality is culturally related and our virtues are based on tradition. This 
view has also been traditionally supported by cultural relativists. However, the 
symmetry of cultural relativism and a communitarian perspective on human rights 
ends here.  
Brown, while trying to transcend the classic “universalists versus relativists” 
conflict, also attacked the existence of human rights standards. He stated that 
human rights cannot derive from positive law, but rather from some version of 
natural law. Concerning this issue, Brown used John Finnis’ reasoning of what 
the idea of natural law is based on: “(i) a set of basic practical principles which 
indicate the basic forms of human flourishing as goods to be pursued and 
realized, and which are in one way or another used by everyone who considers 
what to do, however unsound his conclusions; and (ii) a set of basic 
methodological requirements of practical reasonableness (…) which distinguish 
sound from unsound practical thinking and which, when all brought to bear, 
provide the criteria for distinguishing between acts that (…) are reasonable-all-
things-considered (…) and acts that are unreasonable-all-things-considered, (…) 
– thus enabling one to formulate (iii) a set of general moral standards.”71 
Agreeing with Finnis’ reasoning, Brown stated that “rights – whether claims, 
liberties, powers or immunities – are based on these general moral standards, as 
are the duties which accompany these rights. Crucially, these standards are 
general, which is to say that they are not limited in their application to the 
inhabitants of any particular jurisdiction or legal system, or to any race, creed or 
civilization.”72 He basically claimed that rights emerge from civilized practices and 
are not the cause of them. He was critical of the idea of having inalienable rights 
that we can claim against the state, because in his view our individuality derives 
from a complex network constituted by the three institutional elements: the 
family, civil society and the state.73 Still, Brown did not argue for a relativist 
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position. Neither did he approve of universalists. He criticized both positions for 
“their dependence upon epistemological foundationalism.”74 
Brown’s communitarian pragmatism relates to the work of the postmodern 
philosopher Richard Rorty. He also distanced himself from the epistemological 
constraints of universalists and relativists. In fact, he claimed that it is impossible 
for us to access true knowledge or moral belief through reason. Therefore, we 
cannot rationally justify the basis of human rights. For Rorty, human rights are 
grand narratives told by liberal democratic societies that reflect particular times 
and spaces including the complexities of modern life. Rorty encouraged the 
continuation of “story telling” since these stories have constructed our reality and 
therefore the culture of human rights is also justifiable. According to Rorty, we 
have developed a human rights’ regime not through innate human dignity or 
reason, but through sentimentality. By experiencing and hearing horrific stories of 
human suffering we learnt empathy and human solidarity. “Such stories, 
repeated and varied over the centuries, have induced us, the rich, safe and 
powerful, people, to tolerate, and even to cherish powerless people – people 
whose appearance or habits or beliefs at first seemed an insult to our own moral 
identity, our sense of the limits of permissible human variation.”75 In Rorty’s view, 
the values of human rights can be defended through our shared capacity for 
experiencing pain and suffering. He did not examine the ontological perspectives 
of universal human rights, yet he conceptualized his epistemological position of 
such rights. He stated that “these two centuries are most easily understood not 
as a period of deepening understanding of the nature of rationality or of morality, 
but rather as one in which there occurred an astonishingly rapid progress of 
sentiments, in which it has become much easier for us to be moved to action by 
sad and sentimental stories.”76 Consequently, human wrongs emerge in societies 
where people have not gone through the process of education of the sentiments. 
Those people have been deprived of the possibility of developing feelings of 
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empathy and learning human solidarity. Brown, however, found Rorty’s 
sentimentality inadequate, but was forced to admit that “it is difficult to see what 
other moral vocabulary is available to us once we reach the limits of an ethical 
community.”77    
 
5.1.2. The idea of human rights according to cosmopolitan pragmatists 
Pragmatists question the philosophical foundations of human rights, but their 
rebuttal of epistemological certainty has not answered the central questions 
about the nature and limits of human rights within an ethnical community. The 
debate between communitarian and cosmopolitan pragmatists is not as 
distinctive as the classical debate between relativists and universalists, but it has 
brought about recent philosophical contemplations on the existence of universal 
human rights and universal values. Ken Booth and Bhikhu Parekh are two 
representatives of a metatheoretical position on human rights that Dunne and 
Wheeler labelled cosmopolitan pragmatism.78  
Booth introduced a particular approach to human rights called the three 
tyrannies: the tyranny of the present tense (“presentism”), the tyranny of cultural 
essentialism (“culturalism”) and the tyranny of scientific objectivity (“positivism”).79 
According to Booth, these three tyrannies “constitute sets of attitudes, almost an 
ideology, which imprison human rights potentialities in a static, particularist and 
regressive discourse, reproducing prevailing patterns of power rather than the 
reinvention of the politics of human possibility.”80  
The approach of presentism emerges from the common sense view that 
proposes that human rights reflect the human condition. Rights are based on 
communitarian values, “for rights can only develop on the bedrock of the values 
of distinct ethnical communities.”81 Therefore, presentism goes against the idea 
of universal human rights since there is no universal ethnical community. 
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However, this approach also has its flaws such as lack of understanding social 
complexity, generalizing and overlooking historical components of the social 
world. Booth argued that it is frankly too soon to tell if human rights are universal, 
because “the key move is to anthropologise and historicise human rights, and to 
see the culture of human rights as one aspect of our species’ cultural evolution. 
To do otherwise is to be oppressed by presentism, and its twin, ethnocentrism, 
and so miss the potential open-endedness of politics and the freedom inherent in 
the human consciousness.”82  
The second tyranny focuses on cultures and therefore culturalism which means 
“the reduction of social and political explanations to culture and to the black-
boxing of cultures as exclusivist identity-referents.”83 The emphasis of this 
approach is placed on the uniqueness and exclusivity of every single culture. 
Due to particular social logics, cultural rhythms and world views in each culture, 
this perspective also produces cultural relativism. The main argument of cultural 
relativism suggests that “each culture or society possesses its own rationality, 
coherence and set of values and it is in these terms that one can properly 
interpret the organization, customs and beliefs (including ideas of human rights) 
of that culture or society.”84 Still, Booth argued that culturalism is problematic in 
regard to the development of a human rights’ regime. Firstly, the possibility for 
comparison between cultures is withdrawn since every culture or society stands 
uniquely for itself. Secondly, it emphasizes the self-containedness of societies 
and cultures, which especially in the modern world appears to be less possible. 
Lastly, it supports traditionalism which also serves as a way for elites to hold on 
to their privileges. On that note, Booth reassured that culturalism is flawed since 
it is not an adequate tool for analyzing international relations as well as a human 
rights system. “Culturalism, by giving a totalizing picture of specific cultures, 
produces a false view of the world.”85     
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The third tyranny claims that scientific objectivity or positivism is the right 
approach towards defining the idea of human rights. The idea should be 
examined with scholarly detachment. Nonetheless, many argue that this 
approach also has its faults. To begin with, objectivity is unattainable, because 
we as observers already possess values. Secondly, our central focus lies with 
humans that are evidently self-aware, which adds another dimension to this 
issue. Thirdly, value-free proceedings make scholars refrain from deliberations, 
because there is nothing left to discuss. “The ideal of objectivity, and of 
positivism, can therefore be threatening to human rights in a variety of ways. 
What purports to be value-free/objective/apolitical/positivists analysis can merely 
be a cloak for status quo thinking (and therefore values).”86  
For Booth, the goal of explaining human rights is “trying to settle once and for all 
the philosophical argument between relativism and universalism in a globally 
satisfying way. This is probably impossible; rather, the task is to operationalize 
cosmopolitan democracy. This is the idea which at the present stage of history is 
best calculated to produce a politics of true universalism – an inclusive 
multicommunity “multilogue”, aimed as standard-setting in ways that will reduce 
human wrongs, and balance a tolerance of diversity with a diversity of 
tolerance.”87  
Just like Booth, Bhikhu Parekh, objected to the idea of the relativists’ and 
universalists’ approach towards human rights. The fundamental problem with 
relativism is that it gives us no tools to judge one culture’s beliefs and practices. 
He also found the universalists’ approach (in his words “moral monism”) 
unsatisfactory since it fails to explain the correct and the best way to comprehend 
human existence, human values and thereby human rights. Parekh stated that 
moral monism is philosophically flawed.88 He argued that “human beings are 
culturally embedded, and a culture not only gives a distinct tone and structure to 
shared human capacities but also develops new ones of its own. Since cultures 
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mediate and reconstitute human nature in their own different ways, no vision of 
the good life can be based on an abstract conception of human nature alone.”89     
As for “minimum universalism”, it is placed between the two extremes, but 
according to Parekh, still open to three objections. Firstly, minimum universalism 
supposes that universal principles originate either from human nature or they are 
derived from universal consensus. Parekh claimed that this is a loose argument 
since “human nature is by itself too thin to offer principles with a meaningful 
moral content.”90 The same goes for universal consensus. Universal consensus 
cannot exist and if it does, it is unacceptable, because “there is no universal 
consensus on the evils of cruelty, torture, inhuman punishment, and many of the 
other evils.”91 Secondly, a status of universal principles appears to be 
problematic. The moral minimum is used as a tool to judge all cultures. However, 
every culture has its own set of conceptions of the good life and therefore every 
culture applies the universal principles differently. The issue that arises at this 
point is the question of interpretation. Thirdly, “universal principles are either 
defined so abstractly that they have no bite, or so substantively that they cannot 
be met or are open to the charge of ethnocentrism.”92 Due to these objections 
Parekh is also left unsatisfied with minimum universalism. Finally, he proposed a 
theory of non-ethnocentric universalism that advocates universal values that 
“arise out of an open and uncoerced cross-cultural dialogue”93 and are 
conformed to different historical experiences and cultural sensibilities. In his view, 
a cross-cultural dialogue occurs in large and small groups, as well as on an 
international and national level. The aim of such dialogue is to configure values 
that all participants can agree on. “This is not a matter of teasing out the lowest 
common denominator of different cultural traditions, for such commonality either 
might not exist or be morally unacceptable. Values are a matter of collective 
decision, and like any other decision it is based on reasons. Since moral values 
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cannot be rationally demonstrated, our concern should be to build a consensus 
around those that can be shown to be rationally most defensible.”94 Parekh´s 
view point is characterized as cosmopolitan pragmatism since he recognized our 
cultural embeddedness, but still supported a transcultural consensus. He also 
spoke of universal constants such as human dignity, human quality and 
fundamental concerns that induce appropriate and adequate universal human 
values.95             
 
5.1.3. The idea of human rights according to liberal natural rights theorists and 
universalists 
The liberal natural rights theorists claim that human rights are universal. 
Ontologically speaking, they argue that we all “have rights by virtue of our 
common humanity and that morality exists by virtue of our built-it humanity.”96 
Human rights belong to humanity and not to any legal or moral system. Therefore 
we are automatically granted human rights because we are a part of humanity. 
We, as individuals, are also members of certain communities and enjoy the 
communities’ legal or moral rights, but if we were denied the rights of a certain 
community, we can still claim to enjoy human rights by virtue of common 
humanity.  
Common morality has also been a central topic of the natural law theories. In 
fact, it is not uncommon that some theorists do not make distinctions between 
“natural law” and “natural rights”. However, the two concepts are quite different in 
terms of approaches concerning political order. 
Let us begin with traditional natural law and natural right theory of Aquinas. He 
defined a law as “an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him 
who has care of the community and promulgated.”97 He proposed the existence 
of “the eternal law of God” that consists of all existing laws. This law is also the 
government of the universe. Nevertheless, the eternal law is made of two 
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independent branches: “the divine law” and “the natural and human laws”. The 
divine law deals with the revelation of the Bible and concentrates primarily on 
spiritual salvation. Politics, on the other hand, is defined by natural and human 
laws. According to Aquinas, a rational creature such as a human being can enter 
the eternal law “through understanding the Divine Commandment.”98 By 
participating in the eternal law we create the natural law. Since we cannot 
entirely comprehend the principles of the divine reason, we also have a limited 
understanding of the natural law. To supplement our deficiencies, as argued by 
Aquinas, human laws are introduced – laws that dictate political life and practice. 
In this manner, human laws derive from natural law. Furthermore, Aquinas 
believed that natural laws reside in the individual’s conscience, meaning that 
moral ideas are installed within us. Since we act in accordance with our nature or 
essence, we also act according to natural law. He believed in the goodness of 
human nature and also the goodness of laws. He stated that the main percept of 
law is “good is to be done and pursued and evil avoided.”99 Thus positive law is 
included in natural law. Nonetheless, natural law exists within us and positive law 
is the result of our free will. Aquinas claimed that if we make use of our natural 
reason, we should achieve our best outcome. Achieving goodness and a proper 
end is a reflection of natural law.  
He also stated that human laws are binding as long as they are just. If our 
conscience tells us that a human law is not just, we should not follow it, because 
it would be in contradiction to natural law. Aquinas stated that “laws framed by 
man are either just or unjust. If they be just, they have the power of binding in 
conscience, from the eternal law whence they are derived, (…). Now laws are 
said to be just, both from the end, when, to wit, they are ordained to the common 
good---and from their author, that is to say, when the law that is made does not 
exceed the power of the lawgiver---and from their form, when, to wit, burdens are 
laid on the subjects, according to an equality of proportion and with a view to the 
common good. For, since one man is a part of the community, each man in all 
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that he is and has, belongs to the community; just as a part, in all that it is, 
belongs to the whole; wherefore nature inflicts a loss on the part, in order to save 
the whole: so that on this account, such laws as these, which impose 
proportionate burdens, are just and binding in conscience, and are legal laws.”100 
Thomas Hobbes, on the other hand, was convinced that humans have limited 
access to goodness and need to be forced into following the rules by the state. 
He argued that in the state of nature people are evil and we are all at war against 
each other. Our true nature is competitive; we strive for glory and are filled with 
diffidence. We live in continual fear and in danger of violent death. Our life is 
“solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”.101 For Hobbes, natural law cannot be 
deduced from human nature. More exactly he claimed that natural law deduced 
from human nature has no significance since it cannot place limits on the power 
of the ruler. Hobbes defined the right of nature as “the liberty each man hath to 
use his own power as he will himself or the preservation of his own nature; that is 
to say, of his own life; and consequently, of doing anything which, in his own 
judgment and reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.”102 He 
basically said that in order to achieve peace, a human has the right to use any 
means, even war. Nonetheless, “a law of nature is a precept, or general rule, 
found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive 
of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the same, and to omit that by 
which he thinketh it may be best preserved.”103 As noted in these two quotes, 
Hobbes distinguished between the right of nature and the law of nature. He said 
that we have a right (liberty) to act out the animal in us, but the state, in Hobbes 
words the sovereign, limits us with its laws. Therefore, the state should possess 
limitless power over the laws and consequently over our rights. In Hobbes’ 
opinion the state is just and cannot do harm since it is answerable to God. His 
approach is characterized as legal positivism since he believed that natural law 
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can prevail if men submit to the sovereign that is also the ultimate source of 
morality and therefore just laws.  
Unlike Hobbes, John Locke claimed that human nature mainly consists of reason 
and tolerance, but he also recognized the existence of selfishness within us 
people. However, his theories on natural law and rights were groundbreaking for 
his time, paving the way for contemporary liberal human rights theorists. He 
argued that “the state of nature  has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges 
every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but 
consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in 
his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men being all the workmanship of one 
omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one sovereign master, 
sent into the world by his order, and about his business; they are his property, 
whose workmanship they are, made to last during his, not one another's 
pleasure: and being furnished with like faculties, sharing all in one community of 
nature, there cannot be supposed any such subordination among us, that may 
authorize us to destroy one another, as if we were made for one another's use, 
as the inferior ranks of creatures are for our's.”104 According to Locke our natural 
rights are life, liberty and property. We were born equal. We are entitled to do 
anything if our actions do not harm lives. We can possess anything as long as 
gaining possessions complies with the first two laws. Natural law complies with 
the will of God, because our nature reflects the will of God. He also believed that 
the state has its legitimate authority only if it respects the wishes of civil society 
signifying that if a ruler violates the natural law, he is proclaimed illegitimate. 
Rules, which do not act in accordance with natural law, should not be obeyed 
and can be overthrown. Such rules are criminal. Locke stated that “the first and 
fundamental positive law of all commonwealths is the establishing of the 
legislative power: as the first and fundamental natural law which is to govern 
even the legislative itself, is the preservation of the society and (as far as will 
consist with the public good) of every person in it. This legislative is not only the 
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supreme power of the commonwealth, but sacred and unalterable in the hands 
where the community has once placed it.”105 
The moral foundation of classic natural law theories served as a reasoning basis 
for contemporary advocates of liberal natural rights. They claim that natural law 
as such and furthermore the idea of a cosmic moral law can support a theory of 
universal rights. However, classical natural law theories focused on the duties, 
whereas contemporary liberal universalists’ thinking revolves around rights. 
Universalists epistemologically justify their claims of the content of natural rights 
by applying the concept of common morality. We know what is right based on, as 
Joseph Boyle put it, “those basic precepts of common morality (which) are 
accessible to human reason, they can be known by anyone capable of thought 
and action”.106 Liberal universalists such as R.J. Vincent claim that the only 
qualification for being entitled to human rights is simply by being a human being. 
Their theories occupy the same epistemological grounds as the natural law 
tradition (Dunne’s and Wheeler’s lower-right cell). 
We have already discussed Vincent’s five elements of rights. By adding “human” 
to “rights” Vincent dissected what “human rights” signify. Firstly, we are all the 
right holders of human rights just by being a part of the community of humankind. 
Everybody is a member of the human race. Secondly, the substance or the 
object of a human right overrides the object of mere rights. Vincent, however, 
stated that human rights are not indefeasible, but they are just generally of the 
utmost importance. Thirdly, exercising human rights means “claiming, asserting, 
demanding, enjoying, protecting and enforcing a right.”107 We seem to appeal to 
human rights when they are not acknowledged by positive law which usually 
results in the enforcement of human rights. Fourthly, while examining correlative 
duties of human rights, Vincent pointed out that “there are universal human rights 
in a strong and a weak sense.”108 He argued that “rights in the strong sense are 
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held against everybody else. Rights in the weak sense are held against a 
particular section of humanity.”109 For example, the right of life is held against 
everyone else and labelled as a general duty. That is a right in the strong sense. 
Nonetheless, economic or social rights are held against a particular government. 
Correlative duties of these rights are laid on the responsible authorities and 
therefore these rights are recognized as the rights in the weak sense. Still, when 
scrutinizing the correlative duties of all human rights Vincent emphasized that 
there are “duties to avoid depriving, duties to protect from deprivation and duties 
to aid the deprived.”110 Finally in fifth place, Vincent explained the justification of 
human rights by recognizing the existence of regional international law such as 
the European Convention on Human Rights and global international law such as 
the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In his opinion, the ultimate 
justification of human rights occurs when we do not need to appeal to any 
positive law, but when human rights as such prevail by rational calculation. “The 
space protected by human rights is what it is right that people should enjoy. This 
is the tradition of natural law from which, (…) natural rights and then human 
rights developed.”111        
 
5.1.3.1. Criticism of universalism 
Liberal natural rights theorists or universalists advocate that our common morality 
is transcultural and we are all able to decrypt the correct moral code. Dunne and 
Wheeler argued that this idea of the correct moral code is actually the 
fundamental weakness of natural rights thinking since it cannot be explained why 
people act differently from culture to culture.112 Also, an exact definition of natural 
law that is independent of human nature and of the nature of the world has been 
demanded from utilitarian and relativist philosophers.  
Furthermore, Nicholas Owen pointed out that it is a risky business believing that 
moral rightness is embodied in us. Many occurrences in the past showed us that 
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universal human values can easily be mistaken for what are simply our interests 
and desires. Owen expressed the danger of universalistic arrogance with these 
words: “Their insistence on a single, simple set of universal values, and their own 
historically given part in enforcing them on others, smacks of arrogance and 
threatens to foreclose still necessary debates about what human rights we 
have.”113 Moreover, Ken Booth criticized universalism by stating that it is based 
on an essentialist view of human nature. On his opinion, it is an ideology that 
imposes Western values, produces unhealthy sameness or cultural homogeneity 
and it is simply utopian, totalitarian and dangerous. He also stated that 
universality is a flawed position since there are no universal values. 114 
As discussed above, liberal natural rights theory served as the foundations for 
the development of an international legal regime of human rights.115 Yet, as 
concluded by Jack Donnelly, natural rights’ thinking and consequently the 
international human rights’ regime fails to give an adequate explanation of 
human nature that also encompasses human dignity. Donnelly argued that “the 
source of human rights is man’s moral nature, which is only loosely linked to the 
human nature of basic human needs. Human rights are needed for human 
dignity, rather than health, and violations of human rights are denials of one’s 
humanity rather than deprivations of needs.”116 At first glance, his reasoning 
could be placed in the liberal natural rights section, but he further developed his 
thinking by introducing a constructivist approach to human rights. He argued that 
human rights are not given to us by God or nature, but rather arise from our 
actions. Our human nature is a moral posit filled with human possibilities, but the 
realizing of human potentialities lies in the hands of society and government. 
“Human rights represent the choice of a particular moral vision of human 
potentiality and the institutions for realizing that vision.”117 He also claimed that 
the idea of human rights evolved as a response to overcome the threats to 
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human dignity in the 20th century. The challenges of modernity such as 
repressive political and economic structures “enabled” the evolution of today’s 
human rights regime. “I argue that socially shared moral conceptions of the 
nature of the human person and the conditions necessary for a life of dignity are 
the source of human rights. What distinguishes human rights from other moral 
ideals, however, is that they take the form of rights, a particular kind of institution 
and instrument.”118  
Due to the terrible occurrences in the past century, we have created an 
international system that aims to “establish and guarantee the conditions 
necessary for the development of the human person envisioned in the underlying 
moral theory of human nature, thereby bringing into being that type of person.”119 
Donnelly characterized this analysis as a constructivist theory of human rights. 
This approach focuses on the person and his or her inherent dignity. Human 
rights should support and protect a structure of social practices that enables the 
effective enjoyment of our human potentialities. As Donnelly stated, human rights 
role is to boost our “self-actualization”. They do not centre on what we are – a 
natural or juridical person, but rather on what we might and should become – 
moral persons.120 According to Donnelly, “the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (… tries to set out the minimum conditions for a dignified life worthy of a 
fully human being, requirements so basic that they must be recognized as 
rights/titles/claims, with all that entails.”121 However, while we have many 
international instruments ensuring the realization and protection of human rights, 
eventually the states need to uphold these standards. Dunne and Wheeler 
acknowledged that “individuals claim human rights against their state, because 
states are the only bearers of correlative duties, but they frequently fail to fulfil 
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these duties.”122A stark discordance between the human rights commitments of 
the states and their practices denotes the main problem in the actual status of a 
contemporary human rights regime.          
 
5.1.4. The idea of human rights according to traditional communitarianists and 
cultural relativists 
Communitarians argue that morality does not exist with regard to universal 
principles, but rather in terms of virtues. Instead of believing in universal morality, 
communitarians advocate the ideal of a good society. Traditional communitarians 
draw their convictions from the Aristotelian point of view, which implies that a 
man is a political animal that can distinguish between right and wrong. 
Furthermore, this viewpoint acknowledges some natural human pursuits, aiming 
to achieve natural moral goods, but it also presupposes that the fundamental 
conditions of life are similar for all humans. Traditional communitarians claim that 
human life reveals a common moral pattern.123 “There is a limited set of moral 
goals (or goods) the pursuit of which all human beings share with one another 
and for every act, practical reason must determine whether these common 
human objectives are likely to be furthered or obstructed by it.”124      
Dunne and Wheeler placed cultural relativists in the same box as traditional 
communitarians since they both assume that our rights derive from our 
community and not by some abstract universal human morality. They argue that 
rights can only develop in particular settings. There are no universal rules that 
can be applied to every community or society. We need to treat every entity in its 
own context. Communitarians certainly do not object to the idea of human rights, 
they simply disagree with its universality. Due to these contrary approaches, 
universalists and cultural relativists found themselves standing on opposite 
shores.   
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The doctrine of cultural relativism entails: “In the first place, it asserts that rules 
about morality vary from place to place. Secondly, it asserts that the way to 
understand this variety is to place it in its cultural context. And, in the third place, 
it asserts that moral claims derive from, and are enmeshed in, a cultural context 
which is itself the source of their validity.”125 Relativists oppose universal morality, 
because they believe that our world is constructed by different cultures with 
different scales of values. Universalists, according to relativists, deny the 
existence of the plurality of cultures. Universality of human rights is nothing less 
than imposing the values of a particular culture to all cultures. “In this regard, 
such documents as The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, passed by the 
United Nations in 1948, are futile proclamations, derived from the moral 
principles valid in one culture and thrown out into the moral void between 
cultures.”126    
 
 
5.1.4.1 Criticism of cultural relativism 
Dunne and Wheeler acknowledged that cultural relativists cannot present a valid 
argument when it comes to judging competing values.127 Brown wrote that there 
could be minimal moral standards that are present in every culture. But even if 
they are present in diverse cultures, they can only be judged in a certain culture. 
According to Brown, such an argument lacks a critical cutting edge. Horrific 
human rights abuses such as genocide can be judged by these minimal moral 
standards, but the problem arises with more routine human rights’ abuses. For 
example, what standards do cultural relativists use when judging female genital 
mutilation?128   
Booth accused cultural relativism of being empirically falsifying and ethnically 
flawed. It is empirically falsifying, because it is based on “self-contained socio-
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cultural entities, which have developed their own unique thoughtways and 
systems and which are coherent and unchanging.”129 Such epistemological 
assumptions influence ontological premises. However, the very notion of culture 
is already problematic which makes it politically irrelevant. According to Booth, 
the self-contained nature of societies is overstated and offers no comparison 
among cultures or societies. Furthermore, if we are not allowed to judge cultural 
practices of other cultures, we also cannot condemn oppression, exploitation, 
discrimination or subordination. Booth claimed that is also flawed, because it fails 
to explain to whom or what human rights are supposed to be relative. The radical 
uncertainty makes it hard to find an appropriate referent. In the same way, it 
makes it hard to define human wrongs. Cultural relativism takes away the ability 
to morally judge human wrongs. Moreover, it often supports the power of elites. 
The “outsiders” are not allowed to intervene and the “insiders” who hold power 
naturally do not want things to change. Thereby it privileges traditionalism. Due 
to the above discussed falsities, Booth stated that cultural relativism is not an 
adequate approach to politics. However, he believed that cultural sensitivity 
should be employed.130              
Moreover, Donnelly also attacked cultural relativism. In his view, relativism 
supports moral autonomy and communal self-determination and since only 
internal evaluation is considered appropriate, it goes against “one’s 
responsibilities as a member of the cosmopolitan moral community”.131 According 
to Donnelly, membership in the universal moral community and sometimes also 
membership in one’s own local moral community demand external judgments. 
Furthermore, moral judgments, though historically and culturally diverse, are by 
their nature universal or at least universalizable.132 He also believed that cultural 
relativism is supported by the economic and political elite - the same elite that 
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promote traditional practices of cultures but refuses to exercise those practices. 
They criticize and warn against the values and practices they have embraced. 
They encourage indigenous cultures to stay indigenous, yet cannot image 
themselves “going back” to that life. They speak for local and indigenous cultures 
for the sake of their own self-preservation. 133 “In other words, appeals to 
traditional practices and values all too often are a mere cloak for self-interest or 
arbitrary rule.”134 Donnelly calls this phenomenon “a cynical manipulation of 
tradition”. Furthermore, the concept of culture gets much more complicated in 
multi-ethnic or multi-cultural states. In such states it is extremely tricky to 
navigate among culturally based identities. Many human rights abuses are and 
were justified in terms of “local culture”. The elite use cultural relativism as a tool 
to legitimize their suppression of inopportune and inconvenient local costumes or 
to ensure their domination over the local minority or majority. They abuse the 
idea of cultural relativism to perpetuate their power structures.     
           
5.2. Universal Human Rights 
Despite different philosophical approaches and theories of human rights, the fact 
of the matter is that according to international law, human rights are considered 
universal. In spite of its theoretical and practical frailties, they play a crucial role 
in shaping international politics and relations. With the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 we cemented the way for “true politics of 
common humanity”135 and officially introduced a universal human rights’ culture. 
The Declaration has been supported by virtually all states and what we consider 
“human rights” are basically proclamations stated in the UDHR.136 The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights has since 1948 naturally been further modified with 
additional treaties.  
There are four major categories of human rights:  
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 Integrity rights – to life and individual inviolability 
 Civil and political rights – freedom of expression and assembly, 
participating in public and government activities, to public hearings by 
impartial tribunals 
 Socio-economic rights – offering appropriate cultural and material 
existence 
 Collective rights – community or indigenous rights such as that of 
development137 
Moreover, Jack Donnelly listed four structural features of the Universal 
Declaration model that are just as important as the substance of these rights. 
“First, (universal) rights – entitlements – are the mechanism for implementing 
such values as non-discrimination and an adequate standard of living. (…) 
Second, all the rights in the Universal Declaration and the Covenants, with the 
exception of self-determination of peoples, are rights of individuals, not corporate 
entities. (…) Third, internationally recognized human rights are treated as an 
interdependent and indivisible whole, rather than as a menu from which one may 
freely select (or choose not to select). (…) Fourth, although these are universal 
rights, held equally by all human beings everywhere, states have near exclusive 
responsibility to implement them for their own nationals.”138    
Table 6 indicates a short, but substantial list of the human rights recognized by 
the Universal Declaration and other Covenants. 
 
Table 6: The substance of the universal declaration model
139
 
Non-discrimination (U2, E2, C2) 
Life (U3, C6) 
Liberty and security of person (U3, C9) 
Protection against slavery (U4, C8) 
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Legal personality (U6, C16) 
Equal protection of the law (U7, C14, C26) 
Legal remedy (U8, C2) 
Protection against arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile (U9, C9) 
Access to independent and impartial tribunal (U10, C14) 
Presumption of innocence (U11, C14) 
Protection against ex post facto laws (U11, C15) 
Privacy (U12, C17) 
Freedom of movement (U13, C12) 
Nationality (U15, C24) 
Marry and found a family (U16, C23) 
Protection and assistance of families (U16, E10, C23) 
Marriage only with free consent of spouses (U16, E10, C23) 
Equal rights of men and women in marriage (U16, C23) 
Freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (U18, C18) 
Freedom of opinion and expression (U19, C19) 
Freedom of assembly (U20, C21) 
Freedom of association (U20, C22) 
Participation in government (U21, C25) 
Social security (U22, E9) 
Work (U23, E6) 
Just and favourable conditions of work (U23, E7) 
Trade Unions (U23, E8, C22) 
Rest and leisure (U24, E7) 
Adequate standard of living (U25, E11) 
Education (U26, E13) 
Participation in cultural life (U27, E15) 
Self-determination (E1, C1) 
Protection of and assistance to children (E10, C24) 
Freedom from hunger (E11) 
Health (E12, U25) 
Asylum (U14) 
Property (U17) 
Compulsory primary education (E14) 
Humane treatment when deprived of liberty (C10) 
Protection against imprisonment for a debt (C11) 
Expulsion of aliens only by law (C13) 
Prohibition of war propaganda and incitement to discrimination (C20) 
Minority culture (C27) 
 
Source: Excerpted from Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 2003, 
p.23 
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According to the Declaration, human rights are universal and “belong to each of 
us regardless of ethnicity, race, gender, sexuality, age, religion, political 
conviction, or type of government.”140 They are also incontrovertible, because 
they are absolute and innate. The state or any other political authority is not in 
possession of human rights that is why they cannot be taken away from us or 
denied by political authorities. In addition, human rights are subjective, because 
they are the properties of us – individual subjects. We are entitled to possess 
them on account of our capacity for rationality, agency and autonomy.141 Though 
the Declaration clearly and precisely states what human rights are, the world has 
witnessed many human rights violations in the past sixty years. In fact, we are 
faced with human rights wrongs on a daily basis. It seems as though we have not 
fully recognized the claims written in the Declaration. Western democracies 
made it a custom to preach to non-Western nations about human rights, while 
they ignore them at home.142 As Darren O’Byrne pointed out “the world of 
international relations is still as chaotic and competitive as it was before 1948; 
only it has become more hypocritical.”143      
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6. OSCE 
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is the largest 
regional organization with 56 member states. It is the primary instrument for early 
warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation144 
for the countries between Vancouver and Vladivostok (the area of North America, 
Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia). It also collaborates with Mediterranean 
and Asian partners. It thus encourages the interconnection of the Euro-Atlantic 
and the Euro-Asian integrations.    
The OSCE Charter of Paris summarizes what the OSCE stands for with the 
following words: “ours is a time for fulfilling the hopes and expectations our 
peoples have cherished for decades: steadfast commitment to democracy based 
on human rights and fundamental freedoms; prosperity through economic liberty 
and social justice; and equal security for all our countries.”145 
The OSCE is recognized as a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the 
United Nations Charter and it is known for its comprehensive and co-operative 
approach to security. It strives for the improvement and transparency of security 
issues such as arms control, preventive diplomacy, confidence- and security-
building measures, human rights, election monitoring and economic and 
environmental security146. The OSCE is well aware that preventing a crisis from 
happening or worsening, benefits not just the security of this particular state but 
also to the region as a whole. Insecurity in one country affects the well-being of 
other countries and that is why the OSCE stands for achieving security together.  
The OSCE is engaged in all phases and all levels of conflict. It captures three 
main dimensions of security: politico-military, economic and human. On account 
of this comprehensive approach, it engages in protecting and promoting human 
rights, fundamental freedoms, it deals with economic and environmental affairs, 
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as well as politico-military issues. It raises a red flag at the early stages of a 
conflict, aims for the prevention of a conflict, offers expertise on crisis 
management and provides post-conflict rehabilitation.  
The OSCE is not like any other organization since all decisions are made on the 
basis of consensus of all member states, signifying that all member states enjoy 
equal status. Furthermore, it has no legal status under international law and all its 
decisions are politically but not legally binding.147 However, as any other 
international organization the OSCE has its decision-making bodies, permanent 
headquarters and institutions, permanent staff, regular financial resources and 
field offices.148 Nevertheless, the OSCE decisions are generally written in legal 
language and they need to be interpreted in the framework of international law. In 
addition, the OSCE commitments are signed at the highest political level that 
serves to its advantage in terms of the OSCE efficacy. They claim the same level 
of authority as any other legal decision adopted under international law.      
The OSCE Secretary General, Ambassador Marc Brichambaut stated, that “the 
OSCE is not a military alliance or an economic union. It is a community of values 
as much as a community of interests. It is our shared responsibility to ensure 
that the commitments designed to uphold those values remain salient and are 
applied.”149  
6.2. Historical Overview 
The idea for the CSCE dates back to the 1950s, when the USSR expressed a 
wish for a pan-European security conference. However, at that time the 
West/East conflict was too deeply rooted in the minds of everybody so the 
Western states immediately rejected this idea. A decade later, the talks between 
East and West became more frequent and the USSR suggested a European 
security conference within the framework of the Warsaw Treaty Organization 
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including a proposal of East-West economic co-operation. Most European neutral 
and non-aligned states showed their readiness; yet again the NATO states 
remained sceptical. In 1969, NATO eventually declared that it was ready for such 
a conference, but only under certain conditions. It demanded, amongst other 
things, the full participation of the United States and Canada, reconfirmation of 
the Berlin status, inclusion of a discussion about disarmament in Europe and 
placing human rights issues on the agenda.  
At the beginning of the 1970s, the time was right for a Conference on Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). On 3 July 1973, the foreign ministers of 35 
countries met in Helsinki, Finland for the first stage of the “Helsinki Process”. 
They adopted “the Blue Book” rules on practicalities such as agendas, 
participants, rules of procedure and financial arrangements, but also discussed 
their national views on security and co-operation in Europe. The second stage 
followed in Geneva in September 1973 until July 1975. The participating 
countries negotiated about the content of the CSCE Final Act. This stage marked 
a historic milestone since it was the first multilateral East-West negotiation 
process ever. On 30 July 1975, everything was ready for the signing of the Final 
Act in the Finlandia Hall in Helsinki. 35 heads of states finished the third stage of 
the Helsinki process by signing the Helsinki Final Act.  
The participating countries agreed in the Final Act to periodically meet at follow-
up meetings to exchange their views on the implementation and the tasks of the 
Act. In this manner, they bound themselves to deepen their relations and 
contribute to security and co-operation. They also organized intersessional 
meetings in order to keep the spirit of the CSCE alive. One of the groundbreaking 
conferences took place in Stockholm from January 1984 to September 1986. 
This Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and 
Disarmament in Europe was extremely crucial since it happened for the first time 
that the participating states decided upon some elements of military security. 
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In the 1970s and 1980s, the CSCE brought about qualitative changes in the 
East-West relations given that it advocated security and co-operation in Europe 
beyond ideological divisions. When the communist regimes in Eastern and 
Central Europe collapsed in 1989, security needs dramatically changed and the 
CSCE adapted to this transformation by taking on new responsibilities and 
challenges. The CSCE began with intense institutionalization, enhancing 
operational capabilities, developing field activities and establishing new 
mechanisms. In November 1990, heads of state met for the three-day Paris 
Summit Meeting to sign the “Paris Charter for a New Europe”. In short, it was 
determined that heads of state meet every two years, Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs at least once a year and that high level officials of foreign ministries form a 
Committee of Senior Officials. A Secretariat (firstly set in Prague, but relocated to 
Vienna in 1994), a Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna and an Office for Free 
Elections in Warsaw were founded. Furthermore, the human dimension also 
incorporated free elections, freedom of media and protection of national 
minorities.  
Within a few years, the CSCE expanded its tasks areas, adopted new 
mechanisms, implemented new commitments and founded new institutions. The 
CSCE evolved from a process to a de facto organization. At the Budapest 
Summit in December 1994 the member states decided to change the name from 
the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) to the 
Organization of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The names of the 
decision making bodies changed as well. The CSCE Council became the 
Ministerial Council; the Committee of Senior Officials was renamed the Senior 
Council and the Permanent Committee became the Permanent Council. This 
name change did not give the OSCE a new character nor did it change its 
commitments and institutions, but it did give the OSCE an aspirational boost for 
mastering new challenges.  
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6.2. Structure and Institutions 
6.2.1.   Negotiating and decision-making bodies 
Summits 
The OSCE Summits are periodic meetings of the heads of states or government 
of the member states. At the summits, important decisions about priorities and 
guidelines of the OSCE as well as an assessment of the past OSCE activities are 
made at the highest political level. Until now, there have been only a total of 
seven CSCE/OSCE summits. It all started in August 1975 in Helsinki when the 
Final Act was signed. The second summit followed after the collapse of 
communism in November 1990 in Paris and the member states agreed upon the 
institutionalization of the CSCE. The four subsequent summits were held in 
Helsinki 1992, Budapest 1994, Lisbon 1996 and Istanbul 1999. All of these 
events represent decisive milestones in the history of the OSCE. The most 
recent summit was held in December 2010 in Astana, Kazakhstan.  
The preparations for the summits take place at the review conferences. At these 
meetings, the activities of the OSCE are closely examined in order to figure out 
possible improvements as well as to see how previously adopted commitments 
are being implemented. Moreover, the follow-up meetings also serve as a 
negotiation forum to finalize certain documents, declarations or statements.  
 
The Ministerial Council 
The Ministerial Council, whose members are the Foreign Ministers of the OSCE 
member countries, usually meets once a year (but not in the years of the 
summits) in a country that holds the chairmanship. The Council has a pivotal 
political role due to its decision-making and governing power. At the meetings, 
the Foreign Ministers and their delegations discuss issues relevant to the OSCE, 
review the OSCE activities and make appropriate decisions. The Ministerial 
Council is considered to be a link between the daily operations of the OSCE and 
the political decisions adopted at the summits. It also provides a point of 
reference and guidance for the OSCE institutions.   
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The Permanent Council (PC) 
The Permanent Council meets regularly once a week (usually Thursdays at 
09:00) at the Hofburg Congress Centre in Vienna. The PC comprises the 
permanent representatives of the OSCE states that meet to discuss the latest 
developments in the OSCE region and to make appropriate decisions 
considering the circumstances. Thus the PC serves as a political consultation 
forum as well as a decision-making body.   
The PC emanated from the Permanent Committee which was established in 
1993. At the Ministerial Council Meeting in Rome, a decision was adopted that 
the Permanent Committee should deal with the CSCE’s day-to-day operational 
tasks.  
The PC ascertained after a few years of regular meetings that an additional 
committee could come in handy to further strengthen political consultations and 
to improve transparency within the organization. For that reason, a Preparatory 
Committee (Prep Com) came to life after the Istanbul Summit in 1999. 
 
The Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) 
The Forum for Security Co-operation consists of the representatives of the OSCE 
member states that meet on a weekly basis also at the Hofburg Congress Centre 
in Vienna to discuss the military aspects of security and stability in the OSCE 
region. The FSC’s aim is to strengthen security and stability with the help of the 
OSCE measures such as confidence- and security-building. The Forum was 
established in 1992 and it is an autonomous decision-making body, though 
subservient to the Ministerial Council.  
Since its creation, the Forum has adopted many decisions and agreed on 
numerous documents concerning arms control, disarmament, confidence- and 
security-building, and information exchange on military activities, non-
proliferation and reduction of the risks of conflict. Above all, the Forum holds 
regular consultations on all matters related to security and promotes co-operation 
between the member states as well as the implementation of the adopted 
measures.   
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The Economic and Environmental Forum (EEF) 
The Economic and Environmental Forum is the key annual meeting within the 
economic and environmental dimension. The issues discussed at this meeting 
are proposed by the Chairmanship, but other member countries need to be in 
accord with them. More than 400 participants ranging from the high level 
government officials, representatives of civil society and international 
organizations to businessmen get together to address economic and 
environmental issues connected to security and to propose practical solutions. In 
2010, the theme of the Economic and Environmental Forum was “promoting 
good governance at border crossings, improving the security of land 
transportation and facilitating international transport by road and rail in the OSCE 
region”. 
The EEF are organized by the Office of the Co-ordinator of the OSCE Economic 
and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) based in Vienna. The Office’s main goal is 
to encourage economic and environmental co-operation among the OSCE 
member states and their Asian and Mediterranean partners.  
 
6.2.2. Operational structures and institutions 
The Chairperson-in-Office150 (CiO) 
The OSCE Chairmanship is held every year for a whole calendar year by a 
different member country. The Chairperson-in-Office is exercised by the Foreign 
Minister of that country. The decision about the OSCE Chairmanship is made by 
the Ministerial Council two or three years before the Chairmanship. The function 
of the Chairperson-in-Office has an overall responsibility for supervising and 
executing the OSCE activities. The CiO embodies the political leadership of the 
OSCE and also represents the “face” of the OSCE. The Chairperson is in charge 
of conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation, yet 
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he/she is assisted by his/her predecessor and successor and together they form 
the Troika.  
 
Table 7: Listing of the OSCE Chairpersons-in-Office 
Chairperson-in-Office Chairmanship Member 
State 
Year 
Hans-Dietrich Genscher Germany 1991 
Jiří Dienstbier, followed by Jozef Moravčík Czechoslovakia 1992 
Margaretha af Ugglas Sweden 1993 
Beniamino Andreatta, followed by Antonio Martino Italy 1994 
László Kovács Hungary 1995 
Flavio Cotti Switzerland 1996 
Niels Helveg Petersen Denmark 1997 
Bronislaw Geremek Poland 1998 
Knut Vollebaek Norway 1999 
Wolfgang Schüssel, followed by Benita Ferrero-
Waldner 
Austria 2000 
Mircea Geoană Romania 2001 
Jaime Gama, followed by Antonio Martins da Cruz Portugal 2002 
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, followed by Bernard Bot The Netherlands 2003 
Solomon Passy Bulgaria 2004 
Dimitrij Rupel Slovenia 2005 
Karel De Gucht Belgium 2006 
Miguel Ángel Moratinos Spain 2007 
Ilkka Kanerva, followed by Alexander Stubb Finland 2008 
Dora Bakoyannis; George Papandreou Greece 2009 
Kanat Saudabayev Kazakhstan 2010 
Audronius Azubalis Lithuania 2011 
Eamon Gilmore Ireland 2012 
Source: Adapted from www.osce.org 
 
The Secretary General and the Secretariat 
The OSCE Secretary General exercises two functions. He is the representative 
of the Chairperson-in-Office and the Organization’s Chief Administrative Officer. 
He is the OSCE’s chief manager and administrator and is appointed by the 
Ministerial Council for a mandate of three years that can be renewed. The French 
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Ambassador Marc Perrin de Brichambaut has been the Secretary General since 
June 2005. The Secretary General has quite a lot on his plate. He is responsible 
for managing the OSCE structures and operations, collaborating with the CiO in 
preparation and supervision of the OSCE meetings, promoting the 
implementation of the OSCE decisions, putting out the word of the OSCE policies 
and practices, staying in touch with other international organizations, making 
sure that all the OSCE bodies work in compliance with the OSCE regulations and 
regularly reporting about the work of the Secretariat and the Field Missions to the 
OSCE political bodies.  
The Secretariat in Vienna is compounded of various departments and units.  
 The Office of the Secretary General assists the Secretary General with all 
of his activities and duties including diplomatic contacts with international 
and non-governmental organizations, as well as the OSCE partners for Co-
operation, press and public information, legal services, internal auditing, 
gender issues, etc…  
 The Action against Terrorism Unit (ATU) helps the OSCE member states 
with every aspect of the fight against terrorism; from implementing 
international conventions and protocols to drafting legislation.   
 The Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) assists the CiO, the OSCE 
negotiating and decision making bodies and the OSCE field missions in 
fulfilling their politico-military duties such as early warning, conflict 
prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation. The CPC 
assumes the role of a connecting link between the field missions and the 
negotiating bodies in order for the decisions to get thoroughly implemented 
and executed. 
 External Co-operation; the OSCE believes that international organizations 
need to join forces if they are to overcome the global challenges. For this 
reason, the OSCE works hand in hand with the UN, the EU, the OECD, the 
Council of Europe, NATO and many others both at the political level and 
also in the field.  
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 Gender Section; the OSCE advocates gender equality within the 
organization and throughout the OSCE region by establishing gender focal 
points and encouraging gender-based activities.  
 The Office of Internal Oversight assists the Secretary General, the OSCE 
institutions and bodies, as well as the OSCE field missions in efficiently 
accomplishing their objectives, pointing out the areas for possible 
improvement and descrying any frauds or mismanagement. The Office 
cooperates with independent audits and inspectors. 
 The Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental 
Activities (OCEEA) provides support to the CiO, the PC and the OSCE 
institutions when dealing with the economic, social and environmental 
aspects of security.  
 The Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for 
Combating Trafficking in Human Beings assists the Special 
Representative and the OSCE member states in the fight against human 
trafficking. The Office’s assistance goes beyond prevention. It also includes 
investigation, law enforcement, prosecution and protection of the victims of 
human trafficking.   
 The Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU) offers expertise and assistance 
in all areas relating to the police to the OSCE member states and supports 
a network of police advisers in the field mission.  
 The Training Section is in charge of inducting new personnel and staff 
training throughout the OSCE. 
 
The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA) 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE is made up of 320 members and 
represents the parliamentary dimension of the OSCE. The Assembly’s goal is to 
strengthen democracy building and democracy sustaining throughout the OSCE 
region by promoting inter-parliamentary dialogue. The idea for an OSCE 
parliamentary body was proposed at the Paris Summit in 1990 to ensure greater 
involvement of national parliaments of the OSCE member states. The Assembly 
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works in accordance with the Rules of Procedure that indicate the Assembly’s 
objectives: 
 assess the implementation of OSCE objectives by participating States; 
 discuss subjects addressed during meetings of the Ministerial Council and 
summit meetings of OSCE Heads of State or Government;  
 develop and promote mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of 
conflicts; 
 support the strengthening and consolidation of democratic institutions in 
OSCE participating States; 
 contribute to the development of OSCE institutional structures and of 
relations and co-operation between existing OSCE institutions151. 
The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s main event is the Annual Session held in 
July. The PA also gets together for a winter meeting every February in Vienna, 
as well as an autumn meeting every year hosted by a different country by the 
Mediterranean Sea. Furthermore, the PA organizes many conferences & 
seminars, assists the Election Monitoring Missions, and the Field Missions.  
 
The High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) 
Ethnic conflict is usually the primary cause of violence in today’s Europe. In order 
to tackle ethnic tensions, the OSCE established in 1992 the post of High 
Commissioner on National Minorities. The HCNM identifies ethnic tensions that 
could possible burst out and disrupt the peace and stability in the OSCE region in 
the early stages. This preventive diplomacy begins with an early warning and 
continues with the Commissioner’s recommendation on how to resolve existing 
dissension promptly. 
In this regard, the HCNM has a twofold mission: first of all, to attempt to restrain 
possible escalations of a conflict and secondly, to instantly alert the OSCE 
member states about the threats of the disruption of peace and stability once 
he/she establishes that such tensions cannot be solved with the means and 
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resources available to the HCNM. In addition, the HCNM encourages dialogue, 
confidence and cooperation between the conflicting parties.  
The Office of the HCNM is located in The Hague, the Netherlands. The current 
Commissioner is Knut Vollebaek of Norway. 
 
The Representative on Freedom of the Media 
The Representative’s duty is to assist the governments of the OSCE member 
states in further strengthening of free, independent and pluralistic media. The 
Representative shall observe the media landscape and oversee its compliance 
with the OSCE principles and commitments. The OSCE stands for the freedom 
of expression and free media therefore the Representative also keeps an eye on 
possible hindrances the media may be facing in the participating states and if 
journalists are forced to work in unfavourable conditions.  
Moreover, the Representative is accountable for reacting fast if he/she detects a 
serious non-compliance with the OSCE principles and commitments. If a certain 
member state violates the principles of freedom of expression and freedom of the 
media, the Representative tries to contact the member state and all parties 
involved with the intention of assessing the situation and finding an appropriate 
solution. He/she gathers information and data from all credible sources, 
particularly from the ODIHR.  
The post of the Representative on Freedom of the Media was formally 
established in November 1997 by a PC decision. The Office is based in Vienna 
and the current Representative is Dunja Mijatovic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) 
The ODIHR evolved from the Office for Free Elections (OFE) that was 
established in Warsaw by the Charter of Paris for a New Europe in 1990. In 
1992, the Ministerial Council expanded its functions and activities hence the OFE 
became the ODIHR.  
The ODIHR’s activities are divided into four sections: 
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 The election section promotes free and democratic elections by 
dispatching short-term and long-term election observers to the OSCE 
member states where the elections take place. The OSCE observers also 
provide technical assistance and training to the local observers before, 
during and after the election process.  
 The democratization section focuses on promoting democracy building, 
the rule of law, human rights and strengthening of the civil society by 
organizing practical projects and educational programmes. Among others, 
it also concentrates on combating trafficking in human beings and torture, 
supporting gender equality and religious freedom, and offers assistance to 
the member states in implementing the Programme of Action.152  The 
ODIHR projects are carried out in cooperation with the member states, 
other OSCE institutions, international organizations and NGOs.   
 The monitoring section monitors and gathers information on the 
implementation of human rights commitments in the member states which 
contributes to an early warning and conflict prevention. By collecting data 
on the human dimension situation in the OSCE states the ODIHR also 
advises the CiO and other institutions.  
 The Contact Point for Roma and Sinti promotes capacity-building and 
networking among Roma and Sinti communities. It advises the member 
states on policy-making on Roma and Sinti and it also encourages Roma 
and Sinti representatives to participate in policy making. The Contact Point 
documents the situation of Roma and Sinti thus serves as a clearing-
house for the exchange of information on this particular subject.    
The ODIHR is located in Warsaw and its current director is Janez Lenarčič of 
Slovenia. The ODIHR’s activities are discussed at the OSCE Human Dimension 
Meetings in Warsaw and some supplementary meetings in Vienna. In addition, 
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 The Programme of Action refers to a set of measures adopted by the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) Conference Process in 1996.  Under the joint auspices of the UNHCR, 
the IOM and the ODIHR the countries of the CIS discussed population displacement and refugee 
problems and agreed upon several institutional, operational and preventive measures.  
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the Office organizes an annual Human Dimension Seminar also attended by the 
representatives of the international organizations and NGOs.  
 
OSCE Field Missions 
The OSCE Field Missions represent the heart of the OSCE’s work. The field 
missions enable the OSCE to be actively present in a member state that needs 
the Organization’s assistance. The missions’ mandates vary from mission to 
mission, but they all share two important objectives: firstly, the mission supports 
political processes that either prevent or settle conflicts; secondly, the mission 
makes sure that the OSCE community is well informed on developments in the 
“host” member state.  
As noted above, the missions’ mandates are increasingly varied. Also the size 
and the field activities are different. One might believe that these inconsistencies 
work against its advantage, but they actually signify the flexibility of this 
instrument. However, the focal point for all missions remains democracy building, 
strengthening the rule of law and the protection of human rights. 
Decisions about the mission’s presence, its mandate and field activities are made 
by the Permanent Council and most importantly, in accordance with the host 
country. Usually, the mission is established with a six-month or one year 
mandate and it is renewed if necessary. Most of the mission’s members come 
from the OSCE member states, but there is also a significant number of local 
staff. Every mission has a Head of Mission appointed by the CiO.  
The concept of field missions emerged after the collapse of the communist 
regimes. The OSCE felt obliged to deal with intra-State conflicts and to face the 
challenges of “not so democratic states” head on. The majority of the field 
missions are therefore located in Central Asia, the Caucasus and South-Eastern 
Europe. Although a field mission contributes a lot to democratization and the host 
countries benefit a lot from its presence, not every member state embraces a 
field mission with open arms. The host countries dislike the label that normally 
comes with the presence of the OSCE mission. The OSCE field mission 
symbolizes that a country is “not democratic enough”. Needless to say, a field 
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mission is subject to the laws of the host country and that means that every 
activity needs to be approved by the government of the host country. For this 
reason many projects suggested by the OSCE get rejected by the host 
government, because the host government estimates that the country does not 
require a certain activity.  
Nevertheless, the OSCE in Kosovo never faced this kind of obstacle. The 
Mission of Long Duration and the Kosovo Verification Mission were struggling 
with some challenges simple due to the Yugoslav general belief that the Kosovo 
issue was an internal problem. However, the OMIK started on a completely 
different foot and generally, it can be affirmed that the OSCE presence finds 
favour in the eyes of the Kosovo authorities.       
         
6.3. Decision-making Process 
All the decisions within the OSCE bodies are made by consensus. Consensus 
implies that there is not even a single member state that opposes a certain 
decision. In this manner, every OSCE member state enjoys an equal status. 
However, these decisions are politically, but not legally binding. The organization 
was built up on the basis of political commitment of the member states and not 
as an international treaty.  
The decision-making process occurs at three levels. The highest level of the 
decision-making process takes place at the summits. The summits also 
represent the political orientation of the Organization. Between the summits, the 
Ministerial Council is in possession of decision-making powers and thus acts as 
the central level of the process. The Ministerial Council takes decisions in order 
to ensure that the OSCE activities are in compliance with the OSCE political 
goals. At the bottom of the decision-making pyramid lies the Permanent Council 
that serves as a consultation forum and makes decisions for the OSCE’s day-to-
day activities. 
The Chairperson-in-Office is the coordinator and the organizer of the decision-
making process. He/she prepares the agendas and meets up with the 
representatives of the member state to discuss and negotiate on decisions, 
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statements or documents. Once the wording of a decision, statement or 
document is ready and agreed upon, an appropriate decision-making body can 
adopt it. 
Although very rarely, it has occurred in the past that decisions were made without 
consensus. At the Prague Ministerial Council in January 1992, the OSCE 
member states agreed that if a member state clearly and uncorrectedly violates 
the OSCE commitments, appropriate action should be taken without the consent 
of the state concerned. This principle is called “consensus minus one” and it was 
used for the first time in the case of Yugoslavia in 1992. Due to escalating 
conflicts in former Yugoslavia its OSCE membership was suspended. 
Furthermore, in December 1992 at the Stockholm Ministerial Council, the OSCE 
member states adopted the principle “consensus minus two”. That means that if 
two participating states were in dispute, the OSCE can instruct them to reconcile 
regardless if they support or object to the instructions.    
 
6.4. OSCE Activities (Goals and Objectives) 
Due to the OSCE’s comprehensive approach to security, the work of the 
organization is divided into three divisions. All three divisions - politico-military, 
economic and environmental and the human dimension aim to contribute to the 
OSCE’s key goals of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and 
post-conflict rehabilitation. 
 
6.4.1. Politico-Military Dimension 
The politico-military dimension includes many commitments and regulations 
concerning military transparency and co-operation. The OSCE member states 
need to comply with a number of mechanisms dealing with conflict prevention 
and resolution. 
The dimension focuses on the following activities:  
Arms control has become a worrying issue after the end of the Cold War. At the 
same time, a large amount of weapons were purchased illegally and armed 
conflicts broke out in the OSCE region. Both occurrences called for the OSCE to 
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step in. In order to assist the participating states with the destruction of those 
weapons and to stop the violence, the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) 
adopted many documents to reduce the uncontrolled spread of weapons and to 
regulate the transfers of conventional arms.  
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) depict one of the main 
components of arms control. They are provisions aiming to strengthen the 
exchange of information on military activities among the OSCE member states. 
They also include measures on risk reduction, compliance and verification 
regarding military matters.  
The FSC in Vienna serves as a forum for negotiations and consultations for the 
representatives from the OSCE states on military security and stability. However, 
the practical work such as training and assistance is executed by the Conflict 
Prevention Centre (CPC) at the OSCE headquarters in Vienna and by the OSCE 
field missions.  
The OSCE also assists the participating states with border security and 
management. The organization stands for open and secure borders that 
facilitate travel, commerce and the protection of human rights. Border monitoring 
activities also incorporate conflict prevention and post-conflict management. In 
2005, at the Ministerial Council in Ljubljana, Slovenia, the OSCE participating 
adopted the Border Security and Management Concept (BSMC). The BSMC 
displays a political framework with clear objectives and principles on issues 
concerning cooperation and security at the borders of the OSCE region. In order 
for the OSCE states to comply with the BSMS, the OSCE offers capacity-building 
programmes153 and institutional support. 
The OSCE is also involved in combating terrorism through its knowledge and 
expertise in conflict prevention, crisis management and early warning. The OSCE 
is well aware that particular circumstances or factors foster terroristic activities 
and for that reason, it effectively fights terrorism through social, economic and 
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 For instance, in 2009, the OSCE established Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe, 
Tajikistan. Border officers from all OSCE member and partner states (including Afghanistan) are 
trained to promote cross-border co-operation in the region. 
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political programmes (for example policing and border monitoring), as well as 
specific measurements that combat terrorism on a global level.    
As mentioned above, the OSCE is devoted to conflict prevention. Through its 
observation mechanisms and data gathering it can spot a potential conflict at the 
early stages. With the help of military information exchange and confidence-
building measures nothing in the OSCE region is left unnoticed. The OSCE 
promotes peaceful settlement of conflicts by organizing various workshops and 
projects and by encouraging constructive political dialogue to mitigate mistrust or 
hatred between conflicting parties. In addition, it also assists in the rehabilitation 
process and post-conflict reconstruction.  
Until now, the OSCE’s conflict prevention skills have been put to use in the 
Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Generally, the OSCE works together 
with the representatives of the UN and other international organizations.  
The OSCE engages in helping the OSCE participating states to implement 
military reforms. The FSC acts as a political forum where issues concerning 
military conduct are discussed and commitments on military capabilities are 
taken. Once again, we should emphasize that these commitments are politically, 
not legally binding. The practical work is carried out by the Conflict Prevention 
Centre and the OSCE field missions. All the activities such as assisting in 
reforming the legislation, training personnel, downsizing or conversion of the 
armies are executed in accordance with the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-
Military Aspects of Security.154 To examine the implementation process of these 
commitments, the OSCE states get together at the conferences in Vienna. The 
most prominent is the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting. 
Effective policing can reduce the risks of trans-national and organized crime. 
For this reason, the OSCE endeavours to have police advisers in several field 
missions. The missions organize various police projects and programmes 
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 The Code of Conduct was adopted at the Budapest Summit in 1994. On one side, the Code 
emphasizes the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and on the other side it states new norms 
regarding the function of armed forces in democratic societies. It basically expects from the 
OSCE states to always be in control of their military, paramilitary and security forces and to make 
sure that the forces are in compliance with international humanitarian law as well as the rule of 
law of the OSCE state. 
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ranging from education and training to administrative and structural reforms. The 
OSCE police operations form an integral part of the OSCE’s fight against human 
and drugs trafficking, arms smuggling and violations of human rights.  
In 1999, the OSCE launched the Kosovo Police Service School, a security and 
public safety institution. The police officers were trained and educated in police, 
border, correctional, fire and rescue services. The creation of this school, later 
renamed the Kosovo Centre for Public Safety Education and Development, was 
a stepping-stone for sustaining democratic policing principles and the protection 
of human rights in Kosovo.  
 
6.4.2. Economic and Environmental Dimension 
Although the OSCE is not an economic organization, it is involved in a number of 
economic and environmental issues due to its comprehensive approach to 
security. Economic growth and prosperity influence peace and stability. As a 
result, the OSCE is actively engaged in various activities that promote a safe and 
healthy economic environment throughout the OSCE region.  
Firstly, the OSCE monitors the economic and environmental conditions in the 
OSCE states and warns them in case of a potential conflict. Secondly, it assists 
the states in implementing policies and initiatives linked to economic and 
environmental development. This takes place predominantly in the OSCE states 
that are in a process of transition. The OSCE organizes conferences and 
seminars, advocates the economic and environmental OSCE norms and 
standards and cooperates on relevant projects with other international 
organizations.   
The economic activities cover combating money laundering and the financing of 
terrorism, promoting good governance, supporting transport development and 
security, assisting migration management, strengthening of small- and medium-
sized enterprises, monitoring the economic impact of trafficking and taking action 
against corruption and money laundering.155 
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 See: www.osce.org 
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Representatives of the OSCE member states get together once a year at the 
Economic and Environmental Forum to discuss and examine the development of 
free-market economies; propose appropriate mechanisms to enhance the free-
market economies and to facilitate the cooperation with other international 
organizations.   
Regarding the environmental issues, the OSCE strives for restoring and 
maintaining a sound ecological balance in the air, water and soil.156 The 
environmental activities range from water management, management of natural 
resources, disposal of toxic and radioactive waste, soil degradation, energy 
security to the implementation of the Environment and Security Initiative 
(ENVSEC). Above all, it tries to raise the awareness of environmental threats 
especially among young people through school programmes and summer 
camps.  
The ENVSEC was established in 2003 by the UNDP, UNEP, OSCE, NATO, 
UNECE and REC. These organizations joined forces to peacefully resolve 
political, economic and social problems of our time. The Initiative also 
comprehends the linkage between natural environment and human security. 
Therefore, the OSCE takes part in the Initiative by assisting governments in 
developing projects. 
In addition, since 2002 the OSCE has been involved with the Aarhus Centre, a 
public information centre launched by the Aarhus Convention. The Convention 
supports access to information, public participation and access to justice 
regarding environmental issues. It also recognizes the close connection between 
environmental and human rights. The Centre works together with governmental 
and non-governmental organizations and the OSCE cooperates with the Centre 
by providing assistance with environmental policy-making and implementation. 
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6.4.3. Human Dimension 
“Our efforts to promote peace and stability must go hand in hand with our 
determination to ensure full respect of human rights, fundamental freedoms and 
rule of law.”157  
The OSCE commitments in the human dimension go far beyond the basic 
protection of human rights. The OSCE participating states are politically bound to 
promote tolerance and democracy building by establishing and strengthening 
democratic institutions. The principles of the human dimension have been 
defined in the Helsinki Final Act, but in the course of time the OSCE has 
developed specific mechanisms to implement those principles.   
The OSCE human dimension’s goals and objectives are: 
Combating trafficking in human beings is one of the OSCE’s top priorities. 
The OSCE has been addressing this compelling and complex issue since the 
earliest appearances. Hundreds of thousands of women, children and men are 
trafficked every year. Whether they are being trafficked from the OSCE state or 
to the OSCE state, trafficking in human beings affects the entire OSCE region. 
The OSCE accepts the UN’s definition of trafficking in human beings that says: 
“the exploitation of prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, 
forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the 
removal of organs.”158 Trafficking in human beings is both a crime and a human 
rights violation.  
The OSCE established the Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator 
for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings that assists the OSCE member 
states in reforming legislation, training law enforcement authorities and especially 
in developing and implementing anti-trafficking policies. In 2003, the OSCE 
member states agreed upon the OSCE Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in 
Human Beings. This document contains numerous recommendations for the 
OSCE states on how to implement anti-trafficking commitments and thus serves 
as a strategic long-term plan on fighting trafficking in the OSCE region.   
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The OSCE promotes democracy and thereby democratization across the OSCE 
area. The organization supports the establishment and development of 
democratic institutions in the OSCE states, thus enhancing a democratic culture. 
Democratic capacity building involves all aspects of democracy, ranging from 
universal political participation, a transparent judicial system and governing via 
an embedded rule of law.     
The OSCE believes that education is the key to conflict prevention, but also a 
key component of rehabilitation in the post-conflict period. The OSCE is known 
for its many programmes, seminars, projects and trainings aimed at 
professionals and laymen in the areas of human rights, environmental, legal and 
gender studies. The organization also specializes in educating police forces such 
as the Kosovo Police Service School. 
One of the ODIHR’s (OSCE’s) core activities includes election monitoring 
hence the promotion of democratic elections. The OSCE believes that a 
legitimate government relies on free and democratic elections. Thereupon, the 
ODIHR has developed a specific observation methodology that offers assistance 
to the member states before, during and after the elections. Election observation 
is carried out in every OSCE member state. The observers’ job is to monitor, 
evaluate if elections comply with the OSCE standards and suggest possible 
improvements.    
The OSCE advocates gender equality within the OSCE member states, as well 
as within the organization itself. In cooperation with other international and local 
partners, it encourages equal opportunities for women and men and promotes 
gender equality policies and practices. The goal is to empower women and give 
the local authorities skills in gender issues. The OSCE also provides assistance 
in building gender equality mechanisms. As far as the organization itself is 
concerned, the OSCE supports gender balance in the work place where women 
and men are treated equally.   
The OSCE strongly stands for safeguarding the human rights of all citizens 
within the OSCE region.  Everybody is entitled to enjoy fundamental freedoms 
such as freedom of movement, freedom of expression, religion… Therefore, the 
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organization severely condemns racism, discrimination, intolerance, torture and 
trafficking in human beings. The OSCE and its institutions, first and foremost, 
monitor the human rights situation in every OSCE member state and report on it. 
It particularly focuses on freedom of assembly, fair trials and the use of death 
penalty. It also organizes trainings and workshops in the area of human rights for 
government officials, law enforcement officers and others. Moreover, it provides 
assistance to local human rights watchdogs and institutions.  
Securing media freedom is another OSCE priority since free and pluralistic 
media epitomizes a democratic society. The OSCE Representative on Freedom 
of the Media monitors the media landscape in all OSCE member states and 
raises a red flag in case of violations of freedom of expression. The OSCE trains 
journalists and technicians and also ensures the freedom of internet media.  
The OSCE protects minority rights. The Office of High Commissioner on 
National Minorities aims to identify ethnic tensions at the earliest stages and 
seeks to find an appropriate solution. The OSCE especially supports the political 
rights and civil society development for Roma and Sinti communities.   
The organization actively promotes the embedded rule of law, not only as a 
legal framework, but also as a guarantee for respecting human dignity. The 
OSCE provides assistance in legislative reforms, law enforcements, anti-
corruption and anti-trafficking in human beings actions. It also strengthens the 
human rights situation and diligently addresses issues on refugee and internally 
displaced persons. 
Last but not least, the OSCE firmly encourages tolerance and non-
discrimination in all 56 OSCE member states and strongly condemns racism, 
xenophobia, anti-Semitism and discrimination. In this regard, the OSCE works 
together with other European and UN organizations. The ODIHR is the core the 
OSCE body to promote tolerance and non-discrimination. It gathers data and 
statistics on hate crimes in the member states and publishes the information. It 
supports national initiatives and best practices in the fight against intolerance and 
also assists the member state in formulating and implementing legislation on 
hate crimes.  
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7. Brief History of Kosovo 
Paul Cohen once wrote that history consists of three keys: fact, myth and 
experience.159 He also stated that ordinary human lives are seldom driven by 
facts, meaning that experience and myth are much more influential than factual 
truth. We are not blindly led to truth, but rather find the truth that is the most 
convenient for us, the truth that fits our values.160 The history of Kosovo is no 
exception. For generations, Serbs and Albanians have claimed the ownership of 
Kosovo’s territory with their own respective historians arguing about “the true” 
history of the region. Albanians claim that they are direct descendants of the 
Illyrians, the earliest known inhabitants of this region. On the other hand, the 
Serbs are convinced that Kosovo lay at the heart of their medieval kingdoms with 
Christian monasteries and churches standing all across the region and that 
during that period there was practically no Albanian population present.161           
 
7.1. Kosovo’s History Prior to the 20th Century 
In early history, the region formed part of the Roman Empire and later it was 
absorbed into the Byzantine Empire. In the 6th century, South Slavs including the 
Serbs started to move into the Balkans, settling all across the Balkan peninsula. 
However, in the south-west of the Balkans, an ethnically and linguistically distinct 
Albanian settlement had already begun to develop.162 As Byzantine power 
declined, the Serbs seized power in the region. Kosovo became part of Medieval 
Serbia and later the Serbian Empire. The ruling Nemanjić dynasty built many 
Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries all across the Serbian territory, 
using Pristina and Prizren as their administrative and economic capitals. 
According to available accounts, between the mid-12th and the mid-14th century 
the region was in Slav hands, but it did include a small Albanian minority.163 
However, in 1355 the Serbian state collapsed and dissolved into small fiefdoms. 
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The Ottoman Empire took hold of Serbian weakness and proceeded with its 
expansion. 
The most important battle for the Serbian psyche was fought in 1389 against the 
Turkish Ottoman Empire in Kosovo Polje (west of Pristina). Although the Serbs 
and their allies were defeated, the battle represents an emblem for the fall of the 
Serbian empire and consequently Turkish domination in the Balkans. It is a true 
tale of heroism and symbolizes Serbian resistance. According to the historian 
Noel Malcolm, Kosovo is the birthplace of Serbian nationalism. In his view, 
contemporary Serbian warriors want to conquer Kosovo and take it back from the 
occupier. Since the Turks are gone, they want to take it from the Albanians.164    
By the mid-15th century, all of Serbia (including Kosovo) was ruled by the 
Ottomans. Most Albanians converted to Islam, while many Serbs moved 
northward to Bosnia, the Austrian and Hungarian lands. Nevertheless, some also 
converted to Islam. Through the course of time, Muslim Albanians started to 
occupy the arable lands that Serbs left behind and slowly but surely, the ethnic 
balance changed in favour of Albanian speakers. Another blow for the Christian 
Serbs occurred in 1766 when the Ottomans abolished the Patriarchate of Peć 
causing great disturbance among the Christian population. In a greater measure 
this led to the abatement of the cultural significance of Kosovo for Serbs in 
general. At the same time, ethnic Albanians started to identify themselves with 
the region considering it as home. By the late 19th century Prizen had become a 
vibrant Albanian cultural centre. There, in 1878 the League for the Defence of the 
Rights of the Albanian Nation (League of Prizren) was established. Its main goals 
were the protection of the interests of the entire Albanian population, the creation 
of some sort of autonomous administration, as well as the promotion of the 
Albanian and not the Ottoman identity among Albanians. The movement sparked 
many insurrections across vilayets with Albanian inhabitants, but in the end they 
were forced to abandon their battles.165  
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7.2. Kosovo in the 20th Century 
In the early 19th century Serbia won independence from the Ottoman Empire 
while Kosovo stayed under the Turkish rule. In 1912, during the first Balkan War, 
the Serbian Kingdom regained control of Kosovo. Serbs would call this military 
action liberation, while Albanians were not supportive of the new rule. Legally, 
however, Kosovo was incorporated into the Serbian Kingdom in 1918. During 
those years, the region was occupied by Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria until 
1918, when it also legally became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes (since 1929 Yugoslavia). The Serbian forces forced thousands of 
Kosovo Albanians to move out of Kosovo while simultaneously encouraging 
Serbs to migrate to Kosovo. Even though the plan of Serbian colonization of 
Kosovo was to reverse the population imbalance, Albanians always represented 
the vast majority.  
During World War II, Yugoslavia was occupied by the Axis powers. Most of the 
Kosovo territory was occupied by Italy and united with Albania, while other parts 
were under German and Bulgarian control. Thousands of Serbian colonists were 
chased off Kosovo or killed by the Albanians. In 1944, Kosovo was liberated by 
the Yugoslav partisans with the help of the Albanians, who were promised that 
the territory could stay a part of Greater Albania once the occupiers had been 
defeated. The Yugoslav government did not keep their promise, so the Albanians 
rebelled, but the Yugoslav forces continuously crushed any Albanian uprisings. 
After the war, Kosovo was granted the status of an autonomous region within the 
Republic of Serbia, but it was kept on a tight leash. Later on, in 1974 Kosovo was 
granted full autonomy and was practically considered one of the republics of 
Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav government acknowledged the ethnic Albanian 
identity and supported the involvement of Albanians in political and administrative 
life. These political decisions improved conditions for Albanians in Kosovo 
creating an educated and ambitious generation with a strong Albanian national 
consciousness. Due to the high birth rates among the ethnic Albanian population 
and Serbian emigration to Serbia proper, the Albanian share of the population in 
Kosovo increased significantly. The Serbian population felt threatened and 
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regularly complained of harassment by the Albanians. However, Kosovo as one 
of the poorest regions of Yugoslavia was also coping with a tough economic 
situation. Albanians wished that Kosovo would be granted the status of a republic 
within the Yugoslav state, and to demonstrate their disappointment and 
dissatisfaction over the autonomy status of Kosovo, Kosovo Albanian students 
gathered in 1981 on the streets to protest. The protests were forcefully put down 
by the Yugoslav forces, which then escalated into violent riots. Again intense 
police pressure was applied and the riots resulted in numerous arrests. Ethnic 
tensions continued to grow through the 1980s and 1990s.   
Milošević, once he rose to power, manipulated these grievances and stripped 
Kosovo of its autonomy in 1989. With this move Kosovo was incorporated into 
Serbia. Kosovo Albanians, entirely opposed to this decision, organized repeated 
protests that were again suppressed by the Yugoslav forces.  The Milošević 
regime dissolved Kosovo’s assembly and shut down Albanian schools. After the 
collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, a new Yugoslav state 
with only Serbia and Montenegro was established in 1992. Kosovo Albanians, on 
the other hand, created a parallel state run by president Ibrahim Rugova whose 
politics centred around non-violent resistance to Serbian control. Nevertheless, 
some Kosovo Albanians believed that Rugova’s peaceful resistance was not 
bringing any results and so they formed a guerrilla organization called the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). After its creation in 1996, they began with attacks 
against the Serbian authorities in Kosovo. Over the next months and years, the 
clashes between the KLA on one side and the Yugoslav military, Serbian police 
and Serbian paramilitary groups on the other side became more brutal, more 
violent and more frequent. Once thousands of ethnic Albanians were forced to 
flee their homes, and the international community realized that the situation in 
Kosovo was a serious issue. The international community attempted to end the 
conflict with a series of negotiations and cease-fire agreements. In 1999, their 
efforts to solve the conflict peacefully bore no results. For this reason in March 
1999, NATO began air attacks on Yugoslav targets in Kosovo and Serbia proper. 
The Yugoslav and Serbian forces reacted to the bombings by extensive ethnic 
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cleansing against Kosovo Albanians. In June 1999, NATO stopped the military 
attacks forcing the Yugoslav and Serbian forces to withdraw from Kosovo. As a 
result, on 10 June 1999 the United Nations Interim Administration Mission of 
Kosovo (UNMIK) was established with the intention of ensuring peaceful and 
improved living conditions for all inhabitants of Kosovo.166  
   
7.3. Kosovo’s Recent History 
On June 10 1999, the Yugoslav and Serbian governments agreed in light of the 
Kumanovo agreement to transfer governance of the province to UNMIK. At the 
same time, a NATO-led international peace-keeping force, the Kosovo Force 
(KFOR), was dispatched to provide protection to the UN mission. While Albanian 
refugees were slowly returning to the region, the non-Albanians (mostly Serbs 
and Roma) fearing reprisals began to flee the region. Many in fact were driven 
out, intimidated and attacked. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 
reported that over 240,000 members of local minorities fled their homes in 
1999.167 
In March 2004, a protest escalated into riots perpetuated by ethnic violence 
leaving 19 people dead, 4100 displaced and 27 Orthodox churches and 
monasteries burnt.168 In 2004, Belgrade reported that there were about 220,000 
displaced Kosovo Serbs and Roma in Serbia proper. However, this claim was 
challenged when the European Stability Initiative reported that there were 65,000 
displaced Kosovo Serbs and Roma in Serbia proper – many of whom had 
already sold their homes in Kosovo and were not planning to return.169 
In 2005, the international community began with talks concerning the final status 
of Kosovo. The idea was supported by the UN and in 2007 the Martti Ahtisaari 
draft plan that suggested “supervised independence” for Kosovo was submitted. 
While there was some progress made in terms of technical matters, the Serbian 
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government in Belgrade was permanently at odds with the Kosovo government in 
Pristina over the status question.  
On February 17 2008, Kosovo’s Parliament declared independence. Serbia, 
however, called this declaration illegal and unilateral. In October 2008, Serbia 
requested that the UN General Assembly submitted the question of the legality of 
independence to the International Court of Justice. In July 2010, the International 
Court decided to recognize Kosovo’s declaration of independence. By 2011, 
there are 76 UN countries that have recognized Kosovo as an independent and 
sovereign state. The November 2009 elections were a test of democracy for a 
new born state and according to international observers they were conducted 
peacefully and in a fair manner. In spite of this, Pristina still faces difficulties over 
the status of the small Serb minority. In Northern Kosovo there are many Serb 
dominated areas and their population opposes the authority from Pristina and still 
considers Kosovo a part of Serbian territory.170 According to the International 
Displacement Monitoring Centre, as of December 2010, there were an estimated 
230,000 internally displaced persons from Kosovo living in Serbia proper, 
including 20,000 displaced Roma and 19,000 displaced persons within 
Kosovo.171     
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8. The Presence of the OSCE in Kosovo 
8.1. The CSCE Mission of Long Duration 
The OSCE has been present in the territory of Kosovo for almost two decades. 
Its roots go back to 1992, when the then Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe (CSCE, now OSCE) deployed its Mission of Long Duration 
to Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina). In July 1992 at the CSCE 
Helsinki summit, the crisis in Yugoslavia and specifically the Kosovo issue was 
on the agenda. The resolution adopted called for “immediate preventive action 
and urged Belgrade to halt its repression of Kosovar Albanians and to engage in 
serious dialogue in talks chaired by international mediators”.172 In August 1992, 
the Mission of Long Duration was dispatched and its primary tasks included: 
 promoting dialogue between relevant authorities and representatives of 
the populations and communities in the region 
 collecting information on all aspects concerning violations of human rights 
and promoting solutions to such problems 
 managing contact points for solving problems identified 
 assisting in providing information on relevant legislation on human rights, 
protection of national minorities, free media and democratic elections173  
Bellamy discussed in “Kosovo and International Society” seven phases of 
international engagement in the 1990s in Kosovo. He believes that the 
establishment of the CSCE Mission in Kosovo in 1992 symbolized the end of the 
non-engagement and the start of the limited engagement phase. 174According to 
Bellamy there was a general belief that Milošević opposed the idea of an 
international presence within Yugoslavia. However, Milan Panić, who served as 
the Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 1992-1993, 
persuaded him into accepting the presence of the CSCE. Ambassador Bøgh 
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positively assessed Panić’s intervention that for a short period of time enabled a 
dialogue between Belgrade, Pristina and the CSCE. Nevertheless, as observed, 
the Serbs and the Albanians had fundamentally contradictory demands and 
views on the status of Kosovo within the FRY, but the presence of the CSCE still 
played an important role for the community of Kosovo Albanians since they 
believed that the Mission was internationalizing their standing. The CSCE 
documents at that time described Kosovo as “a region” of Yugoslavia. It is 
essential to know that the CSCE’s priority was never to settle the Kosovo status 
question, but rather improving the state of human rights in the area.   
8.1.1. The CSCE Mission’s Deficiencies  
Already at the beginning of its establishment this mission was facing extreme 
challenges and could never develop to its full potential. Firstly, the CSCE mission 
to Yugoslavia started with only 12 members and later enlarged to 20 in 
November 1992. Those 20 members were scattered across different offices in 
Belgrade, Pristina, Novi Pazar (Sladžak), and Subotica. Initially, the mission’s 
office in Kosovo started off with only three members. This fact says a lot about 
the under-representation of the CSCE observers in Kosovo. Additional human 
resources were clearly needed. Secondly, the mission was poorly financed. It did 
in fact received supplemental funding and voluntary donations from member 
states, but it was not enough to go beyond rudimentary monitoring. It was lacking 
money, but also logistical support. On account of these deficiencies the mission’s 
work was hardly active and the CSCE contributed little to human rights reporting. 
One positive exception was illustrated in December 1992, when the CSCE 
successfully assisted in the Yugoslav elections. The final results were rather 
discouraging since the mission concluded that elections were neither free nor 
fair. Needless to say, the majority of the Kosovo Albanians did not attend the 
elections, but tried to hold so-called shadow elections.  
The mission’s main goal was to promote dialogue, but it could only function 
within a very limited framework. In 1992, as seen from the prospective of the 
international community, Kosovo was a part of Yugoslavia and the CSCE also 
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acted upon it. For this reason the Kosovo Albanians were not very happy with the 
mission at the beginning and refused to cooperate. Even the CSCE reports 
described the Albanian leaders less flexible than their Serbian counterparts. In 
the 1990s there were essentially two main political movements within the Kosovo 
Albanian community. Ibrahim Rugova and his followers believed that an active 
dialogue with Belgrade was crucial for the improvement of living conditions in 
Kosovo. One of his main goals was to peacefully raise the international 
awareness of the province. He promoted a passive resistance movement and 
strongly believed that with such an attitude, Kosovo Albanians would get what 
they wanted. Rugova, however, if he was to cooperate with the international 
community had to implicitly legitimize the Serbian rule over Kosovo. He 
considered the mission to be a useful tool and with its help he could get word out 
about the perpetual human rights violations by the Serbian authorities. On the 
other hand an ever-growing group of radicals opposed the views of the Rugova 
followers. Any acceptance of Serbian rule was outside their thinking.  
8.1.2. The CSCE Mission’s Withdrawal 
The CSCE mission could not be assessed as successful since it did not 
contribute a lot to diminishing human rights abuse, but according to Axel J. 
Bellamy the mission made two important steps in improving the deteriorating 
human rights situation. First of all, the presence of the CSCE symbolized the 
start of the international community’s engagement. Secondly, the mission also 
stimulated the NGOs to expand their involvement in Kosovo.175       
As mentioned before, the mission faced certain limitations right from the 
beginning. It functioned within the framework of a limited capability and a 
restricted mandate. The mission was given a six-month mandate from 28 
September 1992 that was subsequently extended until the end of July. However, 
in 1993 Panić, who supported the CSCE involvement with the Yugoslav 
government and also made it possible, was forced to resign. Consequently, with 
Panić being out of the political picture, Milošević, who was never fond of the 
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CSCE on Yugoslav soil, announced shortly before the mandate should be 
renewed that there would be no renewal of the mandate. The mission withdrew 
from Yugoslavia in June 1993.   
One of the reasons for the expulsion of the mission could be the failure of the 
CSCE to reinstate Yugoslavia’s membership. The membership was temporarily 
cancelled due to the growing violence in Croatia and Bosnia. The government of 
the FRY reasoned that if Yugoslavia did not have access to the organization, why 
should it feel obliged to fulfil the missions’ recommendations and proposals. 
However, as much as the non-membership seemed to irritate the Serbs it was 
not the main reason for the expulsion since the mandate for the presence of the 
CSCE was accepted and renewed after Yugoslavia had been expelled from the 
organization.176  
Alex J. Bellamy claimed that there were three key factors for the expulsion. First 
of all, the mission was “welcomed” to Yugoslavia by Prime Minister Panić and its 
expulsion reassured Milošević’s power. Secondly, the Serbs were worried that 
the mission signalled the internationalization of the Kosovo conflict. Finally 
(Bellamy points out that this factor was small in scale), the presence of the CSCE 
impeded Serbian “security operations” in Kosovo.177 This third key factor was 
confirmed after the mission left the province. “The Human Rights Committee (…) 
reported that within two months of the CSCE’s withdrawal more than 90 political 
activists had been arrested.”178 The expulsion the CSCE mission caused 
crackdowns against Kosovo Albanians. The authorities arrested not only people 
who worked with the organization, but also many intellectuals, journalists, local 
politicians and persons who worked with the NGOs. The international community 
noted a worsening of the human rights situation in the province, yet these 
problems were of a secondary importance in comparison to the horrific war in 
Bosnia. “Turning a blind eye to fate of Kosovo was seen as a price worth paying 
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for peace elsewhere.”179 In the years to come the international society hardly 
ever engaged with the “Kosovo issue” constructively. It took an armed conflict to 
catch the attention of the international community.  
8.2. UN Resolution 1160 
As noted before, not every Kosovo Albanian agreed with Rugova’s peaceful 
resistance approach. About five years later, after the CSCE mission had closed 
its doors in Kosovo, the perpetuating oppression by the Serbian authorities 
sparked the revival of the Kosovo Liberation Army. From the beginning of 1998, 
the KLA started to carry out attacks against Serbian security forces, civilians of 
Serbian ethnicity and Albanians who “collaborated” with the Serbians. Their key 
objective was to gain Kosovo’s independence with the strategies and tactics of 
guerrilla warfare. The Yugoslav forces did not wait long to fight back. Excessive 
violence caused many civilian casualties and this horrific situation caught the 
attention of the international community. Consequently, on 31 March 1998 the 
UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1160.  
The Resolution 1160 condemned the violence by both sides, the use of 
excessive force by the Serbian police as well as acts of terrorism by the KLA. It 
also condemned any group or individual who indirectly supported terrorist activity 
in Kosovo through the financing of arms or trainings.   
Furthermore, the Security Council called upon the government of the FRY to try 
to find a political solution regarding the issue of Kosovo and to implement the 
demands of the Contact Group.180 It also called upon the Kosovo Albanian 
leadership to condemn all terrorist actions and to strive for their goals by peaceful 
                                                 
179
 Alex J. Bellamy, Kosovo and International Society, 2002, p.48 
180
 The Contact Group is the name of an informal group of influential countries that play an 
important role in policy developing in the region of Western Balkans.  The group was initially 
established due to the crisis in Bosnia in the early 1990s. The countries that form the Contact 
Group are the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Russia. The CG 
consists basically of the UN Security Council Permanent Members, except China, and other 
countries that dispatch the largest number of troops and contribute the most to peace building in 
the region. Generally, representatives of the EU Council, EU Presidency, European Commission 
and NATO also attend the CG meetings. Contact Group public statements reflect the position of 
the international community's policy in the region. 
The Contact Group stated in March 1998 that the current situation is untenable and that the risk 
of an escalating conflict requires immediate action. It also stated that an appropriate international 
involvement is essential for confidence building between the parties. 
104 
 
means. Both sides were called upon to engage into a constructive dialogue 
without preconditions. 
According to Resolution 1160, the UN Security Council supported the efforts of 
the OSCE to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis in Kosovo and invited the 
OSCE to keep the Secretary-General informed about the situation and the 
measures taken by the organization. Additionally, the Security Council called for 
the return of the OSCE long-term mission. It also called upon the FRY to accept 
a mission by the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office that 
would involve a specific mandate for dealing with issues in Kosovo.   
The OSCE intended to stop the violence and advocate a political solution. The 
attempt to establish an OSCE mission in Kosovo was doomed to failure since the 
FRY strongly opposed the idea. Its prime goal was to assure Yugoslav renewal 
of the OSCE membership that ceased in 1992.  
As far as the international community was concerned, the Contact Group, the EU 
and particularly the Unites States under the umbrella of NATO joined forces to 
find a suitable political solution. Due to the increasing violence in summer 1998 in 
the province, NATO started to threaten the FYR with airstrikes if the Yugoslav 
government did not put an end to the continuous violation of human rights.181  
 
8.3. UN Resolution 1199 
By June 1998, the KLA controlled about 40 % of Kosovo territory.182 The Serbian 
forces struck back by deploying special police units and the Yugoslav Army. 
Needless to say, the intensification of violence led to many civilian casualties. On 
23 September 1998, responding to the serious concerns from the international 
community, the UN passed Resolution 1199.  
The Security Council was gravely concerned about intensifying violence and 
refugee crisis in Kosovo and therefore it severely condemned the use of force by 
Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav Army. The circumstances caused many 
civilian casualties and many were displaced from their homes. The refugees fled 
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to northern Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and other European countries. 
There were estimated over 230,000 persons who fled their homes of whom about 
50,000 persons were living without shelter and basic necessities.183 
In this resolution the Security Council had a tougher approach towards violence 
and terrorism caused by any party and by any means. It also expressed 
concerns due to violations of prohibitions imposed by resolution 1160. This 
resolution signalled that the conflict had taken on a new aspect also for the UN. 
The UN feared that the rapid deterioration of human rights situation could lead to 
a humanitarian catastrophe and therefore it is emphasized in the resolution that 
the rights of all inhabitants of Kosovo should be respected.  
It also demanded that all parties immediately stop their violent actions and it 
urged that everybody should fully respect the ceasefire. The FRY and Kosovo 
Albanian leadership were called upon to start a meaningful dialogue in order to 
reduce the risks of a humanitarian disaster and to instantly try to improve the 
human rights situation. Furthermore, the resolution demanded that the main 
parties in the conflict, the FRY and Kosovo Albanian leadership, start to 
cooperate with the international community without preconditions so that the 
crisis could be averted and political solution could be found.  
Equally as in resolution 1160, the UN demanded that the Kosovo Albanian 
leadership condemned all terrorist actions and pursued its political goals 
peacefully. On the other hand, the UN Security Council demanded that the FRY 
respected the obligations stated in the UN resolution 1160 and implemented all 
measures in order to achieve a political solution. In resolution 1199, it is also 
specified that the authorities of the FRY and the Kosovo Albanian leaders should 
fully cooperate in the investigation conducted by the Prosecutor of the 
International Tribunal for the Formal Yugoslavia in order to determine whether 
any violations of jurisdiction had occurred.184  
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This resolution definitely had a more rigorous approach towards the violence 
committed on the territory of Kosovo. It strongly condemned the violence 
perpetuated by the Yugoslav side and expressed serious concerns over an 
impending humanitarian catastrophe. The international community realized that a 
worrisome situation in Kosovo was disturbing the peace and security of the 
region.  
 
8.4. The Holbrooke-Milošević Agreement 
Richard Holbrooke was a distinguished American diplomat, who served from 
1997 until 1999 as the special presidential envoy of the United States to the 
Balkans. He was asked by President Clinton to take that post as a private citizen 
on a pro-bono basis due to his knowledge and experiences in the region. As the 
assistant secretary for European and Canadian Affairs (1994-1996), he is 
credited as the chief architect of the Dayton Peace Accords.  
He persuaded Milošević into accepting the terms of the Milošević-Holbrooke 
Agreement that was finalized between 13 and 15 October 1998. Milošević 
agreed to reduce the number of the Yugoslav troops in Kosovo, support the 
establishment of an unarmed “verification mission” (conducted by the OSCE) and 
to engage in a constructive political dialogue with the leaders of Kosovo Albanian 
community. Holbrooke also made sure that Milošević understood that if there 
was any resistance to the agreement. NATO would not hesitate to intervene. 
Holbrooke’s negotiating style was a mixture of diplomacy and force that in his 
eyes had proved to be a good formula since he had also persuaded the 
conflicting parties of the war in Bosnia to sign the Dayton Agreement.185  
Holbrooke stated in a press conference on October 13, 1998 that he is highly 
concerned about a tragic situation in Kosovo and that effectiveness of the 
agreement with Milošević would be proven in “compliance with UN Resolution 
1199 and with actions on the ground in Kosovo regarding the deployment of 
security forces, the return of refugees to their homes, the end of military violence 
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on all sides or armed violence on all sides, the repairing of damage (…) and 
destruction, and the creation most importantly of a political process that gives the 
people of Kosovo autonomy and self-determination.”186 
 
8.5.   The OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission 
In October 1998, OSCE was asked in line with the Holbrooke-Milošević 
agreement to deploy the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). From the beginning 
of the Holbrooke-Miloševićs’ negotiations, an international verification mission 
was actually quite a thorn in Milošević’s flesh. He opposed the idea of the 
international presence since he believed that the conflict was an internal problem 
of Yugoslavia.187 Nevertheless, the Western states persisted that there must be 
an international group that could verify the compliance of the Holbrooke-
Milošević agreement. Eventually Milošević settled for the OSCE, because he 
preferred the OSCE to any NATO or UN deployment. The OSCE mission was 
preferable since its verifiers were unarmed, the size of the mission was relatively 
small, and the OSCE decisions are made with the consent of all 55 member 
states which categorizes a decision-making process almost a mission 
impossible; in addition, Milošević was familiar with the OSCE since he had 
worked with the CSCE before. Alex J. Bellamy writes that the mission was 
perceived as Milošević’s last chance to avoid war with NATO.188 
These above-mentioned reasons led to the establishment of the KVM in October 
1998, the largest and most challenging OSCE mission until now. The KVM also 
represented the first permanent presence of the international community on the 
territory of Kosovo since 1993. Its primary tasks included: 
verifying FRY compliance with the UN Resolutions 1160 and 1199 
verifying the ceasefire 
monitoring movement of forces 
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promoting human rights and democracy-building189(including supervising 
elections)  
The mission was also assigned to report to the OSCE Permanent Council and 
the UN Security Council.  
The KVM faced many challenges already right from the start. The OSCE learned 
about its new important role immediately after the Holbrooke-Milošević 
agreement. It needed to react in an ad hoc fashion and build up a mission 
quickly. The initial plan was to deploy 2,000 unarmed verifiers, but the actual 
number never surpassed 1,300.190  
With the UN Resolution 1203 that was adopted on 24 October 1998, the mission 
gained additional international legitimacy. The resolution specifically stated that 
the FRY and Kosovo Albanian leadership had to fully cooperate with the OSCE 
KVM and respect the freedom of movement of the OSCE personnel. Holbrooke 
wished that the mission worked proactively and that the verifiers would also train 
the Kosovo Albanian police force. In order for the American administration to 
ensure their upper hand over the developments in Kosovo the OSCE Permanent 
Council decided to appoint American diplomat William Walker as Head of 
Mission. Walker, however, also brought some of his own ideas to the table such 
as prioritizing the human right dimension of the OSCE mission. Walker wanted 
the mission to firstly deal with the internally displaced persons and secondly to 
establish an environment that could enable further negotiations with both 
conflicting parties. He stated when asked about the nature of the mission that “it 
is very important that people can understand that this is going to be verification: 
forward-leaning, proactive, assertive, intrusive, whatever word you want to use, 
verification of compliance - not just observation”. 191 The KVM began to fully 
operate in mid-November 1998. 
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8.5.1. The KVM in Action 
“A Verifier was intended to be much more than a Military Observer.”192 That 
meant that the verifiers acted in accordance with the terms of the Holbrooke-
Milošević agreement and could freely visit the barracks and places where the 
KLA and Serbian forces were situated. The verifiers checked their weapons and 
arms and reported to the OSCE headquarters in Vienna and to the UN. They 
also performed independent investigations and other tasks such as verification of 
human rights, assisting in humanitarian organization, reconstruction planning and 
registration for elections.193  
A KVM report to the UN in December 1998 stated that the mission helped in 
assisting 75,000 internally displaced persons to return home, although as many 
as 175,000 remained displaced.194  
The verifiers assigned to the Regional Centres worked closely with the locals, 
patrolling through villages, normally with a local interpreter. This close contact 
invoked confidence and trust towards OSCE. After a while they got to know the 
residents and the Serb authorities and could easily detect changes or if there 
was something out of the ordinary happening. The villagers felt safe with the 
OSCE present. They also learnt about the needs and requirements of the locals 
and could report their findings to the humanitarian agencies. They were there 
when a crime or an incident occurred and verified human rights violations.  
Regional Centres set up small Field Offices in the most sensitive villages to 
ensure the permanent presence of the OSCE. The verifiers decided on the 
location of a Field Office once they evaluated that there was a strong possibility 
for a confrontation between parties. The village of Mališevo could be described 
as an OSCE success story. This village in Central Kosovo was once a peaceful 
multi-ethnic community. In 1998, the KLA established their home base in this 
village. As a consequence the Serbian authorities demolished Mališevo in 
summer 1998. The people fled their destroyed homes. Once a Field Office was 
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placed there in January 1999, people started to come back and begin to rebuild 
what was left of their homes.  
Many times the OSCE even prevented the incidents from becoming detrimental 
or fatal. The verifiers cooperated with both conflicting parties and try to talk them 
out of breaking the terms of the agreement by emphasizing that for any human 
rights violation there would be serious consequences. The prevention of possible 
crimes was unquestionably an accomplishment for the OSCE. 195 
 
8.5.2. Challenges of the KVM 
As mentioned before, the KVM faced significant problems from the start. Firstly, 
we could say that the OSCE was simply overstrained by this mission since it was 
supposed to be the largest and the most complex of the OSCE missions until that 
date. Secondly, the mandate was not clearly defined. The mandates from the 
UN, the OSCE Permanent Council, and the Holbrooke-Milošević agreement were 
overlapping and even subject to interpretation. Thirdly, the OSCE had never had 
any experience with a project like that. The mission should be a traditional 
peacekeeping mission, but they also envisaged a sizable number of human 
rights experts to participate. Since the verifiers’ primary task was to check the 
compliance with the military aspects of the Holbrooke-Milošević agreement, most 
of the personnel were sent through the Defense Ministries, who were not used to 
dealing with human rights issues. Therefore they were experiencing difficulties 
while developing suitable human rights frameworks.196  
In addition, the mission did not possess appropriate logistical and organizational 
means. There were five Regional OSCE Centres with many Field Offices and the 
headquarters were located in Pristina. While the field presence surely helped a 
lot to get the mission recognized and accepted by the locals, it lacked clear 
leadership and guidance. It occurred that field offices developed their own 
particular priorities and operating procedures. For example, the Regional Centre 
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in Prizren had only one agenda and that was to preserve the ceasefire. The 
verifiers in Prizren could not start with proactive verification if the ceasefire failed.  
The biggest structural deficiency of the KVM was simply the fact that the Kosovo 
Albanians were not included in the talks on deploying an international verification 
mission to Kosovo. The Kosovo Albanian community felt that they had been left 
out.197 Later on, the KVM did make a ceasefire agreement with the KLA, but the 
Kosovo Albanian community was in general on a non-participation track. The 
Holbrooke-Milošević agreement basically acknowledged the Yugoslav territorial 
integrity hence legitimizing the status quo. The Kosovo Albanian leadership, who 
essentially fought for the independence of Kosovo or at least discussed its 
possibility, rejected the agreement. However, once the OSCE started with its 
work, the Kosovo Albanians happily endorsed its activities.    
 
8.5.3. The KVM’s Withdrawal 
Regrettably, at no time during the presence of the KVM in Kosovo were the 
Yugoslav forces reduced to the level agreed in the Holbrooke-Milošević 
agreement.198 Since the KLA was not included in the agreement, it moved its 
forces into the areas that the Yugoslav forces had just left empty. Consequently, 
the Serbs were in no hurry to entirely withdraw their forces from the region. There 
were no signs of progress as the parties could not reach a political settlement. 
The mistrust between the Albanians and the Serbs could not be overcome. With 
the KVM present the situation was tense, but still relatively peaceful (apart from 
some incidents). Many believed it was due to the harsh winter that the KLA and 
the Serb forces kept a low profile. Milošević had done just enough to prevent the 
NATO air strikes, but the situation on the ground did not change.  
Lots of small incidents could have turned really ugly if the OSCE had not been 
present. Unfortunately, on January 15 1999 a horrific massacre occurred in the 
village of Račak with the OSCE verifiers just a kilometre away from the crime 
scene. Abductions and killings took place before, as a matter of fact, they were 
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quite common, but between the KLA and the Yugoslav forces and not in great 
numbers. On that day, the Yugoslav police forces planned to attack Račak, 
because the KLA rebels held control over this village. The Serb police even 
invited the foreign media to cover the story. The KVM was also invited, but the 
verifiers stationed themselves on a hill next to Račak. The Yugoslav forces 
opened fire and the villagers fled their homes. The OSCE verifiers entered Račak 
in the afternoon and heard stories that many civilian Albanians men had been 
abducted. Since it was getting dark, they left the village according to the KVM 
standard procedure. The next day 45 bodies were found scattered on a hillside. 
The verifiers determined that the people killed were ordinary farming people, 
which was later also confirmed by the Head of Mission, William Walker in an 
official statement. The Yugoslav authorities vehemently disagreed with his 
statement and as a result declared Walker persona non grata. He was ordered to 
leave, but after consulting with NATO, he decided to stay. Following the 
massacre, the OSCE immediately set up an office in Račak and assisted with the 
investigation.199 
Later in January, the Serb authorities attacked what was believed to be a KLA 
location in Rogovo. 24 people were killed, and again, the OSCE set up an office 
to help with the investigation and to assist the villagers. The attacks kept being 
repeated. Both sides did not spare with the provocations and the compliance with 
the agreements was not achieved at all.200  
At the end of January 1999, the Contact Group demanded that the Serb and the 
Kosovo Albanian high level delegations meet in Rambouillet, France, to start 
immediate negotiations towards a political settlement based on the Hill plane.201 
The Rambouillet conference marked the end of unarmed intervention and the 
beginning of the coercive diplomacy. The threat of the NATO attacks resonated 
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in the air. Long and exhausting negotiations did not lead to a consensus and the 
talks continued in Paris. In the end, the Kosovo Albanian leadership engaged in 
dialogue towards political solution whereas the Serbs pulled out of the 
negotiations and rejected any settlement proposals.  
In March 1999, the situation in Kosovo had become too dangerous and too 
hostile for the verifiers to stay. On 20 March 1999, the KVM withdrew from 
Kosovo. Overall, from the projected 2,000 only 1,300 had been deployed. Out of 
those 1,300 verifiers only 80 were full-time dealing with human rights issues.202 
Four days later, on 24 March 1999, NATO launched Operation Allied Force. As 
the Secretary of Defence at that time, William S. Cohen, stated the Operation’s 
objective was to “degrade and damage the military and security structure that 
President Milošević has used to depopulate and destroy the Albanian majority in 
Kosovo.”203 Moreover, NATO declared that the air strikes would continue until 
President Milošević agreed with the demands of the international community. 
These demands included: 
 ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of 
violence and repression; 
 ensure the withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and paramilitary 
forces; 
 agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence; 
 agree to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced 
persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid 
organisations; 
 provide credible assurance of his willingness to work on the basis of the 
Rambouillet Accords in the establishment of a political framework 
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agreement for Kosovo in conformity with international law and the Charter 
of the United Nations.204 
8.6. UN Resolution 1244 
NATO’s Operation Allied Force strikes ended on June 10 1999, once the UN 
Security Council adopted Resolution 1244. Recalling its past resolutions 
concerning Kosovo, the Security Council in this Resolution regrettably stated that 
there has not been full compliance with the demands of the past resolutions. It 
also condemned all acts of violence, it supported the return of refugees and 
displaced persons, as well as it determined to resolve the worrying humanitarian 
situation in Kosovo.  
While it reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY, it also 
called upon “substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for 
Kosovo”205. 
In addition, Resolution 1244 authorized the deployment of international civil and 
security presences. The international civil and security presences were to 
function under the UN auspices and therefore the Secretary-General appointed a 
Special Representative to oversee the implementation of the international civil 
presence and to collaborate with the international security presence. It basically 
approved the deployment of a NATO-led peacekeeping force - the Kosovo Force 
(KFOR) and the establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo – the 
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).  
According to the Resolution, the main responsibilities of the international security 
presence encompassed maintaining a ceasefire, ensuring the withdrawal of the 
Yugoslav forces from Kosovo, demilitarizing the KLA, establishing a safe and 
secure environment for the returning refugees and displaced persons, as well as 
for the international civil presence, supervising demining, conducting border 
monitoring and cooperating closely with the international civil presence. 
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Furthermore, the main responsibilities of the international civil presence included: 
Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy 
and self-government in Kosovo…; 
Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required; 
Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for 
democratic and autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, 
including the holding of elections; that led to the establishment of the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government - PISG  
Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative 
responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo’s 
local provisional institutions and other peace-building activities; 
Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status; 
In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s provisional 
institutions to institutions established under a political settlement; 
Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic 
reconstruction; 
Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, 
humanitarian and disaster relief aid; 
Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and 
meanwhile through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in 
Kosovo; 
Protecting and promoting human rights; 
Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to 
their homes in Kosovo206 
The Resolution also welcomed the work of the EU and other international 
organizations that took a part in ensuring stability in the region by promoting 
economic development, strengthening of democracy and regional cooperation.207  
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8.7. OMIK 
The current OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMIK) was set up in July 1999, as a part 
of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission (UNMIK), whose mandate 
was established by the UN Security Council Resolution 1244. The OMIK is, 
however, the successor of the transitional OSCE Task Force for Kosovo that was 
established by the OSCE Permanent Council in June 1999.  
 
8.7.1. The OMIK Tasks 
The OMIK constitutes a component within the framework of the UNMIK, the so-
called Pillar III: Democratization and Institution Building.208 On 1 July 1999, the 
OSCE Permanent Council adopted Decision No. 305 that stated that the OMIK 
“will take the lead role in matters relating to institution- and democracy-building 
and human rights.”209 To be more specific, the Decision No. 305 has foreseen for 
the OMIK that it concentrates its work on the following areas: 
Human resources capacity-building, including the training of a new Kosovo police 
service within a Kosovo Police School which it will establish and operate, the 
training of judicial personnel and the training of civil administrators at various 
levels, in cooperation, inter alia, with the Council of Europe;  
Democratization and governance, including the development of a civil society, 
nongovernmental organizations, political parties and local media;  
Organization and supervision of elections;  
Monitoring, protection and promotion of human rights, including, inter alia, the 
establishment of an Ombudsman institution, in co-operation, inter alia, with the 
UNHCHR;  
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Such tasks which may be requested by the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations or his Special Representative, which are consistent with the UNSC 
Resolution 1244 and approved by the Permanent Council.210        
Nowadays, the mission’s tasks encompass three main fields of activity: support 
to democratic institutions and good governance, promotion of human and 
community rights, and the improvement of security and public safety.211 The 
OMIK has also taken on a proactive monitoring role – it monitors, analyses, 
reports and recommends remedial action when shortcomings are observed. In 
addition, it offers training and advice to the institutions “in need”. 
 
8.7.2. The OMIK Mandate and Structure 
The OMIK personnel consist of 199 international and 499 local staff, representing 
the largest OSCE field operation.212 It is also the largest civilian mission in 
Kosovo. The present Head of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo is Ambassador 
Werner Almhofer of Austria who took the office in October 2008. The Mission is 
run by a senior management group – Head of Mission, Deputy Head, and 
directors of the departments. Currently, there are three programmatic 
departments (human rights and communities, democratization, and security and 
public safety) and the administration department.213  
Since the creation of the Mission, the mandate has been renewed annually. 
Nevertheless, as of December 2007, the mandate has been extended at the end 
of every month and only for a period of one month. The mission is mandated 
with:  
the protection of community rights, including returns and the reintegration of 
displaced persons, safety and freedom of movement, property rights, non-
discrimination, participation in public life, access to education and other services, 
and language and culture preservation 
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municipal governance reform with a view to bettering the quality of services and 
public participation in decision-making 
rule of law and human rights monitoring within the municipalities, courts and the 
police 
support to and further development of independent institutions working with 
human rights, rule of law and elections 
supporting anti-trafficking efforts 
enhancing Assembly procedures and the oversight role over the executive, as 
well as all the communities' participation therein 
further development of the public safety sector, including the police, customs and 
correctional services 
strengthening print and broadcast media regulators 
improving access to and quality of higher education for all communities214 
The OMIK headquarters is located in Pristina. However, in order to effectively 
conduct the OSCE activities all over Kosovo, the OSCE set up five regional 
centres and has over 30 field teams. This network enables the OSCE to maintain 
close contact with all municipalities and communities throughout Kosovo. Each 
regional centre has a duty to monitor the activities in a number of municipalities. 
Their specialized teams oversee the judiciary and the police work, check human 
rights and rule of law compliance, promote good governance, strengthen 
community participation and provide advice and expertise related to electoral 
issues on a municipal level. The field teams play a significant role in promoting 
the OSCE principles by offering guidance and support directly and daily to the 
municipal officials.  
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The five regional centres are located in the following towns and cities: 
Gjilan/Gnjilane 
Mitrovicë/Mitrovica 
Pejë/Pec 
Prishtinë/Pristina 
Prizrem 
 
Figure 7: 5 Regional OSCE Centres in Kosovo 
 
Source: www.osce.org/kosovo, 23.07.2011 
 
8.7.3. The OMIK in Action 
Before and even after the Kosovo war, Kosovo has always been a place 
notoriously known for human rights abuses and human rights wrongs. Therefore, 
the international community, including the OSCE, put monitoring, protection 
and promotion of human rights on the top of the priority list. As the OSCE 
estimates in every report, human rights violations still take place in Kosovo. For 
that reason, the OMIK has devoted much attention to activities related to human 
rights protection such as ensuring a functioning judicial system and effective 
human rights law enforcement through monitoring mechanisms for human rights 
protection and overseeing the compliance of the central and municipal 
governments with relevant international and European human rights standards. 
In brief, the OMIK monitors and offers assistance to the institutions in Kosovo 
and pays special attention to the rights of non-majority communities. According to 
the OMIK “in any society it is important that all communities have equal access to 
human rights and that all communities are able to live in a safe environment with 
the freedom to participate actively in public life and to be able to use their 
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language, culture and religion.”215 Therefore, the Mission focuses on the rights of 
all communities in Kosovo - especially minority groups, the youth and the 
inclusion of disabled persons, as well as the empowerment of women. It 
analyses existing legislation, makes suggestions on draft laws, recommends 
improvements and stands strangly for the participation and representation of all 
communities in public life. 
The right to property is by the OSCE also considered as one of the fundamental 
rights. Especially in the case of Kosovo, property rights are inherently linked to 
the right to return. However, the issues of property, housing and land 
management still represent a great challenge, impeding economic development 
and the rule of law. Hence, the Mission co-operates with Kosovo institutions, 
monitoring compliance with property related laws and regulations. The OMIK’s 
work also concentrates on protecting properties with cultural and religious value.     
In order to prevent human rights violations and to raise human rights awareness, 
the OMIK is committed to monitoring compliance with international human rights 
standards and the principles of the rule of law. In particular, the mission has 
established the Capacity Building and Enhancement Programme for Human 
Rights Units (HRU) at the Ministerial Level. This programme provides Human 
Rights Advisory teams to the 16 Kosovo Ministries and municipalities. Through 
this programme, the OMIK assists the government in developing adequate 
mechanisms for promoting and protecting human rights on a municipal and 
national level.  
Furthermore, the OMIK assisted in developing and establishing the 
Ombudsperson’s Institution in Kosovo (OIK) in November 2000. Initially, the 
OMIK’s Ombudsperson Support Section helped the Ombudsperson Institution 
with counselling and coaching staff in all areas related to human rights. Now, the 
OIK is defined under local legislation and is the key guarantor of human rights in 
Kosovo. The OMIK advisors, nevertheless, still provide technical assistance and 
human rights related advice.  
                                                 
215
 OMIK INFRAnet, Monitoring Department, September 2008 
121 
 
In addition, the OMIK was mandated to contribute to the establishment of an 
effective, accountable and human rights compliant police service and security in 
Kosovo. Thus, it has concentrated on the development of an independent and 
effective law enforcement system that complies with human rights standards. 
The OMIK human rights advisors assist with identifying human right concerns 
and giving recommendations for a better performance. The Mission is also 
involved in monitoring the rights of arrested persons, prison conditions and 
assessing mechanisms for the prevention of torture, inhuman treatment or 
punishment.  
 
The OMIK has always been aware of the fact that for most of the inhabitants in 
Kosovo, municipal governance is their closest contact point with the 
government institutions. Municipal governance represents a place where the 
residents get the largest portion of government services and exercise their civic 
rights by participating in the decision-making processes. Therefore, the OSCE 
has field teams working in municipalities all over Kosovo making sure that the 
legislation and the work of municipalities comply with the rules of the European 
Charter of Local Self-Government. The tasks of these teams are essentially 
monitoring and advising municipalities on four specific areas: strengthening of 
legislative oversight, improving the quality of the municipal legal act, supporting 
the local government reform process and increasing public participation in 
decision-making. The OMIK also works on increasing the transparency and 
accountability of municipal administrations.  
 
Since democratic institutions in Kosovo have been functioning, although still in 
the development stage, the OMIK offers them support in applying the principles 
of good governance and human rights. In regard to central governance, the 
OMIK is involved in supporting the Assembly of Kosovo, independent institutions 
and political party development. The OMIK has provided assistance and support 
to the Assembly since its creation in 2002, making sure that it functions 
effectively, qualitatively and transparently. Due to the mission’s involvement, the 
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Assembly meets more regularly, government question periods, public hearings 
and policy debates have been introduced, the Assembly’s oversight capacity has 
been enhanced, the first strategic plan for the future objectives of Kosovo has 
been introduced, the Assembly’s committees have met with the parliaments from 
the region and the EU member states to exchange and strengthen best 
practices...etc. Moreover, the mission assists in improving the overall 
performance of the Assembly by organizing workshops for the senior 
management, providing expertise and building capacity.  
Furthermore, it supports political parties through capacity building and assists 
them in strengthening links with their “sister” parties in the region and in the 
European parliament. By the same token, it has supported the establishment and 
development of various independent institutions and has also been encouraging 
their relations with the Assembly of Kosovo.  
 
The mission ascertains that a functioning legal system is the fundamental 
foundation for a modern democracy. For this reason, the OMIK cooperates with 
the Kosovo Judicial Institute (KJI) and organizes training activities to enhance the 
legal education of judges, prosecutors and lawyers.  
It also closely monitors the development of the legal system in terms of its 
compliance with domestic laws and international human rights standards. It 
recommends sustainable solutions in order to ensure that these standards are 
reached. It reports on observed shortcomings and discusses appropriate 
remedial actions with the relevant authorities. Furthermore, it proactively 
monitors the work of the criminal courts, civil courts and the police service.  
 
From the establishment of the OMIK in 1999, one of the Mission’s long term 
commitments in Kosovo has been the formation of a strong security and public 
safety sector. The OMIK had the task to develop and train the new police service 
that could uphold human rights and democratic policing principles. The Mission 
created the Kosovo Police Service School that in 2006 became the Kosovo 
Centre for Public Safety Education and Development (KCPSED). Eventually, the 
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OSCE handed the managerial responsibility of the Centre to the local 
stakeholders, but now it still provides specialized and advanced trainings 
programmes. The Mission has also helped with the formation of the Police 
Inspectorate of Kosovo whose main aim is to ensure the internal oversight and 
application of good governance practices. Still, the OMIK proactively monitors the 
work of the police and advises the police on how to improve their practices.  
Since organized crime is a burning issue in Kosovo, the mission works with law 
enforcement agencies on the development of long-term strategies and action 
plans to combat trafficking in human beings, drug smuggling, money laundering 
and cyber-crime.  
 
In an effort to combat trafficking in human beings, the OMIK works intensely on 
anti-trafficking measures and co-operates with various local counterparts. The 
Mission is involved in policy development, strengthening the local infrastructure 
and capacity-building, as well as awareness-raising. The two important 
guidelines for the anti-trafficking initiatives are the OSCE Action Plan for 
Combating Trafficking in Human Beings and the Kosovo Strategy and Action 
Plan against Trafficking in Human Beings for 2008-2011. The Mission helps with 
the implementation of the latter and also focuses on establishing a broad 
framework for the rights of victims.  
 
From 2001 until 2008, the OMIK has been involved with the preparation and 
organization of all elections in Kosovo. However, in 2008 the Central Election 
Commission and the Election Complaints and Appeals Panel took over full 
responsibility for electoral operations in Kosovo and the Mission was granted an 
advisory role. Now it provides non-executive support, advice, expertise, guidance 
and technical assistance.  
 
The OMIK plays a significant role in creating and upholding high media 
standards in Kosovo. For any democratic society, free, independent, 
responsible, unbiased and professional media represent a pivotal element. 
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Therefore, the Mission assists media regulatory bodies in establishing a modern 
and comprehensive legal framework for the media that complies with 
international media standards and best practices. It also supports the work of the 
media watchdog institutions: the Independent Media Commission and the Press 
Council of Kosovo.  
In 1999, the Mission also assisted in the establishment of the Radio Television of 
Kosovo (RTK) and now it provides support to ensure a sustainable, professional 
and politically independent public server broadcaster. It encourages 
programming and access to information for non-Albanian communities as well.  
  
The OMIK has also directed much of its attention towards ensuring quality 
education services to all in Kosovo by assisting the providers of public higher 
education. Kosovo has one of the youngest populations in Europe, but 
unfortunately an inadequate education system. In response to this trend, the 
Mission helps out with institutional reforms and teacher education. It assists the 
providers of public higher education in Kosovo in their efforts to integrate into the 
European Higher Education Area and to implement the European Credit Transfer 
System. It also concentrates on teacher education and training programmes for 
non-Albanian communities.216  
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9. Other International Actors Deployed in Kosovo 
9.1. UNMIK 
On 10 June 1999, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244 and thereby 
outlined the objectives of the UN Interim administration Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK). UNMIK was set to create “substantial autonomy and meaningful self-
administration for Kosovo”, while reaffirming “the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” 217The Security Council, as the 
Report of the Secretary-General on 12 July 1999 explained, “has vested in the 
interim civil administration authority over the territory and people of Kosovo. All 
legislative and executive powers, including the administration of the judiciary, will, 
therefore, be vested in UNMIK.”218  
From the beginning of its foundation, the UNMIK’s work has been divided into 
four pillars, each of them reporting to the SRSG. In 1999, the division of 
responsibilities was set out as follows: 
Pillar I: Humanitarian Affairs led by the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) 
Pillar II: Civil Administration led by the UN 
Pillar III: Democratization and Institution Building led by the OSCE 
Pillar IV: Reconstruction and Economic Development led by the EU 
Pillar I was phased out in mid-July 2000, once the emergency stage was over. 
Afterwards in 2001, Pillar I was assigned new task areas: Police and Justice. 
From 2001 until now, the UNMIK’s four pillars remain: 
Pillar I: Police and Justice led by the UN 
Pillar II: Civil Administration led by the UN 
Pillar III: Democratization and Institution Building led by the OSCE 
Pillar IV: Reconstruction and Economic Development led by the EU 
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9.1.1. Efforts of the UNMIK Pillar I 
The core mandate of Pillar I was to establish law and order in Kosovo. It brought 
together the Department of Justice and the UNMIK Police in order to develop an 
efficient law enforcement service and an impartial and independent juridical 
system.  
The “Police” component of Pillar I concentrated on two main goals: the creation 
of enforcement services that complied with interim law and the formation of 
professional and unbiased Kosovo Police Service (KPS). The UNMIK has always 
supported local involvement and engagement in all areas since they represent a 
crucial element in ensuring peace and security. At the beginning, KFOR 
assumed all responsibilities concerning public safety and order. To enhance its 
efforts, the international police assisted as advisers. After the initial phase was 
over, the UNMIK civilian police took over, but at the same time they were training 
the Kosovo Police Service. The final phase was completed when competencies 
were gradually transferred to the KPS and the international police withdrew to a 
monitoring and advisory role.  
The Department of Justice's mandate was defined in the report of the Secretary 
General in July 1999 when he called for “immediate re-establishment of an 
independent, impartial and multi-ethnic judiciary.”219 The Department focused its 
work on developing a competent judiciary who could fight, persecute and punish 
organized crime according to international standards and therefore a team of 
international judges and prosecutors was assembled to address these issues 
properly and to assist the local judiciary. Other priorities of the justice department 
included the integration of Kosovo Serbs in the judiciary, enabling a better prison 
infrastructure and implementing a probation service. In addition, the UNMIK also 
devoted much effort in determining the fate of several thousand missing persons 
regardless of ethnicity, ensuring that all communities have access to justice and 
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offering assistance and protection to victims of trafficking in human beings, 
organized crime and vulnerable witnesses of crime.220  
 
9.1.2. Efforts of the UNMIK Pillar II 
Pillar II assumed all responsibilities concerning civil affairs in Kosovo. During the 
stabilizing phase the pillar performed basic administrative functions, but its long-
term goal was to build public administrative and political structures with the 
people of Kosovo actively participating in their processes. The master plan 
foresaw the initial phase with provisional institutions with international and local 
staff sharing the duties and authorities and the eventual transfer of all 
responsibilities to autonomous self-governmental structures led by the people of 
Kosovo.  
In December 1999, the UNMIK set up the Joint Interim Administrative Structure 
(JIAS). The JIAS departments were jointly led by one Kosovo and one 
international Co-Head. The JIAS were administrating Kosovo on a central and 
municipal level, slowly but successfully replacing all security and administrative 
parallel structures. In addition, the UNMIK also ensured that all the 
representatives appointed reflected the ethnical diversity of the people of 
Kosovo. The successful execution of the first municipal elections in October 2000 
represented the first step towards self-governance. 
In May 2001, the UNMIK signed regulation 2001/9 which symbolized a stepping 
stone for the process of self-determination of Kosovo. The regulation set up the 
Constitutional Framework on Interim Self-Government in Kosovo - a legal guide 
that led Kosovo towards the establishment of democratic structures in the 
legislative, executive and judicial fields and outlined the Kosovo final status 
proceedings. The Framework also foresaw the formation of the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) that included the Assembly, President of 
Kosovo, Government, courts, as well as other bodies and institutions. The PISG 
are basically the JIAS Departments and their successor ministries, municipal 
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governments and associated organizations that are gradually taking over the 
administrative competencies from the hands of the UNMIK. Their responsibilities 
encompass literally all areas ranging from economics, trade, budgetary issues, 
and administrative activities to human rights, good governance, education, 
technology, agriculture…etc.221 
Another milestone for the democratic development of Kosovo was the 
presentation of a UN-document that set out the standards for Kosovo in 
December 2003. The document -Standards for Kosovo – outlined the 
benchmarks for democratic Kosovo, “A Kosovo where all – regardless of ethnic 
background, race or religion – are free to live, work and travel without fear, 
hostility or danger and where there is tolerance, justice and peace for 
everyone.”222In this document, the UNMIK displayed its priority of making the 
PISG free, fair and democratic institutions that govern impartially and 
transparently, as well as in accordance with UN Resolution 1244 and the 
Constitutional Framework. All communities of Kosovo are fairly represented and 
fully participate in Kosovo’s political life. The document also states that the 
standards of PISG approach European standards. Not only do the laws and 
functions of the PISG conform to the European standards, but also the election, 
media and civil society regulations. Concerning the rule of law, the UNMIK 
expects Kosovo to have an existing well-functioning legal framework, effective 
law enforcement and police, as well as a judicial and penal system that perform 
in compliance with European standards. The top focuses remain the respect of 
human rights, minorities’ rights and equal access to justice for all. Another two 
standards for Kosovo as described in this document, are freedom of movement 
and free use of language. All residents of Kosovo are allowed to live in safety, 
use their own language freely without fear of intimidation or attack and threats to 
their security. Moreover, the standards also included the issues of sustainable 
returns and the rights of communities. The UNMIK presupposes that all refugees 
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and displaced persons wishing to come back to Kosovo should be able to do so 
in safety with their rights and dignity being respected. Furthermore, all members 
of all communities in Kosovo are able to engage in economic, political and social 
life without being discriminated against due to their ethnic background. 
Regarding the economy, the document implies that essential legal regulations for 
enabling a sustainable and competitive market economy have to be 
implemented. These conditions offer a legal and institutional base for Kosovo’s 
economy to move towards achieving European standards. Property rights are 
also on the agenda of the Standards for Kosovo. Effective legislation and 
property dispute resolution mechanisms are especially important for safe returns, 
as well as the preservation of cultural heritage. The UNMIK supports PISG in 
establishing legislation that enforces fair property rights and consists with 
European legislation. Above all, the standards also lay stress on maintaining a 
constructive and continuing dialogue between the PISG and their counterparts in 
Belgrade. Lastly, the document ensures that the Kosovo Protection Corps 
complies with its mandate to keep functioning as “a civilian emergency 
organization, which carries out in Kosovo rapid disaster response tasks for public 
safety in times of emergency and humanitarian assistance.”223 Standards for 
Kosovo was a policy endorsed by the international community which encouraged 
“standards before status” meaning that the Kosovo’s status question remained 
unaddressed until the standards and good governance had been reached.224 
The UNMIK continued its work in Kosovo in accordance with these standards 
when in 2005 the initiation of a Kosovo status process began. By March 2007, 
the comprehensive proposal for Kosovo Status Settlement had been drafted by 
the UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari that was also accepted by the government 
of Kosovo and backed by the European Union and the United States. The first 
Article of the Proposal indicates that “Kosovo shall be a multi-ethnic society, 
which shall govern itself democratically, and with full respect for the rule of law, 
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through its legislative, executive and judicial institutions.”225 The Proposal also 
specified that Kosovo will adopt a Constitution and that the international 
community will monitor the implementation of the Settlement.  
On 17 February, the Assembly of Kosovo adopted a “Declaration of 
Independence”, declaring Kosovo an independent and sovereign state. On 15 
June, the “Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo” entered into force. As it was 
planned at the beginning, the Kosovo Protection Corps disbanded in January 
2009, PISG gradually took over the responsibilities and authorities and the 
UNMIK assumed the monitoring and assisting role. 
However, the UNMIK continues to cooperate with all communities in Kosovo, as 
well as the authorities in Pristina and Belgrade. Its aim remains to ensure 
peaceful and better living conditions for all inhabitants of Kosovo, to protect the 
rule of law and human rights and to promote stability while still maintaining a 
status neutral position under Security Council resolution 1244.  
Moreover, due to inter-ethnic tensions between Albanian and Serbian 
communities in northern Kosovo, which continue to scar Kosovo’s society, the 
UNMIK focuses on mediation between the conflicting communities and facilitates 
a dialogue between the authorities in northern Kosovo and Pristina.226  
 
9.2. EU and EULEX 
After the Kosovo war, the EU outspokenly supported the process of European 
integration of Kosovo, as a part of the “Stabilisation and Association Process” – a 
policy for the Western Balkans that encourages political, economic, trade and 
human rights reforms to eventually achieve an “EU level”.  
On 4 February 2008, the EU founded the position of the European Special 
Representative in Kosovo. The EUSR’s main duties in Kosovo include providing 
advice and support to the government of Kosovo, encouraging cooperation 
between the Kosovo and the EU authorities, as well as offering political guidance 
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to EULEX – the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo that was 
approved by the European Council on December 2007 and launched in 
December 2008. The initial plan for EULEX was to replace the UNMIK, but on 
account of Serbian and Russian objections, EULEX was incorporated into the 
UNMIK umbrella. The EU also submitted to the demands of Serbia to remain a 
status neutral position and not to implement the Ahtisaari plan through EULEX. 
However, due to these hesitations and police cooperation with Serbia in Kosovo, 
EULEX has been facing some resentment from the government and people of 
Kosovo.227    
Nevertheless, EULEX represents the largest EU civilian mission made up of 
about 2,000 officials from the EU countries as well as Norway, Switzerland, 
Turkey, Croatia, the US and about 1,000 locals. The mission was set up to 
oversee police, judicial, and customs activities in Kosovo. EULEX is not present 
in Kosovo to govern, but to monitor, mentor and advise under the framework of 
the UN Resolution 1244 and in cooperation with the EU institutions in Brussels. 
To sum up, EULEX is “supporting local ownership”. 
The EULEX Justice Component focuses on working with the Kosovo authorities 
to install an impartial, effective and independent justice system. Its mandate is 
two-fold: on one side, the EULEX oversees and mentors judges and prosecutors 
in Kosovo and on the other side, it exercises judicial and prosecutorial activities 
in joint panels. Still, EULEX judges and prosecutors possess executive powers 
when it comes to serious and sensitive cases such as inter-ethnic crime, 
organized crime, financial crime...etc. The EULEX Police Component offers 
assistance and mentorship to the Kosovo Police. It mainly plays a supportive 
role, but it also can use corrective powers in case the Kosovo authorities fail to 
prevent violence. In addition, the EULEX Customs Component offers support to 
the local customs service – the Kosovo Customs, helping out with the customs 
law enforcement and combating organized crime.228  
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EULEX’s objectives are to “assist and support the rule of law institutions, judicial 
authorities and law enforcement agencies in their progress towards sustainability 
and accountability, and in further development and strengthening an independent 
multi-ethnic justice system, multi-ethnic police and customs service.”229  
 
9.3. Kosovo - United States Relations 
In the mists of the Kosovo war in June 1998, President Clinton responded to 
deteriorating human rights conditions by condemning the violence and promising 
that everything will be done in order to not repeat another Bosnia.230 
Consequently, “the US pursued what was a unified Holbrooke/Albright approach 
– diplomacy backed by a credible use of force.”231 As special presidential envoy, 
Holbrooke persuaded Slobodan Milošević to comply with the demands of the UN 
Resolution 1199 by finalizing the Milošević-Holbrooke agreement in October 
1998. Holbrooke made Milošević clear that if he did not comply with the 
demands, the likelihood of NATO air strikes was very high especially since the 
US believed that the UN Resolution 1199 provided enough authorizations for air 
strikes. 232 Once Holbrooke and the international society assessed that Milošević 
was not really pursuing political progress in reaching peace in Kosovo and after 
in January 1998 the massacre in Racak occurred, the Contact group with the US 
at the head stepped into action. The Contact Group meetings ended 
inconclusively, but it demanded that the Serbs and Kosovo Albanians high level 
officials meet in Rambouillet to discuss settlement based on the Hill plan. The 
Rambouillet negotiations proved to be unfruitful at first, with both parties refusing 
the principle to the settlement. Later on, the negotiations continued in Paris and 
the Kosovo Albanians high officials agreed in principle to the settlement, but at 
some point Milošević refused any settlements. Moreover, he even stayed 
indifferent when the international society threatened with possible NATO war. On 
22 March 1999, Holbrooke was sent to Serbia to deliver a final ultimatum, but 
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failed to draw any concessions from Milošević. Milošević’s uncooperative 
approach caused a shift in the US diplomacy towards Kosovo. According to 
Madeleine Albright, the NATO launch of the Operation Allied Force on 24 March, 
1999 represented “the end of diplomacy backed by force and the beginning of 
force backed by diplomacy”.233 
Nicholas Kerton-Johnson put together a figure displaying the US justifications for 
intervention in Kosovo. He analysed President Clinton’s speeches, discussion 
session and official documents related to Kosovo. According to his findings, 
Clinton mostly justified the intervention by emphasizing the humanitarian 
necessity. But to satisfy the American public, the national interest such as the 
avoidance of wars with many casualties also played a significant role. Other 
justifications included international law, egoistic morality and NATO. In terms of 
NATO, Clinton’s justifications highlighted the importance of the alliance and its 
credibility.234 
    Figure 8: Justifications for intervention in Kosovo 
 
Source: Adapted from Nicholas Kerton-Johnson, Justifying America’s Wars, 2011, p.64 
 
After a 78-day NATO air strikes campaign against Serbia, Milošević withdrew his 
forces and the US and other NATO alliances deployed their peacekeepers. In 
June 1999, the military base of the United States Army under KFOR command 
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called Camp Bondsteel was constructed. It is located near Farizaj/Uroševac and 
also serves as the NATO headquarters in Kosovo. There are about 7,000 US 
citizens living and working in the camp with the aim of maintaining a competent 
military force and to guarantee the safe return of Kosovo refugees.235 Camp 
Bondsteel is one of the biggest military bases of the US Army in Europe and it 
has a huge geo-strategic significance for the USA. Admiral Gregory Johnson, 
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces in Europe and Commander in Chief, Allied 
Forces for Southern Europe stated that anybody who takes a look at the security 
situation in the vicinity of Europe will understand that southward and eastward 
there are a few sensitive areas.236 Furthermore, in 2002 and 2003 the camp 
served as a preparation facility for the troops going to Iraq.  
Once some sort of stability was reached in the region, the US and other Western 
policymakers were left with a huge challenge – how to ensure normal living 
conditions in a post-war region. With the international community setting up the 
UNMIK in June 1999, the process of reconstruction began. Moreover, the Clinton 
Administration also underlined the importance of US and European coordination 
in restoring Kosovo. The US was committed to ensure peace in the Balkans, 
although the aftermath of terrorist attacks in September 2001 caused the gradual 
decrease of in US deployment.  
The first Bush Administration followed the policy of the “standards before status” 
supporting the realization of essential democratic and sustainable benchmarks 
such as a functioning government, a free market economy, respect of the rule of 
law, human and minorities rights in Kosovo before discussing the status. 
However, in his second term, Bush and his policymakers expressed the need to 
resolve “unfinished business” in the region. They were in favour of resolving the 
status question and therefore in favour of implementation of the Ahtisaari plan. 
They publicly expressed support for Kosovo’s independence in various 
statements and when on 17 February, 2008, the Kosovo assembly declared 
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independence, the United States recognized Kosovo as a sovereign and 
independent state on the following day.237 
Furthermore, the US also assisted Kosovo with financial means. From 1999 until 
now, the United Stated obligated more than $1 billion in bilateral aid to Kosovo. 
Due to American support during and after the Kosovo war, the people of Kosovo 
developed a generally favourable sentiment towards the US. They even named 
two majors streets in Pristina after the US Presidents, namely Bill Clinton Avenue 
and George W. Bush street. The diplomatic relations between Kosovo and the 
United States were established on 18 February, 2008 and until now the US 
continues to contribute their troops to the KFOR and their staff to UNMIK, EULEX 
and OSCE missions. The US Department of State reassures that “the United 
States remains committed to working with the Government of Kosovo and our 
international partners to strengthen Kosovo’s institutions, rule of law, and 
economy and build a democratic, law-abiding, multi-ethnic, tolerant, and 
prosperous country.”238 
However, Helmut Kramer and Vedran Džihić write in “Die Kosovo-Bilanz” that the 
US foreign policy in Kosovo resembles the one in Bosnia. It has the same 
characteristics that display pragmatic improvising and muddling through. This 
suggests that the US appear to be flexible, prioritize short-term successes, 
secure their own interests and act according to their military superpower ideas. 
Above all, their international politics mirrors the tradition of exceptionalism. The 
term exceptionalism describes the belief of American political and military 
leaders, as well as the American people, that asserts that they are an 
extraordinary and an exemplar nation. They believe that they have the most 
developed and the most sought-after level of democracy and society and that 
gives them the right to expand their concept of the world order around the globe. 
It does not just give them the right to perform according to their beliefs, but they 
assume they are also obliged to act in compliance with these assumptions. The 
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US foreign policy is influenced by and conducted in accordance with American 
exceptionalism.239 
 
10. Conclusion  
Džihić and Kramer display in the “Die Kosovo-Bilanz” published in 2006, a rather 
discouraging report about the success rate of the international community in 
Kosovo. It has already begun with the UN Resolution 1244 that was according to 
Tim Judah “an artful construct because it gave something to everyone. It did not 
foreclose any options for Kosovo or Serbia, and, above all, it brought time.”240 
The initial momentum with big goals and hopes of great success vanished with 
time because, according to Džihić and Kramer, the Kosovo project has had 
political, conceptual, organizational and personnel weaknesses. In the “Die 
Kosovo-Bilanz” they observe that institutional capacity building has shown 
modest success. The economy experienced a certain boom after the war, but 
things slowed down pretty fast. Although there was money pouring into Kosovo 
from the EU and the USA, it was just enough to build barely functioning 
economic, social and civil structures. The unemployment rate is still very high at 
about 50% and organized crime is on the rise. However, in terms of political 
institutions and democracy building, Džihić and Kramer speak of a mixed balance 
of accounts. The international community’s job was to develop and modernize 
democratic institutions. That is what they certainly tried to achieve and the 
beginnings of a democratic process can be observed, but they fail to stimulate a 
democratic culture. A culture ruled by mutual respect and where all minorities 
can live peacefully and in harmony with the majority. They note in 2006 that ethic 
affiliation still dominates everyday life and is the sole principle of society’s order 
in Kosovo. What is lacking in the society are the values of European civil society 
which is based on reciprocal tolerance and partnership. Džihić and Kramer also 
indicate that the Serbian community in Kosovo is partially guilty for this failure 
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since it boycotts the establishment of Kosovo institutions, Kosovo elections and 
considers Belgrade its political, cultural and ideological capital. While the people 
of Kosovo were also unsatisfied with the situation, tensions escalated into violent 
unrest in March 2004. The Kosovo Albanians directed their anger against the 
Kosovo Serbs. In this campaign of ethnic violence 19 persons were killed, many 
houses, churches and monasteries were set on fire. This riot definitely hindered 
the democratic process for quite some time.  
Moreover, Džihić and Kramer talk about the strategic and organizational 
weaknesses of UNMIK and other international organizations (including the 
OSCE). They make an assertion that all international organizations present in 
Kosovo lack systematic processing and critical self-evaluation. A point also made 
by Ambassador Tim Guldimann in our interview in September 2008 (see 
appendix II). The missions in Kosovo have also been facing severe budgetary 
situations and they have been constantly under-staffed. Above all, a consistent 
and clear political leadership on the part of the UN and the super powers has 
been missing and that makes the job even harder. Džihić and Kramer also 
suggest that the international personnel have been quite overwhelmed by their 
tasks. Especially the OSCE staff were overwhelmed since it was the first time for 
the organization to take up a huge challenge like that – to build democratic 
institutions from scratch. In addition, international personnel are notoriously 
known for its “mission junkie” behaviour, meaning that people are coming and 
leaving without really getting to know their job tasks properly and in detail.  
Nonetheless, there has been, according to Džihić and Kramer a problem with the 
international community’s attitude toward a project like Kosovo. The international 
community has a specific organizational culture that nurtures diplomatic rituals 
and traditional secrecy politics. It performs as a protective power and has a 
tendency to act like it owns the reformatory process. Gerald Knaus and Marcus 
Cox imply that “in the protectorates, the international missions have “ownership” 
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of the reform process, which gives them a strong institutional interest in 
overstating the success of their work.”241 
But the biggest dilemma of international intervention and “state-building” must 
have occurred due to “democratization from the outside”. Michael Ignatieff states 
that there is a fundamental discrepancy in trying to attain democratization with 
imperial means. “Achieving democratic goals through imperial means is, of 
course, an exercise in contradiction. A true democracy cannot be ruled by the 
strangers”242 Ignatieff explains the contradiction when dealing with imperial 
power and local sell-government a bit further: “Essential contradiction is the 
whole art of the modern imperium: building institutions for the sake of the local 
people, without confiscating their decision-making capacity: forcing them to take 
responsibility without abandoning them to the demons of their past.”243 After 
indicating all the “flops” of the methodology of the international community in 
Kosovo, Džihić and Kramer suggest that a new and better strategy is necessary 
in order to build sustainable democracy in Kosovo.244 
 
10.1. The Role of the OSCE in Kosovo, Its Efforts and Challenges  
 
As stated before, the OSCE received the mandate from the UN Security Council 
obliging the OSCE to A build democratic institution and to promote the process of 
democratization within the framework of the UNMIK in Kosovo. The OSCE 
Mission in Kosovo was set up in July 1999 and the aim of my thesis was to 
describe, analyse, evaluate and to compare the role of the OSCE in the fields of 
democratization, governance, monitoring, protection and promotion of human 
rights. I tried to examine what were and still are its key efforts, its challenges and 
the legacy of its work, activities and tasks on the ground of Kosovo. Furthermore, 
I have also compared its advantages and disadvantages in relation to other 
international players in Kosovo. To get a better understanding of the subject 
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matter and to not only rely on my judgements on numerous OSCE, UNMIK 
reports and literature, I also interviewed two experts who have worked for the 
OMIK to give me a more accurate insider’s perspective on the developments in 
Kosovo and their relation to the international community. In September 2008 I 
conducted qualitative interviews with Melissa Stone, Chief of the Human Rights 
Section and Ambassador Tim Guldimann, Head of Mission from 2007 until 2008. 
The transcripts of these interviews can be found in the appendix section.  
One of the responsibilities of the OMIK was to promote good governance hence 
promoting the process of democratization. The OSCE set up five regional offices 
around Kosovo in order to have a greater outreach and to really increase 
participation and representation of all communities in the political decision-
making process. The OMIK built up democratic institutions from scratch at, both 
the central and the municipal level which proves to be beneficial for local 
governance because the OSCE democratization, good governance and human 
rights action plans, programmes, trainings and monitoring activities ensure a 
more efficient and transparent use of resources, reduce the likelihood for 
mismanagement, improve communication between elected representatives and 
their constituents, improve the access to government services, etc. The OMIK 
staff have monitored the meetings of municipal assemblies, provided appropriate 
advice and helped in the implementation process of policies and commitments of 
the European Commission’s White Paper on European Governance. The OMIK 
still strongly works on promoting the good governance principles: participation, 
transparency, efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability. Since 1999, the OMIK 
has been working on assisting the local officials on implementing and complying 
with the provisions that have ultimately contributed to sustainable governance.  
One of the greatest OMIK successes was according to Tim Guldimann the 
establishment of the Kosovo Police Service School in September 1999. Its main 
goal was to create a police force that restores confidence in law enforcement 
officials that in Kosovo prior to 1999 practically did not exist and complies with 
the principles of democratic policing. Democratic policing is a crucial component 
of good governance and also essential for the protection of human rights. Police 
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officers are also responsible for maintaining a safe and secure living environment 
for everybody living in Kosovo. For this reason, the OMIK provided basic police 
training to the recruits to develop a professional police force that works according 
to the internationally accepted standards and have contributed to a sustainable 
system of security in Kosovo. In January 2006, the Kosovo Police Service School 
transformed into the Kosovo Center for Public Security, Education and 
Development. The Center now trains and gives technical, administrative and 
educational support to all agencies of public security, such as: the Kosovo Police 
Service, the UNMIK Customs Service, the Department for Management of 
Emergencies and the Kosovo Correctional Service.  
Another milestone in building Kosovo’s democratic structure was a programme 
developed and supported by the OMIK called Capacity Building and 
Enhancement Programme for Human Rights Units (HRU). These units were 
established in 2006 by the government on the OSCE’s advice and are still 
present in every ministry in Kosovo. The OMIK has worked with these units 
steadily on different aspects of human rights standards. At the beginning the 
focus of their work was educating, training and advising the local staff, whereas 
nowadays the emphasis is on monitoring and supporting. The OMIK takes 
special pride in assisting in the establishment of the Office of the Prime Minister.  
“Technically, the Office of the Prime Minister was developed with the OSCE. The 
Advisory Office on Good Governance, Human Rights, Equal Opportunities and 
Gender devolved from a structure during 1999 until 2001. (…) There were 20 
ministries and the ones related to civil administration were administered by the 
UN, the ones that were about the economy or infrastructure were administered 
by the EU and then there was one that the OSCE administered, called the 
Department of Democratic Governance and Civil Society. That department in 
2002, when we got the Prime Ministry, exactly after the elections, (..) we had all 
departments turned into ministries, this department was converted to the Office 
of the Prime Minister. We (the OSCE) helped to hire the staff in the Office of the 
Prime Minister, we helped to develop the terms of references, job descriptions 
and everything like that...” (Melissa Stone, September 2008, Interview Transcript 
I) 
The Office of the Prime Minister serves as the coordinator of all the human rights 
units. In 2008, the Office was preparing a human rights strategy programme for 
2009 to 2011 for the whole government.  
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Certainly, the OMIK staff have worked closely with all ministries and some of 
them took the help they have received to another level. For example, the Ministry 
of Local Government and Administration passed on the knowledge and the 
know-how skills on gender equality, minority rights issues, child rights and anti-
trafficking issues to the municipalities. The Ministry recognized the efforts and 
effectiveness of its own human rights unit and decided to establish a human 
rights unit on the municipal level. In 2008, Melissa Stone reported in the interview 
that there were 24 human rights units across Kosovo. That means 24 units out of 
30 municipalities and which surely exhibits the success of this programme.   
“I would say that the methodology of working with the ministries has been very 
good and has been very well received. That is definitely one of our strengths. 
And the fact that the human rights units want to extend the Capacity Building 
Programme and they also want to include their senior officials, I think that is a 
vote of confidence in the work that we have done. Also the expansion of the 
methodology from the ministry level to the municipality level is also a huge vote 
of confidence. We actually do very well with our local interlocutors. They do what 
they say they are going to do, of course with our advice. And we have 
accomplished a lot together.” (Melissa Stone, September 2008, Interview 
Transcript I) 
 
In addition, the Human Rights Section of the OMIK organizes trips to other 
European countries where Kosovo officials from the human rights units meet with 
their ministerial counterparts to see how they deal with and address certain 
human rights issues. Since the Section also realizes that just one single 
coordinator at every ministry cannot handle all of the work and especially with the 
high turnover of the staff, it makes sure that they build up a competent unit. They 
focus their training not just on one person, but rather on an operational team. 
Their goal is to build an institution and not a personality. 
Melissa Stone assessed in the interview that the programme has definitely 
produced success.  
“You have to look at the whole programme like an investment. We invested in 
these human rights units and now in the coming year it is when we will see the 
pay-out. We will see that these units themselves apply the capacity building 
lessons that they’ve learnt from the OSCE staff.” (Melissa Stone, September 
2008, Interview Transcript I) 
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In September 2008, Melissa Stone emphasised in the interview that in 1999 
when the OMIK started to build democratic institutions in Kosovo there was 
basically no existent institutional structure. Until 2009, there were about 160 
human rights experts who completed professional training in human rights 
organized and supported by the OMIK.  
  
 
The greatest challenge the OMIK was facing was staff related problems. There 
has always been a high staff turnover, within the OSCE mission and within local 
authorities the OMIK cooperates with. I have mentioned the term “mission 
junkies” before and the mission in Kosovo is certainly no exception. There are 
many internationals who work for the OMIK for a year or even less. Such a short 
time period does not give them an opportunity to get to know their own working 
tasks, environment, true needs of the locals, as well as the true nature of the 
problematic in Kosovo. On the other hand, there are locals who often switch 
position within the ministries or maybe even for political reasons change their job.  
However, there have been many projects where the OMIK has felt that their work 
suffered because of understaffing which is usually connected with budgetary 
issues. The staffing issues really affect the OMIK’s and the local institutions’ 
overall productivity.  
Melissa Stone drew attention to the fact that the OMIK has a task not only to 
address the current human rights issues, but also to correct some “old sins”. In 
practice, the OMIK and its co-operators have to settle with prioritizing.  
“There are big needs for remedial redress of human rights problems from earlier 
times, as well. So it’s not just the situation on the ground as we see it now that 
needs to be addressed. We have to take a longer term perspective and also we 
need to realize that ministries have a certain amount of staff and a certain 
amount of financial resources every year. They have to pick and choose the 
issues that are more important. They have to prioritize because there is no 
way that they can address every issue. Just because something is a human 
rights issue and the OSCE would like to wave a red flag in front of the issue that 
doesn’t mean that it will necessarily make it on the ministries priority list that year. 
It depends what else is on that list.” (Melissa Stone, September 2008, Interview 
Transcript I) 
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Other challenges the OSCE is dealing with on the ground of Kosovo are content 
related. The OSCE leadership has paid special attention to certain community 
human rights issues. It means that it might have overlooked some or rather 
looked with “tunnel vision” some issues. Nevertheless, Melissa Stone spoke 
about in the interview that certain communities might feel like their rights are not 
as important as the rights of minorities, just because the OMIK does not address 
them so much or so often. Due to this occurrence, the OMIK has experienced 
some criticism and backlashes from the locals.   
“And this is the cons of the backlash that we are experiencing now and this is 
why I have been advocating to take a more moderate approach whereby we do 
have a balanced approach otherwise there would create a long term imbalance 
that would create a base for another conflict.” (Melissa Stone, September 2008, 
Interview Transcript I) 
 
On the other hand, Tim Guldimann was quite critical about the objectivity of the 
international community and the OSCE.  
“I think that the OSCE, as a part of the international community, could have 
invested more in giving a very critical objective assessment of where we are, 
instead of staying too much in the shadow of UNMIK, above all when it comes to 
the rule of law. That is what we have been doing recently, but the rule of law was 
a problem for a period and the OSCE should have been more consequent with 
its assessment concerning the deficiencies in this area.” (Tim Guldimann, 
September 2008, Interview Transcript II) 
 
He also suggested that the OSCE should have a tougher and maybe even a 
more aggressive approach toward the problems and challenges of the OSCE. In 
addition, it should also be stricter with the local officials and authorities.  
“We nurse them too much and we make too little political interventions. The 
whole human rights nursing…I’m very sceptical. We should be very tough on 
compliance with human rights. But all these institutions…[nodding 
disapprovingly] 
“It is not a question of political correctness. It’s a question of taking a position. At 
least people know what they have to deliver, they know what the principles, they 
know… They just have to read their own legislation and that is what they have to 
comply with. And that is what we have to work for. And for that we need a very 
objective assessment for which no rosy reports are helpful.” (Tim Guldimann, 
September 2008, Interview Transcript II) 
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Every international organization has its own structure, working tools and 
activities, methodology and specific objectives. The aim of this thesis was also to 
examine the advantages and disadvantages that the OSCE mission has in 
comparison to other international actors in Kosovo. One of the OSCE strengths is 
its local presence which gives it an enormous advantage in comparison with 
other international actors. The OMIK works closely with the municipalities on all 
issues related to democratization, good governance and human rights. For 
example, the OMIK was asked by the Anti-Corruption Agency to cooperate in its 
fight against corruption. They have put out many media campaigns, but 
corruption needs to be fought on as many fronts as possible. The issue of 
corruption is also problematic because people in Kosovo still have trouble 
confiding in their authorities and do not easily believe that the confidentiality of 
their corruption report is guaranteed. Due to close ties with local authorities, the 
OMIK staff and the Anti-Corruption Agency organized meetings in all public 
institutions, hospitals, school, centres for social work,…etc., to talk about 
corruption and money mismanagement with people face to face and informing 
them how corruption hinders democratization and giving them assurance that 
their reports would be handled with confidentiality. This close contact gives the 
OMIK a special position because as Melissa Stone put it: 
“that’s something that the OSCE can assist with, whereas the UNDP and 
the EU just don’t have that structure to offer. (Melissa Stone, September 
2008, Interview Transcript I) 
 
Another advantage of the OMIK’s approach is also the attitude the OMIK staff 
have towards their local interlocutors and cooperating partners.  
“Actually, I think that our plan has been unpredictably successful. And the reason 
why it has worked better than other types of assistance programmes that were 
offered for example by the EU or by UNMIK is that we took a peer advisory 
approach rather than coming in as, you know, the experts we know everything 
and looking at them grumbling: “You know nothing”. We took the approach that 
all of us are from countries that have human rights violations. There is no country 
without them. We are here to help, to share experience, to identify with the 
ministry what the ministry needs. And based on a ministry’s perspective of what 
they need that’s what we give them. So they are the leaders, they are the drivers 
of the car and so it’s been very successful because we’re always in alignment 
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with them with what they are identifying as their problems.” (Melissa Stone, 
September 2008, Interview Transcript I) 
 
Tim Guldimann also assessed that the status neutral position of the OSCE has 
its advantages.  
“Right now, our advantages as a consensus organization are having also states 
on board that do not recognize the independence of Kosovo to pursue our role 
from a status neutral position, above all when it comes to the question that we 
could support the dialogue with the Serb community as we just have done. This 
was a good example of bringing the Serb community together with the authorities 
to have a dialogue on how to proceed with the integration of the Serb community 
here in Kosovo and under whatever terms this will be done. Ahtisaari is a 
reference, but as long as we pay respect to the position of the Serb community 
not accepting certain issues then we are OK. That is something that only we can 
do, the ICO, EULEX cannot do.” (Tim Guldimann, September 2008, Interview 
Transcript II) 
 
After all, the OSCE also has a mission in Serbia and their help, advice and 
support to the Serbian officials in the areas of democratization, good governance 
and human rights equals that of the OMIK staff in Kosovo since the OSCE 
promotes the same international standards, respects the same principles and 
uses the same working methodology wherever it is present. 
“If you accept Kosovo as an independent nation, as an independent nation 
Kosovo has human rights obligations. If you do not accept Kosovo as an 
independent nation but as an autonomous region in Serbia then they still have to 
address human rights obligations. If Kosovo is going to be under the UN 
administration, Kosovo has human rights obligations. No matter what scenario, 
however you paint the picture, what colour is it at the end of the day the Kosovo 
government has the same human rights and legal obligations. There is no 
question here.” (Melissa Stone, September 2008, Interview Transcript I) 
 
The OSCE also takes pride in its leading election mechanisms. One of the top 
priorities of the OMIK was to establish local institutions that could conduct 
elections according to international standards since fair and free elections are the 
backbone of a democratic society. The mission has assessed the implementation 
of OSCE electoral standards and commitments, provided technical-assistance 
projects and legislative reviews. The goal was to build capable local electoral 
institutions that could organize independent, transparent and accountable to the 
rule of law elections. Since the Kosovo War and until 2008, the OSCE has 
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conducted four municipal and three parliamentary elections. However in 2008, 
local electoral institutions took over the executive functions, but the OSCE still 
maintains an advisory role. Nevertheless, the OSCE has passed on a systematic, 
comprehensive and verifiable election methodology, a know-how that other 
international actors do not possess.  
 
 
On the other side, concerning the disadvantages of the OSCE in comparison to 
other international actors in Kosovo, the OSCE has definitely never had 
experience to set up a large mission like the OMIK, whereas the UN have years 
of experience of various missions deployed into war-torn regions. The mission 
was an enormous task for the organization and many people believe that it 
struggled at the beginning because of simply being overwhelmed with the 
assignment. 
  
At the end of my interviews, I asked the experts what they thought the legacy of 
the OSCE mission in Kosovo would be after the mission someday in the future 
closes its doors. As expected, they assured me that the OMIK’s support and 
assistance to develop local democratic institutions, human rights standards, rule 
of law, democratic governance and an independent electoral body was of the 
utmost importance for sustainable democracy building in Kosovo. The OMIK has 
played a paramount role in the fields of democratization, governance and human 
rights.   
 “In terms of the human rights issue, the OSCE has been the lead actor on the 
ground of Kosovo. And if OSCE had not been there, who knows what kind of 
structures they would have. Probably somebody else would have risen to the 
occasion. I think that the OSCE has been very active and very engaged in the 
development of human rights structure and human rights systems in Kosovo and 
now it is time for the government to pick it up all and take it forward. (..) That was 
what the organization had as its objective given by the Security Council. I think 
that the OSCE has very much met these objectives.” (Melissa Stone, September 
2008, Interview Transcript I) 
 
Nevertheless, Ambassador Tim Guldimann gave a mixed assessment when 
asked about the legacy of the OSCE mission in Kosovo. 
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“Police school, elections to a certain extent that successful elections took place 
but the capacity building was insufficient, capacity building of the institutions, 
central assembly and above all regional and the general monitoring activity. But 
nine years is a very long time and I would be more critical of what the 
international community including the OSCE has done during all that time. Above 
that, there is too little self-critical discussion within the institutions of what we 
have been doing.” (Tim Guldimann, September 2008, Interview Transcript II) 
 
Off the record, the OMIK staff like to tell a story of the true success of their work 
in Kosovo. They get actual proof when there is car accident and the locals call 
the police and not their cousins. Prior to the UNMIK presence and activities in 
Kosovo, people rather rely on their family to settle any types of disputes. The 
international community has helped to build the confidence in local authorities, 
law enforcement agents and government officials.  
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Persons present: Anja Šmid 
   Melissa Stone 
 
Anja Smid: Firstly, I want to talk about your current task - the Capacity Building and Enhancement 
Programme. I would like to know when did you start with it, what are your exact activities, 
responsibilities,... 
Melissa Stone: Well, the project was agreed between the OSCE Ambassador Werner Wnendt 
and Prime Minister Agim Çeku on 21
st
 March in 2006. So our project began than and the biggest 
focus of the project is/was to provide capacity building assistance and technical assistance to 
human right units in 16 ministries, including the prime ministry, but exclude ministry of foreign 
affairs and ministry of Kosovo security force, which were invented this year (2008). But essentially 
the entire project is focused on improving the ministries’ human rights complex.  
Anja Smid: Alright. So where do you stand at the moment, I mean, do you have an influence on 
what they do? 
Melissa Stone: Sure. A huge influence. Yes, we do. In fact, I think that the programme has 
succeeded in the ministries in much part, because of the OSCE support. Because we’ve given 
essentially a Senior Human Rights Advisor and Programme Assistant team to every two 
ministries and so we’ve been beside them every day working with them on all of their issues since 
2006. Until now we’ve been pretty successful in having a team for each two ministries, but lately 
we’ve been a bit short-staffed and so we’re working with a team for every three ministries right 
now. But the bottom line is that the focus has been on building capacity of the human rights units 
themselves. Each unit is comprised of 3 to 7 people who take care of several different tasks from 
the coordinator of the section to addressing anti-discrimination law and anti-trafficking, human 
abuse to the more traditional human rights addressing – minority rights, gender equality, persons 
with disabilities, child rights, rights of the elderly, the issue of returns and that kind of things. 
Kosovo really likes to divide their rights based approach into sort of population focus, because 
there are certain population groups that are at higher risk than another. So that’s how they like to 
do their focusing. Since the middle of 2006 we’ve made a bit of a shift, from focusing on the 
capacity of the human rights unit itself to assisting the human rights unit to branch out to the 
Senior Managers in their ministry. So these are the people who they work with to work with. So 
now the human rights units are working with their key interlocutors with the OSCE advice to make 
sure that the whole ministry is aware of their role, of their mandate and the fact that they are in 
the ministry in order to assist the ministry in improving its human rights compliance however that’s 
necessary. 
Anja Smid: Right. Would you say that you are also monitoring their activities or rather just 
assisting? 
Melissa Stone: Monitoring…the word monitoring actually comes with the concept of reporting on. 
I wouldn’t use the M word in this context. It’s actually a very politically sensitive word. I would use 
the word observe for the purpose of identifying the best interest of the government. And of course 
in the OSCE perspective the best interest of the government is to be maximally human rights 
compliant, maximally compliant with the principles of the rule of law, as well as democratic 
governance. So when we observe that something is going wrong, we don’t report it to the public, 
we don’t even report it to our institution every time. When we see something going wrong, we 
make a recommendation on how it can be corrected and then we work with the staff inside the 
ministry and their supervisors to take the action for correction. 
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Anja Smid: Right. So you make a direct recommendation to the officials who are working in the 
ministry. You don’t report it to the OSCE Secretariat? [Melissa nods]. Not at all. OK. 
Would you say that have you encountered any problems working with them, addressing the 
issues, were your plans or assistance blocked in any way? 
Melissa Stone: Actually, I think that our plan has been unpredictably successful. And the reason 
why it has worked better than other types of assistance programmes that were offered for 
example by the EU or by UNMIK is that we took a peer advisory approach rather than coming in 
as, you know, the experts we know everything and looking at them grumbling: “You know 
nothing”. We took the approach that all of us are from countries that have human rights violations. 
There is no country without them. We are here to help, to share experience, to identify with the 
ministry what the ministry needs. And based on a ministry’s perspective of what they need that’s 
what we give them. So they are the leaders, they are the drivers of the car and so it’s been very 
successful because we’re always in alignment with them with what they are identifying as their 
problems. Actually the biggest obstacle that we have had, are political in nature. When 
sometimes we have had a change of government, we had a change of permanent secretaries.  
For example, in 2005 5 permanent secretaries out of 16 changed and we have already been 
starting to work with human rights units even then even before the terms or reference was signed 
and this year (2008) we’ve already had 7 permanent secretaries changed. So that’s half of 
permanent secretaries. So they are the bosses of human rights units essentially. When you get a 
new boss, you have to start from the very beginning. All over again and training that person to 
understand what human rights are, why human rights are different from other legal systems, how 
human rights are benefit to Kosovo, how observing human rights norms will put the ministry in a 
better position even though it takes a lot of energy, a lot of human resources and financial 
resources. So these have been obstacles for us – a high staff turnover. Also we’ve had difficulties 
with ministries not understanding what their human rights issues are and so it’s just taken a lot of 
training. But usually once senior officials understand what their obligations are, they are more 
than happy to try to meet them because they understand how important they are.  
Anja Smid: I have heard that this programme supposed to finish this year, by the end of 2008, but 
I also heard that there has been talks of prolongation. It should be prolonged for another year. So 
it should go on until the end of 2009. My question is whether you think that ministries at the 
moment are ready and well equipped to work on their own? 
Melissa Stone: No. That’s why we’re asking for another year. And that’s why is really important to 
us. We’re at the moment now, we actually have hoped to be at this moment earlier, where the 
human rights units are now ready to do the outreach to their ministries, but we don’t even have a 
full year left in 2008 to do it and it takes a while to actually do that kind of outreach. Also you have 
to look at the fact the human rights unit have developed at different pace from each other. So for 
example Ministry of Education, Science and Technology was always well developed. They have 
had the same people there the whole time. Ministry of Local Government and Administration. 
same thing. They had the same people there the whole time. But many other ministries have had 
a huge turnover in their staff. For example, Ministry of Internal Affairs, the first human rights unit 
coordinator was so good that she was promoted to become the chief of staff of the ministry at that 
time. Then Ministry of Energy and Mining had a human rights unit member, he wasn’t the 
coordinator at that time, but he was an excellent lawyer, he was promoted to lead one of the 
departments in the Ministry of Justice. So we’ve had many cases where the staff in the human 
rights unit has been recognized for their proficiency and for their effectiveness because suddenly 
there are in a human rights unit and then they get promoted to even higher positions. Ministry of 
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Communities in Returns has also had a significant turnover. In addition to that, of the 
coordinators, this is going to be interesting to you, 25% of the coordinators have been out for a 
year or more on maternity leave. So with all of this turnover, with the turnover of permanent 
secretaries  and also the turnover of staff and the maternity leaves, this has made our program 
move a little bit slower than we had hoped that it would. But at the same time, you have to look at 
the whole programme like an investment. We invested in these human rights units and now in the 
coming year it is when we will see the pay-out. We will see that these units themselves apply the 
capacity building lessons that they’ve learnt from the OSCE staff. They apply it in their own 
ministry. In addition, we have another stellar success with the Ministry of Local Government and 
Administration where that ministry saw how effective the ministry based human rights unit system 
was and they’ve realized that they’ve had some of the same problems from municipality to 
municipality where they were coordinating gender equality and minority rights issues and child 
rights issues as well as anti-trafficking issues…they were dealing with all of these issues and they 
were having some of the problems that we had at the central level when all of these officers were 
working competitively with each other rather working under the umbrella of human rights. And so 
they’ve decided that they would like to establish human rights units on the municipality level. So 
they took that initiative. They’ve established that programme. It was all Kosovars on the stage 
making the announcement. They had very strong support from their minister, they had very 
strong support from their permanent secretary, they wrote administrative instruction, they 
recommended to all municipalities to develop a human rights unit and now they are 24 human 
rights units across Kosovo in municipalities. That’s 24 out of 30 municipalities which is quite a 
good track record considering that they have just started to put their units together at the 
beginning of the year. So these are successes that we didn’t anticipate. We didn’t anticipate that 
the units would want to do this massive training to their senior staff, we didn’t anticipate that the 
Ministry of Local Government and Administration would also reach down into the municipality 
level and I think that this is another indication of how successful the programme has been.  
Anja Smid: That is definitely good news. So in 2006 when you started with the programme, you 
had a mandate for two years. Does that mean that you thought that your work will be done in two 
years? 
Melissa Stone: Actually we had a mandate for one year, but it was renewable and it was assume 
that it would be renewed for as long as it was necessary to be renewed. 
Anja Smid: OK. 
Melissa Stone: And after the first six months we did an evaluation and then from there on we’ve 
done an evaluation on an annual basis. Our next evaluation will be going out next week. We sent 
it out as a questionnaire every year and then we put together the results and whatever the 
ministry says they want we do. Based on what their human rights needs are. We anticipated that 
it would be a multiyear program. How many years it was not clear. And I think that we needed to 
remain flexible with it, because some ministries have been more responsive, other ministries 
have been less responsive, some ministers are more responsive, and some permanent 
secretaries are more responsive. Some ministries who did very well at first are not doing so well 
any longer. Some ministries that were terrible at first have turned into the best ones. It hasn’t 
been something that we’ve been able to predict. In addition, we have two new ministries, for 
example Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Justice were very very new at the beginning of 
our programme, they were formed just in 2005, so we came in in 2006 and they didn’t even have 
their entire staff hired. So we couldn’t go and knock on their doors and say: “Where’s your human 
rights unit?” and they didn’t have their other staff hired either.   
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Anja Smid: Of course. Yes. Were you personally involved with this project from the very 
beginning? From 2006?  
Melissa Stone: Honestly, I’ve started to work on that project in 2000. When I started…I started as 
an advisor to the, what was at that time, department of joint administrative structure, it was a 
department of democratic governance and civil society and I was working in the equal opportunity 
bureau and I was the coordinator of the equal opportunity bureau or unit or division… But we had 
also a human rights unit and human rights unit essentially advised all of the other departments. 
These departments were preliminary systems of ministries on their human rights compliance 
issues. And we’ve noticed even then that the departments didn’t have staff, internal staff, who 
understood human rights principles and so we advised each of the ministries to develop a focal 
point and to start developing their staff. The way that it actually did develop is... they developed 
gender equality officers, minority rights officers, children rights officers and anti-trafficking officers. 
It was only after they had addressed these thematic areas in human rights that we were able to 
suggest the ministries to put thematic areas together under the lager human rights umbrella. 
Anja Smid: Sure. Was the prolongation of the mandate for 2009 confirmed yet?   
Melissa Stone: It’s already in the budget and in the programme outline. 
Anja Smid: Have the ministries already agreed on it? 
Melissa Stone: Pretty much. Yes. They’ve been… 
Anja Smid: You have to have their approval to continue your cooperation? 
Melissa: Generally, we asked them through the evaluation. We asked them every year if they 
think we should continue and what we should do differently. And we also ask them, you know, we 
have in our capacity building sections, we have them in a group and we say: “OK, we’re planning 
for the next year, what would you like?”. And we hand them the microphone and it goes from 
person to person and they tell us what they would like. This year they really wanted to have more 
study visits because although they understand human rights principles more than they have ever 
before, they don’t understand, well, many of them have never been in a country where they 
actually had a chance to analyse that country’s operations on human rights. So they would like to 
meet colleagues from other countries where the countries are successful in implementing human 
rights and hear what those colleagues are doing. Whether it’s in a labour sector, whether it’s in en 
education sector… Ministry of Local Government and Administration is planning to go to Spain 
and look at some of the ways they deal with the multi-ethnicity and decentralization in Barcelona. 
Another group is going to look at the education issues in Slovenia. Another group on the Official 
Gazette is going to Austria to see how Austria handles the publication of laws because that’s 
within human rights. You need to know what the law is that you need to follow. 
Anja Smid: Of course. So do you organize those visits and meetings? 
Melissa Stone: Yes. 
Anja Smid: You organize meeting with colleagues from other countries? Everything is done by 
you? 
Melissa Stone: Yes.  
Anja Smid: That must cause a lot of administrative and organizational stress.   
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Melissa Stone: That’s what we’re doing. Another very exciting thing that we’re doing is we’re 
taking a group of the human rights unit coordinators to Geneva in November so that they can see 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in action when they are reviewing the 
reports submitted by Kosovo. There’s a place in the room where the public can seat and observe 
the proceedings. So we have members from the Kosovo ministries who may very well see what is 
happening with their actual report. They will see the Committee in action. This is part of their 
capacity building because they have never seen the Committee work before. They don’t know 
how it looks like, how do they ask the questions, how do you prepare your responses. But anyone 
of them technically could also be selected to go on the official delegation. So there will be an 
official delegation with UNMIK and there will be an observer delegation made up of some of the 
colleagues and the ones who are on the official delegation. So it’s going to be a wonderful hands-
on training opportunity. 
Anja Smid: When will this take place? 
Melissa Stone: 10
th 
November. (2008) 
Anja Smid: And everything is initialized by them? It’s their idea and they ask you for your help, 
support, recommendations…etc.? 
Melissa Stone: Right. We might suggest things for them. Like several of them say: “Well, we 
would really like to go and see how human rights work in other places that have a good human 
rights record. What does it look like, how do they do things, how does their political structure 
support them, how do things work there.” And then we would say: “Hmmm, well this is want you 
want to do, maybe you could do this, maybe you could do that, maybe, you know, in your sector 
think about this, maybe you could attend this conference, maybe you could apply for that.” We 
give them ideas. 
Anja Smid: You have already mentioned some forerunners among ministries, but just to repeat. 
Which ministries are at the moment doing a good job? Which ministries have the best functioning 
human rights unit? 
And do you think that in 2009 you will stop cooperating with some of the ministries since some 
ministries are doing so well on their own? 
Melissa: To answer the first question…I’m looking at my ministries list here and I will give you 
different ministries that I suggested last time and I will tell you why I think they are good. Ministry 
of Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Development they were the lead in reaching out to their senior 
officials. They’ve had trainings on the anti-discrimination law all over Kosovo, in every region for 
their senior officials in those regions. Of course they work in agriculture, so their staff is spread 
out around Kosovo. Ministry of Environment, Energy and Mining, they were excellent, because 
their legal staff gave us the most incredibly good helpful comments on an administrative 
instruction that we drafted and then the human rights units revised themselves. We drafted it 
based on what their ideas were. So we just put it together. We were the note takers essentially. 
And the Ministry of Energy and Mining put it together and gave excellent comments on it from the 
government side. Ministry of Public Services has really come up in recent times. The head of their 
human rights unit, the coordinator there is now on the leading working group for the new national 
action plan for the disability rights. Ministry of Environment and Spatial Planning has really 
increased their efforts. They are also reaching out to their senior officials; in fact they are 
organizing a conference for five other ministries on the issue of expropriations. Ministry of 
Culture, Youth and Sport has been strong from the beginning. Ministry of Education, Science and 
Technology has also been strong from the very beginning. Those two ministries plus Ministry of 
Local Government and Administration and Office of the Prime Minister, as well as Ministry of 
161 
 
Economy and Financing, because a fair share financing has experienced a lot of pressure since 
their ministries have been created and established in a legal framework to address minority 
rights, to address gender equality issues and also to address trafficking in human beings. So they 
were pretty well set up when we came on to the scene.  
What was the second question? 
Anja Smid: By the end of 2009 you will probably assess that there are some ministries who still 
need your attention and on the other hand, there are some ministries that can work on their own. 
Do you think that you might quit cooperating with those who don’t need your help anymore? 
Melissa Stone: I don’t think that we would completely quit them, because there are so many 
projects going on that involve all ministries and even if they don’t need basic capacity building any 
longer, they need technical assistance. For example, they may be writing inputs to a human rights 
strategy or what they ministry is going to do to implement their human rights strategy or what their 
ministry’s human rights work plan should be for the year and they will still ask for comments from 
our advisers and they will still want to know if they are in alignment with other ministries. So even 
if it’s not capacity building, we would still continue with them with technical assistance. But if you 
consider that every advisor team has now three ministries it’s up to that team to judge for 
themselves. They are the professionals on the ground on the OSCE side. There might be a 
month when they spend more time on ministry nr. 1 and ministries 2 and 3 take a back seat and 
then they rotate. Or there might be one problem with one ministry that they just, you know, for a 
whole year spend more time with. There may be some ministries that have political problems 
inside them – the permanent secretary is new and they have to help the human rights unit 
backstop them as they are getting their permanent secretary back on board again. And once the 
permanent secretary is on board, they leave the human rights unit to do what they need to do. So 
it’s really, I don’t think that we would leave any ministry behind totally before the programme 
ends. And I don’t think that any ministry would want us to leave them before the programme 
ends. We don’t have any indication of that at this stage. In fact, even though they are working 
pretty well by themselves, it’s kind of a like, our advisors even for the ministries that are quite 
functional, are sort of a security blanket right now. And so we would leave them with that security 
blanket until as many of the ministries as possible are at their maximum level of proficiency. And 
then we would have a gradual exit strategy toward the third quarter of next year. We will spend 
less and less time with them and we will also do a proficiency test for them based on the lessons 
that we’ve shared with them. In the all ministry capacity building programme we’re creating a 
manual which would help the new members who’ve come in that didn’t get all of the capacity 
building training, because they came in after we started, but still we’re making a folio where they 
can read about it and read the principles that we taught and then we’ll have a proficiency test and 
if they know all of the principles and they understand the basics then they will get a certificate 
from us saying that they have demonstrated that they are proficient in the principles that we 
offered. And that will come toward the end of next year, we were actually planning on doing it this 
year, but I think that that’s a good way to conclude the programme. Rather than test them to 
early, I would rather provide them materials early and then have some study sessions for them. 
Anja Smid: You said that the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport has been strong from the 
very beginning. I read couple of weeks ago in the newspapers that there are lots of children that 
cannot start with the school, because there’s not enough teachers and actual space to fit all these 
children in. How do you address these issues? 
Melissa Stone: Yes, they have the overcrowding in schools. I wouldn’t immediately call this a 
failure. I would say that they need to address the school capacity and they are doing that. They 
162 
 
are in the process of assessing where the problems are and where they need new schools. You 
should also be aware that the Kosovo population is growing… 
Anja Smid: Yes, population growth rate is more than 1% a year. But do you also address this 
issues? 
Melissa Stone: If they are human rights related. There is overcrowding in schools, but all the kids 
in the area actually do have access to the schools. That would be more of an administrative 
issue. If we were given a list of issues that were problematic, we would choose issues that are 
stronger in a human rights content, for example, there are some schools for minority students 
who don’t have books. So this is a huge hindrance to one’s access to education.  
Anja Smid: Especially, because it’s primary school. It’s not at the university level. 
Melissa Stone: Exactly.  
Anja Smid: But it’s quite harsh to think about it. Sometimes they need to wait a year or two to 
enter and there could be children who are 10 and start with the school for the first time.  
Melissa Stone: Yes. It’s a problem. But then there are also a huge number of people who didn’t 
have an opportunity to go to school at other times and so there are big needs for remedial 
redress of human rights problems from earlier times, as well. So it’s not just the situation on the 
ground as we see it now that needs to be addressed. We have to take a longer term perspective 
and also we need to realize that ministries have a certain amount of staff and a certain amount of 
financial resources every year. They have to pick and choose the issues that are more important. 
They have to prioritize because there is no way that they can address every issue. Just because 
something is a human rights issue and the OSCE would like to wave a red flag in front of the 
issue that doesn’t mean that it will necessarily make it on the ministries priority list that year. It 
depends what else is on that list. And what can we do? We need to also to be considered of 
issues like saturation like the fact that understaffing affects everyone and really affects ministry’s 
productivity overall. There can be some special projects from time to time. 
Anja Smid: I will proceed with another topic now. Your second task is the Anti-corruption Agency. 
You’re also working with them, but there is no human rights advisory unit from the OSCE staff?      
Melissa Stone: We did have an advisor who was an ex-parliamentarian, and ex Belgium 
parliamentarian. He was lovely, but he had some family obligations and they took him back. We 
miss him terribly, but the bottom line is also that the UNDP has for a long time been taking the 
lead on anti-corruption and starting on November 1 (2008), we knew this was coming, that the EU 
was going to be taking a significant role on addressing the corruption issue in the context of 
Kosovo looking toward EU membership. So this is an area where the OSCE would naturally step 
back and allow the EU to take on the function, because they actually have significant expertise on 
this specific issue. The OSCE needed to address the issue when there was no one else doing the 
job, because it is very much an issue related to the rule of law, very much an issue related to 
democratic governance. But it is a specialized issue and there are specialized technics and 
issues that need to be address within the corruption sector.   
Anja Smid: To what extent are you still working on the Anti-Corruption Action Plan with the 
Agency? 
163 
 
Melissa Stone: We have given them some specific suggestions early on about the Anti-Corruption 
Action Plan. In the meantime UNDP does provide the Anti-Corruption Agency with two full-time 
advisors. I believe that they’re full time. So we don’t need to duplicate the efforts that are going 
on. We did give them our preliminary recommendations earlier this year in March. Some of the 
things that we were trying to do with the Anti-Corruption Agency now are things that other actors 
in the field can’t do. For example, OSCE is well known for its municipality structure. So we have a 
municipal team in every municipality and the Anti-Corruption Agency has come to believe that 
although they have done very good media campaigning and just having a TV ad in front of you 
doesn’t encourage you to believe that the actually human beings in the Anti-Corruption Agency 
are going to protect the confidentiality of your corruption report. So for some time they had some 
resistance to people reporting because they were afraid. A lot of people in Kosovo have the 
legacy, they have experienced the legacy where government worked against them rather than for 
them. So they were afraid that if they made a report that other people would find out, the people 
they’ve reported on would find out and then it would be revengeful. And so now the Anti-
Corruption Agency wants to go to each municipality and to convene a meeting of the mayor, of 
the department directors, of the heads of public institutions, the post office, the hospital, the 
school, the centre for social work and especially those who are looking on procurement on the 
money management in those institutions. Put them into a room and say this is who we are, this is 
why we’re here. We’re here to help you and if you give us a report, this is how we are going to 
handle it, this is how we handle other reports. If you want to check out our references, you can, 
but we are strongly believe that corruption can kill Kosovo and we are very interested in seeing 
Kosovo survive. And so we count on all of you and you need to count on each other. Please know 
that if you give us information about something going on that you don’t feel is right and is in the 
realm of corruption, we will guarded it with our lives. When you say that face to face with the 
person, eye to eye… 
Anja Smid: It’s more believable than if is just written on a piece of paper. [Melissa nodding] 
Melissa Stone: So that’s something that the OSCE can assist with whereas the UNDP and the 
EU just don’t have that structure to offer. We have our strong points and as long as we can 
identify where the connections are, it’s actually for a very small amount of money and then we 
might help to fund a TV commercial for them or rather a TV public service announcement for anti-
corruption day which is on 9
th 
December. So it’s actually small amount of assistance when you 
think about it from our section. I just make a project proposal and we pay it out of our budget, but 
every municipal team will work with them (the Anti-Corruption Agency). So it’s actually really 
maximizing what the OSCE has to offer and I think that that may very well be the last piece of 
assistance that we give to the ACA and then I would advocate, I would recommend for the 
mission to take on the monitoring respective on the corruption issue, because, you know, in most 
places where we have OSCE missions, in this region of the world, they are monitoring missions. 
This is our typical way of being and the only reason why we did something different this time was 
because the institutions were starting up and we had a mandate from the UN, from the Security 
Council to do institution building as Pillar III of UNMIK. So we’re fulfilling that obligation and then 
moving more into monitoring function as our Head of Mission has advocated. 
Anja Smid: Do statistics show that since you have started with the Anti-Corruption Action Plan 
that the situation on corruption has improved? 
Melissa Stone: The situation has improved and we have some statistics. You can go to the Anti-
Corruption Agency’s website if you want to see more. They do an annual report and now they’re 
doing a six-month report. You can take a look at the six-month report and I think that that could 
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be very helpful for you. Technically I think that they have had a lot of gains, they have done a lot 
of investigations. The weak point is really in prosecutions. 
Anja Smid: The third topic I want to talk about is the OSCE involvement with the Office of the 
Prime Minister. What is the focus of your support, how often do you meet, what are the key topics 
of your discussions with the officials from the Office of the Prime Minister? 
Melissa Stone: Technically, the Office of the Prime Minister was developed with the OSCE. The 
Advisory Office on Good Governance, Human Rights, Equal Opportunities and Gender devolved 
from a structure during 1999 until 2001. It was a Joint Interim Administrative Structure that was 
set up. There were 20 ministries and the ones related to civil administration were administered by 
the UN, the ones that were about the economy or infrastructure were administered by the EU and 
then there was one that the OSCE administered, called the Department of Democratic 
Governance and Civil Society. That department in 2002, when we got the Prime Ministry, exactly 
after the first elections, when we had the government, we had all departments turned into 
ministries, this department was converted to the Office of the Prime Minister. We (the OSCE) 
helped to hire the staff in the Office of the Prime Minister, we helped to develop the terms of 
references, job descriptions and everything like that. So I knew the people, I knew all the senior 
people in that office when I was an advisor there, earlier, many years ago. And so my advice to 
them has always been quite consistent. On a human rights level we have been earlier advising all 
the departments that they need to improve their human rights compliance with their human rights 
legal obligations that have been taken under UNMIK. So this was pretty much more of the same 
for them, to have me back as their advisor, even though I was gone for couple of years, so when I 
came back, they were very warm and very welcoming. And it was actually with them that we built 
this programme. There had been other advisors to the OSCE who have tried to build this 
programme, but they have not succeeded, because the Prime Ministry was very unhappy with the 
OSCE for a period of time, because they felt that some of the advisors who came after me and 
the group that I was with had an approach where they would take information from the Prime 
Ministry and then they would come back to the OSCE and the OSCE published the information 
that was internal operating information. They published it in the press. So this was very difficult 
time for the OSCE, especially when those people left the mission, the OSCE took on a new, a 
different approach with that office. And I was a part of that new initiative and so they agreed to 
give us a year to convince them that we are not going to use any of the information we have 
collected from the ministries for reporting purposes or going public with it. What we promised to 
do for them is offering them assistance, offering them help. So essentially everything that we 
were to do in the Prime Ministry or in any other ministries are always according to the principle of 
what is in the best interest to the ministry. Of course, we’re staffed by the OSCE, so we also take 
into consideration what is the interest of our organization, the OSCE. But on top of that our 
second highest consideration is what is the best interest of the ministry. So technically I have 
been advising the same people since 2000. 
Anja Smid: But what is the focus of the support at the moment (September 2008), what issues do 
you discuss, how often do you meet? 
Melissa Stone: I meet them almost every day. The focus of our support, at this point, has been 
developing human rights unit in every ministry. We’ve been working on that since… 
Anja Smid: So they are the main office of all the human rights units? 
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Melissa Stone: They are the coordinator of all the human rights units. We work on the 
coordination of their faculties. In addition, they are preparing a human rights strategy for the 
whole government for three years from 2009 to 2011. We work very closely on that. This week I 
am working very closely on their input to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
There is a meeting coming up in November (2008) and Kosovo has submitted a report through 
UNMIK to the Committee on the Cabinet for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. And the 
Committee has come back with 38 or so questions about the official report. And the Prime 
Ministry is answering the part of that that relates to their operations and has consolidated also 
inputs from all of the other ministries. So I am giving them feedback on this, unofficially, it is not 
coming on the OSCE letterhead, it is not coming as an OSCE feedback. It is just a feedback as 
their advisor on how they can be more concluded in their answers, what else they could include. 
Anja Smid: Would you say that they are seeking your help the whole time? 
Melissa Stone: Oh, yes. They have more work that I can possibly do, because I also coordinate 
the section, my section in the OSCE and we have a huge administrative load as well. So this is 
one of the reasons why I have been begging my department for a deputy, but the deputy post is 
really the same rank as all the other senior advisor posts and so the senior advisors are obliged 
to do more work it is not like they really have a higher rank or more money or anything like that. I 
would rather keep my same job otherwise I will just go crazy for nothing gained.  
Anja Smid: Do you cooperate with any other divisions and sections within the OSCE? 
Melissa Stone: Almost all of them. We cooperate with the media section in our department when 
it comes to issues having to do with RTK or communication problems. We work very closely with 
the Higher Education Unit when it comes to the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology 
although we are focused more on primary and secondary education, because that is the area with 
the human rights address more…hmm… We work very closely with the Central Assembly Unit, 
because now they have a committee that addresses human rights directly. We advocated for that 
committee for years, now they have finally developed it and we are very happy to see it. We 
offered them training opportunities or trainers. I hope, coming up this fall (2008), we will have this 
opportunity again. They have done training for us, for human rights units as well. We work closely 
with the Local Governance Section on issues having to do with the Ministry of Local Governance 
and Administration. We are participating in a working group from the OSCE to address what is 
going to happen to the Ministry’s Community Officers now. We work closely with the Communities 
Division because the community rights are also overlapping with human rights. We work closely 
with the Property Section because we also work with the Ministry of Environment and Spatial 
Planning. We work closely with the LSMS - Legal System Monitoring Section. Because we work 
closely with the Ministry of Justice, so did they work on judiciary monitoring – the function of the 
administration and justice. We work closely with the Anti-Trafficking Unit because they work on 
trafficking in human beings. We work closely with the Security Section, now it is called Security 
Monitoring Section, or maybe it is something different, they changed names several times and it 
is hard to keep up. We work closely with them on issues of security because the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs houses the Police Inspectorate. We also work closely with I guess it is called Local 
Governance now. They will be doing a legislative review. In the past they put out a very good 
report assessing the implementation by the ministries of the assembly law and that has many 
human rights components that interest us. So we are very happy that they have put out that 
report, because then we can use this report as the leverage for the other advice that we give 
inside the ministries and make sure that we are constantly asking our colleagues in the OSCE 
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their opinions on things, even if they are not a copy of the official documents, just to make sure 
that we are in alignment in our advising and in what they are advising in their specific field.  
Anja Smid: What about the Human Rights Division from the Monitoring department? 
Melissa Stone: I’ve just named all of their sections. They have an Anti-Trafficking Section. They 
also have a Property Section, as well. And what used to be the Rule of Law Section that they 
later changed into the Local Governance Section which now is going to be called the Legislation 
Review Section. I think those are the three sections that they have now. 
Anja Smid: How come the names of sections are changing? Are they changing with every new 
Head of Mission? 
Melissa Stone: They change every year. We had two Heads of Mission who were really 
interested in restructuring so we had two restructurings under Werner Wnendt, first one on the 
municipality level and then the departments on central level. And then we just had a mission that 
has been constantly restructuring. Things are changing so fast that I don’t follow. For example, 
the section you’re working with (Central Coordination Unit), nobody understands exactly what 
their job and their mandate is and we don’t understand the half of it because things are 
happening on a senior level and then we never know why it happened that way and we never get 
the explanations until somebody comes to us and explains to us who they are. It is strange 
sometimes, because I see their face for the first time and I should follow their instructions? It is a 
challenge. But I don’t want to complain. It just takes time to get organized again. 
Anja Smid: In your opinion, what are the biggest strengths and weakness of your section? I mean 
other than the problem of being understaffed. My question refers to policies, methodology of your 
work and activities… 
Melissa Stone: I would say that the methodology of working with the ministries has been very 
good and has been very well received. That is definitely one of our strengths. And the fact that 
the human rights units want to extend the Capacity Building Programme and they also want to 
include their senior officials, I think that is a vote of confidence in the work that we have done. 
Also the expansion of the methodology from the ministry level to the municipality level is also a 
huge vote of confidence. We actually do very well with our local interlocutors. They do what they 
say they are going to do, of course with our advice. And we have accomplished a lot together. 
I think the weakness of our section is that we haven’t had very much mission’s support. The 
section was moved from what was “Human Rights and the Rule of Law”. When we were in the 
“Human Rights and the Rule of Law” our management had experience with human rights and the 
rule of law. And the majority of international staff are human rights lawyers and I think that it is 
really hard to take a whole section of human rights lawyers and dumped them in the middle of 
political scientists. They sometimes don’t understand the legal ramifications of what we do 
because our whole point of leverage is legal compliance. Not political compliance, we do not get 
into the politics, we just address legal compliance. So to take us out of the department that uses 
that rubric for development has been catastrophic. The first way that it happened was that the 
mission was re-divided from human rights and democratization into central authorities and 
municipal authorities. And then we were moved into central department. And the department 
would just rename without really functionally changing we would divide between monitoring and 
assistance. And the next day it is going to go back to what it was before – human rights and 
democratization. And we are going to be stuck in the democratization. So we are going to have 
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the human rights and democratization and we are going to be divorced from the larger 
department on human rights. And this is every day something that I ask to change. Every day I 
ask someone in the ministry to change this. 
Anja Smid: So I guess you will be having a lot of suggestions for the new Head of Mission? 
Melissa Stone: Oh yeah. That’s the weak point. And then most of the colleagues that we work 
with the most closely are on the most difficult human rights issues – property, communities, 
access to justice, anti-trafficking and they are in the different department. So essentially it means 
that I should go to other department. 
Anja Smid: What do you expect to happen to your section after 2009 when the Programme is 
completed? 
Melissa Stone: I would advocate that we keep up relationships with the ministries. Not to be 
placed inside the ministries, but to continue to work with them in some capacity on special 
projects.  
Anja Smid: But I am guessing that some restructuring will take place or maybe even a merge with 
some other sections? 
Melissa Stone: We’ll see. I will be leaving the Mission no later than January 2010, because my 
seven years will be up. So we will see. It depends on the will of the Head of Mission and also 
what OSCE’s mandate is by then and what we can afford because our budget is being reduced 
on annual basis. 
Anja Smid: I am guessing that it also depends on the local officials whether this cooperation will 
continue. If they still have the interest and the need to continue to work with the OSCE? 
Melissa Stone: They sure will because there will be some human rights issues that they have 
never reported on before and they will have zero experience and they will need some support and 
advice.  
Anja Smid: Do you think that the EU will take over some tasks? 
Melissa Stone: I don’t think that the EU has human rights as a separate issue. They have the rule 
of law and public administration. But in the terms of human rights they don’t have something 
specific. The OSCE is the largest European human rights organization. So that is really our 
mandate, no matter where we go, no matter what we do that is our organization’s mandate. It is 
not just the mission in Kosovo. So we would focus on that.  
Anja Smid: Based on your judgment, do you think that after the completion of the Programme 
there will not be enough focus on human rights? 
Melissa Stone: No, I do not worry about that. But what I do worry is that the OSCE leadership 
might not be aware of the backlash on the ground that is happening against the international 
authorities because they have overlooked or rather tunnel vision looked some community rights 
and exclusion of all other human rights. So the development of community rights has been much 
more resources demanding….putting communities at the exclusion of other issues like disability 
rights, rights for the elderly, child rights,… And this is a problem because the local governance 
and the majority of the population sees that they have people who are more in need and that they 
are in more vulnerable and desperate positions than some of the minority members and for them 
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it feels unfair. And this is the cons of the backlash that we are experiencing now and this is why I 
have been advocating to take a more moderate approach whereby we do have a balanced 
approach otherwise there would create long term imbalance that would create a base for another 
conflict. 
Anja Smid: Do you think that after 2009 there could be a new programme such as the one you 
are working on right now? 
Melissa Stone: It is really hard to predict now because we are in the middle of 2008. So we have 
to take an assessment, probably in April, May of next year (meaning 2009) we will make an 
assessment of what should we do in 2010 with the section that we have, with the resources that 
we have, with the relationships that we have and how all of that can do for the next year of 
OSCE’s work in Kosovo depending on what mission’s mandate and objectives are going to be.  
Anja Smid: What about the institutionalized surveys taken by Kosovo ministries every half of a 
year and every year. I have heard some complains that those surveys are not detailed enough 
and not up-to-date. Would you marked them as unsatisfactory? 
Melissa Stone: The whole purpose of the survey was to assess whether the ministries were 
meeting the criteria that they felt they needed in order to do their job properly. So they, in sense, 
have created the criteria not our section. They have developed the criteria how they work should 
be measured.  
Anja Smid: Every ministry created the criteria for itself? 
Melissa Stone: No. There was a general survey that assesses the compliance within 
administrative instruction that addresses the institutionalization for the development of the human 
rights unit in each ministry. Each ministry should have minimum of 3 people, they should have 
office space, they should be placed in the permanent secretary’s office, they should have a 
budget,… They should have reasonable working conditions in other words. So technically they 
were their criteria so it is not like we are sitting here creating new standards every year for them. 
No, we actually came in with suggestions: you should do this and this. We have been working 
staidly on different aspects of their standards from the very beginning. The standards have not 
changed. Our post to addressing them has not changed over time as they have accomplished 
things we just moved to another aspect. Standards are not going to change. They are basic 
principles or models of what constitutes good organizational development and these are the 
standards they we have been trying to assess and they are in our institutionalized survey. So 
there are different aspects that we have expended on, for example the interface between the 
legal office and the human rights unit, is something that we are going to be focusing more and 
more on. I think that that is really one of last task we can take. Also making sure that the human 
rights unit when the coordinator goes on leave, that there is somebody else competent to take 
over that responsibility, otherwise you are developing just one person rather than a unit that can 
be operational within the ministry. So rather than building a personality per default, we rather 
build an institution. But otherwise, as of the first of this year, the first of 2008, that project with that 
effort was handed over to the prime ministry. We have done it and shown it as an example to the 
prime ministry. Now they have the documentation, they have the survey forms and they were 
actually going to do the survey themselves in June, but then we had a few obstacles, the prime 
ministry has been terribly short-staffed and oversaturated, so there is only so much we can ask 
for them to take on. They are already taking on a tsunami load of work. So that is not even in their 
own mandate. They are also taking on the work of other ministries that are not able to do their 
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work. It is very difficult for me to fault them for not doing it yet. This issue is actually on my 
calendar to discuss it with them this week when are they going to distribute this survey. It is about 
time. We were doing it every six months, but now I think that it would be appropriate for the 
Advisory Office on Good Governance, Human Rights, Equal Opportunity and Gender Issues to 
do it once a year. 
Anja Smid: Are these documents available to the public? 
Melissa Stone: No. They are only working documents and technically I do not think anybody 
would be interested in seeing them.  
Anja Smid: In your opinion, what are the greatest achievements of your section by now? 
Melissa Stone: The human rights strategy has every ministry involved. And they are working with 
us on Protection of Minorities Action Plan that involves every ministry that could be possible be 
included. The prime ministry is now in the position for the first time to respond to a treaty body 
without very much of the OSCE intervention. I mean, I would give comments, but they do not 
technically have to have my comments. My comments would make their replay better, but the 
OSCE does not need to do any work with them. They have a structure now that the ministries, for 
better or for worse, are supporting. It is not as easy as it sounds when you have permanent 
secretaries turning over, well half of them turning after every year. That is pretty amazing, 
because we did not have a structure when we started out in 1999 with zero people who had 
professional training in human rights and now we have 160, because of the OSCE inputs. From 
zero to 160.  
Anja Smid: I guess the fact that you created these units two years ago and now they are able to 
work on their own can also be considered as a success?  
Melissa Stone: The units were created by government at our advice. But yes.  
Anja Smid: How would you grade the activities of the OSCE in the fields of human rights and 
democratization until now? 
Melissa Stone: I cannot speak on the issue of democratization, because I have not been involved 
with the programme. That is not the area where I have the expertise, but in terms of human rights 
issue, the OSCE has been the lead actor on the ground of Kosovo. And if OSCE had not been 
there, who knows what kind of structures they would have. Probably somebody else would have 
risen to the occasion. I think that the OSCE has been very active and very engaged in the 
development of human rights structure and human rights systems in Kosovo and now it is time for 
the government to pick it up all and take it forward. OSCE has been very steady and reliable and 
it is in part to human rights in general and also to specific human rights where violations continue 
to occur. That was what the organization had as its objective given by the Security Council. I think 
that the OSCE has very much met these objectives.  
Anja Smid: Do you think that the OSCE is getting some negative reviews from the locals since it 
remains its status neutral position? 
Melissa Stone: No.  
Anja Smid: Don’t you think that the people of Kosovo expected some sort of a reply from the 
OSCE after declaring independence in February? 
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Melissa Stone: Different ones of us deal with this issue differently. In the absence of a larger 
initiative or specific instruction from the head of mission, we can address this issue as we need to 
within the context of our relationship with Kosovo authorities. You know, the OSCE has also a 
mission in Serbia and we give a lot of assistance to the Serbian government. So you cannot say 
that we are one-sided here. We have never been one-sided. OSCE has been status neutral about 
Kosovo since 1999. The OSCE is impartial when it comes to this issue. We depend on 
international law. If something is confused or uncertain in international law, it is up to the powers 
accountable to resolve the problem, not for us. We are not that body that has a resolution kind of 
authority to make that level of decision. But we have also 56 member states, so if any of our 
member states disagrees with a certain position then it is not an organization-wide position. It is 
so simple. So technically, while I am sitting here in Pristina advising the Kosovo government, 
there is someone else up in Belgrade advising the Serbian government. And whoever is advising 
the Serbian government is saying the same thing that I am regardless of what your position is, 
politically speaking, you need to make sure that you comply with human rights. If you accept 
Kosovo as an independent nation, as an independent nation Kosovo has human rights 
obligations. If you do not accept Kosovo as an independent nation but as an autonomous region 
in Serbia then they still have to address human rights obligations. If Kosovo is going to be under 
the UN administration, Kosovo has human rights obligations. No matter what scenario, however 
you paint the picture, what colour is it at the end of the day the Kosovo government has the same 
human rights and legal obligations. There is no question here. In term of being for or against, the 
political paradigm is irrelevant to the fact that every government in Europe who wants to be a 
member of the European Union has to comply with human rights legal obligations that are 
applicable according to the UN standards and also to the European standards.  
Anja Smid: But you have to get criticized for being status neutral on one hand and then also for 
cooperating and collaborating with the Kosovo government on the other? 
Melissa Stone: We cooperate and collaborate with everybody. We do not take sides. That is what 
status neutral means.  
Anja Smid: Does the Serbian minority in Kosovo agree with this arrangement? You are, after all, 
assisting the government of the newly declared state of Kosovo that Serbia does not recognize. 
Melissa Stone: It is actually in the best interest of Serbians in Kosovo that the Kosovo 
government is maximally adherent to human rights. Especially they have a lot to gain from the 
OSCE presence here.  
Anja Smid: Last question. I imagine that in 10 years’ time, the OSCE in Kosovo will shut its 
doors… 
Melissa Stone: It is hard to make any predictions, because the organization such as the OSCE 
can involve like NATO has involved. I do not know what will happen to the OSCE.  I think that the 
OSCE has to remain flexible and responsive to its member states and to the people in its member 
states. It is very hard now to predict what may be. For example, if you look at 1999, we have no 
idea that the issue of terrorism would have come upon us, upon on a horizon, as it has. Now 
terrorism has become a huge issue inside of the OSCE. So it is hard to sit here now and imagine 
what it would be like in 10 years. If you look 10 years back and you will see that it was a different 
world. And ten years before that, it look different yet again. 
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Anja Smid: Sure. But my question is when and if the OSCE in Kosovo one day closes its doors, 
what will its legacy be? 
Melissa Stone: Of course human rights issues, supporting the government and human rights, the 
rule of law and of course democratic governance through the election and assembly…, 
development of the institutions,… 
Anja Smid: I guess there will always be a political connection between Kosovo and the OSCE due 
to election observation.  
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   Tim Guldimann 
 
Anja Smid: If you look at the past nine years of the OSCE presence in Kosovo. What would you 
say are the greatest achievements of the mission in the fields of human rights and 
democratization? 
Tim Guldimann: Police school, elections to a certain extent that successful elections took place 
but the capacity building was insufficient, capacity building of the institutions, central assembly 
and above all regional and the general monitoring activity. But nine years is a very long time and I 
would be more critical of what the international community including the OSCE has done during 
all that time. Above that, there is too little self-critical discussion within the institutions of what we 
have been doing. 
Anja Smid: Do you think that there was an issue or a situation in the past that the OSCE should 
or could address better or react in a different way? 
Tim Guldimann: I think that the OSCE, as a part of the international community, could have 
invested more in giving a very critical objective assessment of where we are, instead of staying 
too much in the shadow of UNMIK. Above all, when it comes to the rule of law. That is what we 
have been doing recently, but the rule of law was a problem for a period and the OSCE should 
have been more consequent with its assessment concerning the deficiencies in this area.  
Anja Smid: Are you suggesting that the OSCE should work more independently? Or even outside 
of the UNMIK framework?  
Tim Guldimann: Yes, it is not contradictory, It think when we… what we have tried with the report 
now, with the annual report, that should have been done before and us being pillar III does not 
hinder us from doing that. We have done it now once and I would be very pleased to see it 
repeated next year. 
Anja Smid: In your opinion, what are the advantages and the disadvantages of the OSCE 
policies, methodology of the OSCE activities and its work? 
Tim Guldimann: Right now, the advantages as a consensus organization with having also states 
on board that do not recognize the independence of Kosovo to pursue our role from a status 
neutral position above all when it comes to the question that we could support the dialogue with 
the Serb community as we just have done. This was a good example of bringing the Serb 
community together with the authorities to have a dialogue on how to proceed with the integration 
of the Serb community here in Kosovo and under whatever terms this will be done. Ahtisaari is a 
reference, but as long as we pay respect to the position of the Serb community not accepting 
certain issues then we are OK. That is something that only we can do, the ICO, EULEX cannot 
do.  
Anja Smid: Based on your personal observation and evaluation, do you think the people of 
Kosovo and the authorities of Kosovo has still a lot of work to do to reach international standards 
in the fields of protection of human rights, democratization and good governance? 
Tim Guldimann: Of course. You can say that there has been very substantial progress, but the 
way is quite long. It is not early to state that still a lot has to be done otherwise we would not need 
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a EULEX mission here. But it is also about being very clear in our assessment and not giving 
wrong positive rosy assessment which is not truth. No way that they can get closer to European 
institutions if they do not live according to these central issues.  
Anja Smid: So you think that for progress of Kosovo, the support of the international community is 
definitely needed? 
Tim Guldimann: Yes, of course. That is not dated otherwise we would not have the consensus 
among the EU to go ahead and also among the OSCE member/participating states. 
Anja Smid: Do you think that the status neutral position of the organization ever worked against 
it? 
Tim Guldimann: To put it bluntly if we did not do that, the mission would have been closed. We 
could not have survived with a formal approach supporting actively the preparations of 
independence. Taking a stand on an issue on which it was no consensus. That would trigger off 
immediately different opponents against this mission. The Russians were crystal clear on closing 
the mission after independence and I think that this status neutral approach was, I think, decisive 
for preventing the closure of the mission. 
Anja Smid: Do you think that this status neutral position might ever change? 
Tim Guldimann: It will change as soon as there is a consensus of accepting independence of 
Kosovo. But there is no consensus among the OSCE participating states. If there is consensus, 
there would be no problem.  
Anja Smid: Don’t you think it is a little bit contradictory that there is a status neutral position from 
the OSCE side, but it still continues to work closely with the local government? 
Tim Guldimann: It works.  
Anja Smid: But I guess you are facing certain popularity loss from the locals because they feel 
that if you have a status neutral position, you do not support their independence? 
Tim Guldimann: I do not see it. Not with our cooperation with local authorities which works very 
well. From the local media there are sometime campaigns, but it can hit us, it can hit the SRSG, it 
can hit…whoever… But that is not, I mean, the published opinion doesn’t mean that we should 
consider it as the opinion of the people in Kosovo. 
Anja Smid: Did anything change for the OSCE concerning its work and activities since 
independence was declared in February and since the constitution was adopted in June? 
Tim Guldimann: The interesting experience was that we were able to proceed with virtually all 
activities which we have been pursuing for implementing our mandate before and after the 
declaration of independence and the constitution entered into force apart our executive role in the 
election area that was obvious. That, we just realized that now, ceases but otherwise we continue 
to do what we do. 
Anja Smid: What do you think is the ultimate goal of the OSCE presence here in Kosovo? 
Tim Guldimann: I think there is still a lot to do - supporting the institutions, capacity building and 
an objective assessment of what is going on is very well needed. I mean, I say assessment 
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because it is not about description of the problems, it is about a judgment of where we are and 
that is something that we should address more head on. But it is difficult to convince the people 
here to do it. We have tried to do it with that report.  
Anja Smid: Can you make any estimation when the OSCE mission in Kosovo will close its doors? 
Tim Guldimann: I hope that the principle that a mission should have a beginning and an end can 
also be applied to this mission. I cannot give you any prognoses when this will be the case. But I 
see that there is a tendency to keep functions from the international side too long, instead of 
empowerment, instead of handing over, instead of making sure that the responsibility is assured 
by local institutions and we lean back and say: “Here and here you do not comply with your own 
obligations.” That is a different role than just to be the help forever. We should stop nursing them 
forever.  
Anja Smid: Do you think that you can compare the work of the OSCE here in Kosovo with the 
work of any other OSCE mission in the region? 
Tim Guldimann: I only can compare our work with the mission in Croatia where 10 years ago I 
was the head of mission.  
Anja Smid: They just closed it. 
Tim Guldimann: Yes. Very late. That just shows you how long it was active. I don’t see the 
reason. But there we developed an efficient reporting which was giving an important role to that 
mission and I think that that is something that we can also apply here. The capacity building part 
we didn’t do in Croatia, but it is very crucial for Kosovo mission. I don’t know other missions well 
enough to judge. 
Anja Smid: In your opinion, do you think that the mission did enough to protect the human rights 
and to develop a sound democratization process? 
Tim Guldimann: We nurse them too much and we make too little political interventions. The whole 
human rights nursing…I’m very sceptical. We should be very tough on compliance with human 
rights. But all these institutions…[nodding disapprovingly] 
Anja Smid: Do you want to say that the OSCE is too politically correct for an environment like 
Kosovo? 
Tim Guldimann: No. It is not a question of political correctness. It’s a question of taking a position. 
At least people know what they have to deliver, they know what the principles, they know… They 
just have to read their own legislation and that is what they have to comply with. And that is what 
we have to work for. And for that we need a very objective assessment for which no rosy reports 
are helpful. They have never thought of it before when it comes to organized crime. That is 
something we need to pursue.  
Anja Smid: In the future, when the mission closes, what do you think the OSCE legacy in Kosovo 
will be? 
Tim Guldimann: It should be the OSCE’s assisting role. It should be, but I don’t know whether this 
will be the case. Our legacy should be offering support with respect and not with paternalism. And 
by doing so, we can be open, frank, clear and consequent in our assessment. But it is important 
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to have the respect. And that is the relationship which, yes I wouldn’t say it is not ideal, but it 
would be good if we had it.  
Anja Smid: How would you evaluate your work as the head of mission? With what kind of feelings 
you are leaving Kosovo? 
Tim Guldimann: Mixed feelings.  When it goes to the mission I had three goals: first, the elections. 
It worked. Second, the survival and it worked. Third, to get this internally on track,… Mhm…I still 
think of this mission as not efficient.  
Anja Smid: Do you want to say that the international community is overwhelmed with the work 
here? 
Tim Guldimann: No. Overwhelmed, come on. I mean what are we doing here? We have 800 
people and what do we produce? I mean if we were organized differently… I think that what is 
necessary to be done here, can be done with less people. We do a lot of things which are totally 
superfluous. And that is something which is very difficult to change because there is huge 
bureaucracy. But it does not function as it should.  
Anja Smid: Are you suggesting that a radical restructuring of this mission is necessary in order for 
the OSCE to do a better job? 
Tim Guldimann: It can only be done with a strong support from Vienna and I don’t have the 
support. I didn’t have the support. So the only think what I can do is smoothly go down 40 % and 
change some activities with the effect that I think we are more effective with less personnel. I 
cannot prove this yet, but some people tell me yes, it’s true. But we should go further and with far 
more determination for this task.  
Anja Smid: But I guess, especially the international staff is changing quite frequently. Maybe that 
could also be causing the “inefficiency”? 
Tim Guldimann: Yes also. It became a habit here. There are excellent, very dedicated people 
here, with these people we can do things. But then there are many others who think I don’t like to 
do this, I don’t like to do that…[shakes his head and gives a disapproving look] 
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Appendix III: UN Resolution 1160 
 
RESOLUTION 1160 (1998)  
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3868th meeting, on 31 March 1998  
The Security Council,  
Noting with appreciation the statements of the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, Italy, the 
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United 
States of America (the Contact Group) of 9 and 25 March 1998 (S/1998/223 and S/1998/272), 
including the proposal on a comprehensive arms embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
including Kosovo,  
Welcoming the decision of the Special Session of the Permanent Council of the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) of 11 March 1998 (S/1998/246),  
Condemning the use of excessive force by Serbian police forces against civilians and peaceful 
demonstrators in Kosovo, as well as all acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation Army or any 
other group or individual and all external support for terrorist activity in Kosovo, including finance, 
arms and training,  
Noting the declaration of 18 March 1998 by the President of the Republic of Serbia on the political 
process in Kosovo and Metohija (S/1998/250),  
Noting also the clear commitment of senior representatives of the Kosovar Albanian 
community to non-violence,  
Noting that there has been some progress in implementing the actions indicated in the 
Contact Group statement of 9 March 1998, but stressing that further progress is required,  
Affirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,  
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,  
 
1. Calls upon the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia immediately to take the further necessary 
steps to achieve a political solution to the issue of Kosovo through dialogue and to implement 
the actions indicated in the Contact Group statements of 9 and 25 March 1998;  
2. Calls also upon the Kosovar Albanian leadership to condemn all terrorist action, and 
emphasizes that all elements in the Kosovar Albanian community should pursue their goals 
by peaceful means only;  
3. Underlines that the way to defeat violence and terrorism in Kosovo is for the authorities in 
Belgrade to offer the Kosovar Albanian community a genuine political process;  
4. Calls upon the authorities in Belgrade and the leadership of the Kosovar Albanian 
community urgently to enter without preconditions into a meaningful dialogue on political 
status issues, and notes the readiness of the Contact Group to facilitate such a dialogue;  
5. Agrees, without prejudging the outcome of that dialogue, with the proposal in the Contact 
178 
 
Group statements of 9 and 25 March 1998 that the principles for a solution of the Kosovo 
problem should be based on the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and 
should be in accordance with OSCE standards, including those set out in the Helsinki Final 
Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe of 1975, and the Charter of the 
United Nations, and that such a solution must also take into account the rights of the Kosovar 
Albanians and all who live in Kosovo, and expresses its support for an enhanced status for 
Kosovo which would include a substantially greater degree of autonomy and meaningful self-
administration;  
6. Welcomes the signature on 23 March 1998 of an agreement on measures to implement 
the 1996 Education Agreement, calls upon all parties to ensure that its implementation 
proceeds smoothly and without delay according to the agreed timetable and expresses its 
readiness to consider measures if either party blocks implementation;  
7. Expresses its support for the efforts of the OSCE for a peaceful resolution of the crisis in 
Kosovo, including through the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office for the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, who is also the Special Representative of the European 
Union, and the return of the OSCE long-term missions;  
8. Decides that all States shall, for the purposes of fostering peace and stability in Kosovo, 
prevent the sale or supply to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, by their 
nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels and aircraft, of arms and related 
matériel of all types, such as weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment and 
spare parts for the aforementioned, and shall prevent arming and training for terrorist 
activities there;  
9. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provisional rules of procedure, a 
committee of the Security Council, consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake 
the following taks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and 
recommentations: 
(a) to seek from all States information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective 
implementation of the prohibitions imposed by this resolution;  
(b) to consider any information brought to its attention by any State concerning violations of the 
prohibitions imposed by this resolution and to recommend appropriate measures in response 
thereto;  
(c) to make periodic reports to the Security Council on information submitted to it regarding 
alleged violations of the prohibitions imposed by this resolution;  
(d) to promulgate such guidelines as may be necessary to facilitate the implementation of the 
prohibitions imposed by this resolution;  
 
(e) to examine the reports submitted pursuant to paragraph 12 below;  
1. Calls upon all States and all international and regional organizations to act strictly in 
conformity with this resolution, notwithstanding the existence of any rights granted or 
obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or of any contract entered 
into or any license or permit granted prior to the entry into force of the prohibitions imposed 
by this resolution, and stresses in this context the importance of continuing implementation of 
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the Agreement on Subregional Arms Control signed in Florence on 14 June 1996;  
2. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assistance to the committee 
established by paragraph 9 above and to make the necessary arrangements in the 
Secretariat for this purpose;  
3. Requests States to report to the committee established by paragraph 9 above within 30 
days of adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken to give effect to the 
prohibitions imposed by this resolution;  
4. Invites the OSCE to keep the Secretary-General informed on the situation in Kosovo and 
on measures taken by that organization in this regard;  
5. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed and to report on 
the situation in Kosovo and the implementation of this resolution no later than 30 days 
following the adoption of this resolution and every 30 days thereafter;  
6. Further requests that the Secretary-General, in consultation with appropriate regional 
organizations, include in his first report recommendations for the establishment of a 
comprehensive regime to monitor the implementation of the prohibitions imposed by this 
resolution, and calls upon all States, in particular neighbouring States, to extend full 
cooperation in this regard;  
 
16. Decides to review the situation on the basis of the reports of the Secretary-General, which 
will take into account the assessments of, inter alia, the Contact Group, the OSCE and the 
European Union, and decides also to reconsider the prohibitions imposed by this resolution, 
including action to terminate them, following receipt of the assessment of the Secretary-General 
that the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, cooperating in a constructive 
manner with the Contact Group, have:  
(a) begun a substantive dialogue in accordance with paragraph 4 above, including the 
participation of an outside representative or representatives, unless any failure to do so is not 
because of the position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or Serbian authorities;  
(b) withdrawn the special police units and ceased action by the security forces affecting the 
civilian population;  
(c) allowed access to Kosovo by humanitarian organizations as well as representatives of Contact 
Group and other embassies;  
(d) accepted a mission by the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office for the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that would include a new and specific mandate for addressing the 
problems in Kosovo, as well as the return of the OSCE long-term missions;  
(e) facilitated a mission to Kosovo by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights;  
 
1. Urges the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal established pursuant to 
resolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993 to begin gathering information related to the violence in 
Kosovo that may fall within its jurisdiction, and notes that the authorities of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia have an obligation to cooperate with the Tribunal and that the Contact 
Group countries will make available to the Tribunal substantiated relevant information in their 
possession;  
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2. Affirms that concrete progress to resolve the serious political and human rights issues in 
Kosovo will improve the international position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and 
prospects for normalization of its international relationships and full participation in 
international institutions;  
3. Emphasizes that failure to make constructive progress towards the peaceful resolution of 
the situation in Kosovo will lead to the consideration of additional measures;  
 
20. Decides to remain seized of the matter.  
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Appendix IV: UN Resolution 1199 
 
RESOLUTION 1199 (1998)  
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3930th meeting, on 23 September 1998  
The Security Council,  
Recalling its resolution 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998,  
Having considered the reports of the Secretary-General pursuant to that resolution, and in 
particular his report of 4 September 1998 (S/1998/834 and Add.1),  
Noting with appreciation the statement of the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, Italy, the 
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United 
States of America (the Contact Group) of 12 June 1998 at the conclusion of the Contact 
Group’s meeting with the Foreign Ministers of Canada and Japan (S/1998/567, annex), and the 
further statement of the Contact Group made in Bonn on 8 July 1998 (S/1998/657),  
Noting also with appreciation the joint statement by the Presidents of the Russian Federation 
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of 16 June 1998 (S/1998/526),  
Noting further the communication by the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia to the Contact Group on 7 July 1998, expressing the view that the 
situation in Kosovo represents an armed conflict within the terms of the mandate of the 
Tribunal,  
Gravely concerned at the recent intense fighting in Kosovo and in particular the excessive and 
indiscriminate use of force by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav Army which have resulted 
in numerous civilian casualties and, according to the estimate of the Secretary-General, the 
displacement of over 230,000 persons from their homes,  
Deeply concerned by the flow of refugees into northern Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
other European countries as a result of the use of force in Kosovo, as well as by the increasing 
numbers of displaced persons within Kosovo, and other parts of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, up to 50,000 of whom the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has 
estimated are without shelter and other basic necessities,  
 
Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety, 
and underlining the responsibility of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for creating the 
conditions which allow them to do so,  
 
Condemning all acts of violence by any party, as well as terrorism in pursuit of political goals by 
any group or individual, and all external support for such activities in Kosovo, including the 
supply of arms and training for terrorist activities in Kosovo and expressing concern at the 
reports of continuing violations of the prohibitions imposed by resolution 1160 (1998),  
 
Deeply concerned by the rapid deterioration in the humanitarian situation throughout Kosovo, 
alarmed at the impending humanitarian catastrophe as described in the report of the 
Secretary-General, and emphasizing the need to prevent this from happening,  
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Deeply concerned also by reports of increasing violations of human rights and of international 
humanitarian law, and emphasizing the need to ensure that the rights of all inhabitants of 
Kosovo are respected,  
 
Reaffirming the objectives of resolution 1160 (1998), in which the Council expressed support for 
a peaceful resolution of the Kosovo problem which would include an enhanced status for 
Kosovo, a substantially greater degree of autonomy, and meaningful self-administration,  
 
Reaffirming also the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,  
 
Affirming that the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region,  
 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
  
1. Demands that all parties, groups and individuals immediately cease hostilities and maintain a 
ceasefire in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which would enhance the prospects for 
a meaningful dialogue between the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 
Kosovo Albanian leadership and reduce the risks of a humanitarian catastrophe;  
2. Demands also that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo 
Albanian leadership take immediate steps to improve the humanitarian situation and to avert 
the impending humanitarian catastrophe;  
 
   3. Calls upon the authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo Albanian    
leadership to enter immediately into a meaningful dialogue without preconditions and with 
international involvement, and to a clear timetable, leading to an end of the crisis and to a 
negotiated political solution to the issue of Kosovo, and welcomes the current efforts aimed at 
facilitating such a dialogue;  
 
4. Demands further that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in addition to the measures called for 
under resolution 1160 (1998), implement immediately the following concrete measures 
towards achieving a political solution to the situation in Kosovo as contained in the Contact 
Group statement of 12 June 1998:  
 
(a) cease all action by the security forces affecting the civilian population and order the 
withdrawal of security units used for civilian repression;  
(b) enable effective and continuous international monitoring in Kosovo by the European 
Community Monitoring Mission and diplomatic missions accredited to the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, including access and complete freedom of movement of such monitors to, from and 
within Kosovo unimpeded by government authorities, and expeditious issuance of appropriate 
travel documents to international personnel contributing to the monitoring;  
(c) facilitate, in agreement with the UNHCR and the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), the safe return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes and allow free and 
unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations and supplies to Kosovo;  
(d) make rapid progress to a clear timetable, in the dialogue referred to in paragraph 3 with the 
Kosovo Albanian community called for in resolution 1160 (1998), with the aim of agreeing 
confidence-building measures and finding a political solution to the problems of Kosovo;  
 
5. Notes, in this connection, the commitments of the President of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, in his joint statement with the President of the Russian Federation of 16 June 1998:  
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(a) to resolve existing problems by political means on the basis of equality for all citizens and 
ethnic communities in Kosovo;  
(b) not to carry out any repressive actions against the peaceful population;  
(c) to provide full freedom of movement for and ensure that there will be no restrictions on 
representatives of foreign States and international institutions accredited to the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia monitoring the situation in Kosovo;  
(d) to ensure full and unimpeded access for humanitarian organizations, the ICRC and the 
UNHCR, and delivery of humanitarian supplies;  
(e) to facilitate the unimpeded return of refugees and displaced persons under programmes 
agreed with the UNHCR and the ICRC, providing State aid for the reconstruction of destroyed 
homes,  
 
and calls for the full implementation of these commitments;  
 
6. Insists that the Kosovo Albanian leadership condemn all terrorist action, and emphasizes that 
all elements in the Kosovo Albanian community should pursue their goals by peaceful means 
only;  
7. Recalls the obligations of all States to implement fully the prohibitions imposed by resolution 
1160 (1998);  
8. Endorses the steps taken to establish effective international monitoring of the situation in 
Kosovo, and in this connection welcomes the establishment of the Kosovo Diplomatic 
Observer Mission;  
9. Urges States and international organizations represented in the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia to make available personnel to fulfil the responsibility of carrying out effective and 
continuous international monitoring in Kosovo until the objectives of this resolution and those 
of resolution 1160 (1998) are achieved;  
10. Reminds the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that it has the primary responsibility for the 
security of all diplomatic personnel accredited to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as well 
as the safety and security of all international and non-governmental humanitarian personnel 
in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and calls upon the authorities of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia and all others concerned in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to take all 
appropriate steps to ensure that monitoring personnel performing functions under this 
resolution are not subject to the threat or use of force or interference of any kind;  
11. Requests States to pursue all means consistent with their domestic legislation and relevant 
international law to prevent funds collected on their territory being used to contravene 
resolution 1160 (1998);  
12. Calls upon Member States and others concerned to provide adequate resources for 
humanitarian assistance in the region and to respond promptly and generously to the United 
Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Humanitarian Assistance Related to the 
Kosovo Crisis;  
13. Calls upon the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the leaders of the Kosovo 
Albanian community and all others concerned to cooperate fully with the Prosecutor of the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the investigation of possible violations 
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal;  
14. Underlines also the need for the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to bring to 
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justice those members of the security forces who have been involved in the mistreatment of 
civilians and the deliberate destruction of property;  
 
15. Requests the Secretary-General to provide regular reports to the Council as necessary on his 
assessment of compliance with this resolution by the authorities of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and all elements in the Kosovo Albanian community, including through his 
regular reports on compliance with resolution 1160 (1998);  
 
16. Decides, should the concrete measures demanded in this resolution and resolution 1160 
(1998) not be taken, to consider further action and additional measures to maintain or restore 
peace and stability in the region;  
 
17. Decides to remain seized of the matter.  
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Appendix V: UN Resolution 1244 
  
 RESOLUTION 1244 (1999)  
Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999  
The Security Council,  
Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the 
primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and 
security,  
Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March 1998, 1199 (1998) of 23 September 
1998, 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998 and 1239 (1999) of 14 May 1999,  
Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the requirements of these resolutions,  
Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, and to provide for the safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons to 
their homes,  
Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well as all terrorist acts by 
any party,  
Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on 9 April 1999, expressing 
concern at the humanitarian tragedy taking place in Kosovo,  
Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety,  
Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia,  
Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis adopted on 6 
May 1999 (S/1999/516, annex 1 to this resolution) and welcoming also the acceptance by 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles set forth in points 1 to 9 of the paper 
presented in Belgrade on 2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to this resolution), and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s agreement to that paper,  
Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final 
Act and annex 2,  
Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy and meaningful self-
administration for Kosovo,  
Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international 
peace and security,  
Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel and the implementation 
by all concerned of their responsibilities under the present resolution, and acting for these 
purposes under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,  
1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on the general principles in 
annex 1 and as further elaborated in the principles and other required elements in annex 2;  
2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles and other 
required elements referred to in paragraph 1 above, and demands the full cooperation of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in their rapid implementation;  
3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an immediate and verifiable 
end to violence and repression in Kosovo, and begin and complete verifiable phased 
withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid 
timetable, with which the deployment of the international security presence in Kosovo will be 
synchronized;  
4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serb military and police 
personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo to perform the functions in accordance with 
annex 2;  
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5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international civil and 
security presences, with appropriate equipment and personnel as required, and welcomes 
the agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to such presences;  
6. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the Security Council, a Special 
Representative to control the implementation of the international civil presence, and further 
requests the Secretary-General to instruct his Special Representative to coordinate closely 
with the international security presence to ensure that both presences operate towards the 
same goals and in a mutually supportive manner;  
7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the  
international security presence in Kosovo as set out in point 4 of annex 2 with all necessary 
means to fulfil its responsibilities under paragraph 9 below;  
8. Affirms the need for the rapid early deployment of effective international civil and security 
presences to Kosovo, and demands that the parties cooperate fully in their deployment;  
9. Decides that the responsibilities of the international security presence to be deployed and 
acting in Kosovo will include:  
(a) Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a ceasefire, and 
ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, 
police and paramilitary forces, except as provided in point 6 of annex 2;  
(b) Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups as 
required in paragraph 15 below;  
(c) Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home 
in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be 
established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered;  
(d) Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility 
for this task;  
(e) Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as appropriate, take over 
responsibility for this task;  
(f) Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the international civil 
presence;  
(g) Conducting border monitoring duties as required;  
(h) Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil presence, 
and other international organizations;  
 
1. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international 
organizations, to establish an international civil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an 
interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial 
autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional 
administration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic 
self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all 
inhabitants of Kosovo;  
2. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include:  
(a) Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-
government in Kosovo, taking full account of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords 
(S/1999/648);  
(b) Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required;  
(c) Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and 
autonomous self-government pending a political settlement, including the holding of elections;  
(d) Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities while 
overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo’s local provisional institutions and other 
peace-building activities;  
(e) Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status, taking into 
account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);  
(f) In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s provisional institutions to 
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institutions established under a political settlement;  
(g) Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction;  
(h) Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, humanitarian and 
disaster relief aid;  
(i) Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile 
through the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo;  
(j) Protecting and promoting human rights;  
(k) Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes 
in Kosovo;  
 
12. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations, and for the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia to allow unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid 
organizations and to cooperate with such organizations so as to ensure the fast and effective 
delivery of international aid;  
13. Encourages all Member States and international organizations to contribute to economic and 
social reconstruction as well as to the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, and 
emphasizes in this context the importance of convening an international donors’ conference, 
particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11 (g) above, at the earliest possible date;  
14. Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the international security presence, with 
the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia;  
15. Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end immediately all 
offensive actions and comply with the requirements for demilitarization as laid down by the 
head of the international security presence in consultation with the Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General;  
16. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1160 (1998) shall not 
apply to arms and related matériel for the use of the international civil and security 
presences;  
17. Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other international organizations to 
develop a comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the 
region affected by the Kosovo crisis, including the implementation of a Stability Pact for South 
Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to further the promotion of 
democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation;  
18. Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the implementation of all aspects of 
this resolution;  
19. Decides that the international civil and security presences are established for an initial period 
of 12 months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise;  
20. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on the 
implementation of this resolution, including reports from the leaderships of the international 
civil and security presences, the first reports to be submitted within 30 days of the adoption of 
this resolution;  
21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.  
 
Annex 1  
Statement by the Chairman on the conclusion of the meeting of the G-8 Foreign Ministers held at 
the Petersberg Centre on 6 May 1999  
The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on the political solution to the 
Kosovo crisis: 
  
- Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo;  
- Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police and paramilitary forces;  
- Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and 
adopted by the United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common 
objectives;  
- Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo to be decided by the Security Council of the 
United Nations to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo;  
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- The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpeded access to Kosovo 
by humanitarian aid organizations;  
- A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement 
providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet 
accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA; 
Comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region.  
 
Annex 2  
Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards a resolution of the 
Kosovo crisis:  
1. An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.  
2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a 
rapid timetable.  
3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective international civil and 
security presences, acting as may be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of 
guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.  
4. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
participation must be deployed under unified command and control and authorized to 
establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their 
homes of all displaced persons and refugees.  
5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil 
presence under which the people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations. 
The interim administration to provide transitional administration while establishing and 
overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure 
conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.  
6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted to 
return to perform the following functions:  
-Liaison with the international civil mission and the international security presence; 
-Marking/clearing minefields;  
-Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites;  
-Maintaining a presence at key border crossings. 
7. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision of the Office 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and unimpeded access to Kosovo by 
humanitarian aid organizations.  
8. A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement 
providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet 
accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of UCK. 
Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the 
establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.  
9. A comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis 
region. This will include the implementation of a stability pact for South-Eastern Europe with 
broad international participation in order to further promotion of democracy, economic 
prosperity, stability and regional cooperation.  
10. Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the principles set forth above in 
addition to agreement to other, previously identified, required elements, which are specified in 
the footnote below.
1 
A military-technical agreement will then be rapidly concluded that would, 
among other things, specify additional modalities, including the roles and functions of 
Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo:  
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Withdrawal  
-Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed schedule and delineation of a buffer 
area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn;  
Returning personnel  
-Equipment associated with returning personnel;  
-Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities;  
-Timetable for their return;  
-Delineation of their geographical areas of operation;  
-Rules governing their relationship to the international security presence and the 
international civil mission.  
 
Notes  
Other required elements:  
-A rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals, meaning, e.g., seven days to complete 
withdrawal and air defence weapons withdrawn outside a 25 kilometre mutual safety zone 
within 48 hours;  
-Return of personnel for the four functions specified above will be under the supervision of the 
international security presence and will be limited to a small agreed number (hundreds, not 
thousands);  
Suspension of military activity will occur after the beginning of verifiable withdrawals; 
The discussion and achievement of a military-technical agreement shall not extend the previously 
determined time for completion of withdrawals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Suspension of m 
 The discussion and achievement of a military-technical agreement 
shall not extend the previously determined tie for completion of 
withdrawals.  
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Abstract 
The OSCE has been present in the territory of Kosovo for almost two decades. 
Its roots go back to 1992, when the then Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe (CSCE, now OSCE) deployed the Mission of Long Duration 
to Yugoslavia (Kosovo, Sandjak and Vojvodina). The mission focused on 
preventive actions – promoting constructive political dialogue and peaceful 
mediation, collecting information on the human rights situation and administering 
contact points for problem solving. Struggling with many challenges such as 
working within a framework of limited capability, budgetary deficiencies and 
understaffing, the mission’s mandate was not renewed and it consequently 
closed its doors after almost a year.  
In 1998, after months of ethnic-fuelled violence between the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA) on one side and the Yugoslav and Serbian forces on the other, the 
UN Security Council passed Resolution 1199, demanding an immediate cease-
fire in Kosovo and calling for the international community to monitor its 
compliance. Less than a month later, in October 1998 the OSCE Kosovo 
Verification Mission was set up and the verifiers began their monitoring, 
investigating and reporting activities on human rights abuses. Regrettably, brutal 
bloodshed continued and the Rambouillet peace process collapsed. In March 
1999, the situation in Kosovo had become too dangerous and too hostile for the 
verifiers to stay, therefore the KVM withdrew from Kosovo.  
On 24 March 1999, NATO launched Operation Allied Force, a military operation 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that was completed on 10 June 1999 
when the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1244. This resolution gave 
legal justification for an international civil and military presence in Kosovo, 
establishing the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK). The UNMIK consists of four task areas or pillars, with the OSCE 
representing pillar III responsible for democratization and institution building.  
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During its presence in Kosovo, the OSCE has certainly made significant efforts to 
mitigate the conflict, promote a constructive political dialogue between authorities 
in Belgrade and Kosovo, and generally served as a mediator in a variety of 
disputes between local communities. With very well developed mechanisms, 
internationally acknowledged standards and a comprehensive policy framework 
on democratization, good governance and human rights, the OSCE has assisted, 
advised and monitored the establishment of accountable democratic structures 
and institutions in Kosovo. Furthermore, it organized countless trainings, 
seminars and workshops for local authorities, it provided recommendations and 
has overseen the process of transition in order to create a better, safer and more 
humane environment for all inhabitants of Kosovo.  
After setting an analytical theoretical framework, this thesis describes, analyses, 
evaluates and compares the role of the OSCE in the fields of democratization, 
governance, monitoring, protection and promotion of human rights. It examines 
the OSCE’s key efforts, its challenges and the legacy of its work, activities and 
tasks on the territory of Kosovo. 
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Zusammenfassung 
Die OSZE ist auf dem Gebiet des Kosovo seit fast zwei Jahrzehnten präsent. Die 
Wurzeln reichen bis zum Jahr 1992 zurück, als die damalige Konferenz über 
Sicherheit und Zusammenarbeit in Europa (KSZE, heute OSZE) eine 
Langzeitmission für Kosovo, den Sandschak und die Vojvodina einrichtete. Diese 
Mission im Kosovo war der erste Versuch der Konfliktverhütung in der Region. 
Ihre Aufgaben konzentrierten sich auf die Konfliktpräventionsmaßnahmen wie 
Förderung eines konstruktiven politischen Dialoges, Friedensverhandlungen, 
Problemlösungen und das Sammeln der Informationen über die 
Menschenrechtslage. Schon seit dem Beginn kämpfte die Mission mit vielen 
Hindernissen wie finanzielle Knappheit, mangelnde Arbeitskraft und Kapazitäten. 
Nach fast einem Jahr weigerte sich die jugoslawische Regierung das Mandat zu 
verlängern und die Mission musste im Juni 1993 zurückgezogen werden. 
Im Jahr 1998, nach Monaten der ethnisch-motivierten Gewalt zwischen der 
Befreiungsarmee (die UÇK) auf einer Seite, der jugoslawischen Armee und der 
serbischen Sonderpolizei auf der anderen Seite, verabschiedete der UN-
Sicherheitsrat die Resolution 1199, die sofortigen Waffenstillstand forderte und 
die Einrichtung einer internationalen Mission für die Überwachung der Einhaltung 
von Resolutionsbestimmungen überprüfen sollte. Infolgedessen wurde im 
Oktober 1998 die Kosovo-Verifizierungsmission (KVM) geschaffen. Ihre Prüfer 
überwachten die Menschenrechtslage und berichteten über 
Menschenrechtsverletzungen. Bedauerlicherweise setzte das Blutvergießen fort. 
Ferner scheiterte der Rambouillet-Friedensprozess. Im März 1999 wurde die 
Lage zu gefährlich und zu feindselig, die Prüfer mussten ihre Arbeit unterbrechen 
und die KVM wurde abgezogen.   
Am 24. März 1999 begann die NATO im Rahmen des Kosovokrieges die 
militärische Operation – Operation Allied Force gegen die damalige 
Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien. Die Operation endete am 10. Juni 1999, als der 
UN-Sicherheitsrat die Resolution 1244 verabschiedete. Diese Resolution bildete 
die völkerrechtliche Grundlage für die Einrichtung der internationalen zivilen und 
militärischen Präsenz im Kosovo, beziehungsweise für die Gründung der 
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Übergangsverwaltungsmission der Vereinten Nationen im Kosovo (UNMIK). Die 
UNMIK besteht aus vier Säulen, die OSZE vertritt die Säule III und ist für die 
Demokratisierung und den Aufbau von Institutionen zuständig.   
In den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten unternahm die OSZE erhebliche Anstrengungen 
um den Konflikt im Kosovo zu beenden. Sie fördert immerhin einen politischen 
Dialog zwischen den Behörden in Belgrad und Pristina und dient als Mediator in 
zahlreichen Konflikten zwischen lokalen Gemeinschaften. Mittels ihrer gut 
entwickelten Mechanismen, international anerkannten Standards und eines 
umfassenden Policy Frameworks für die Demokratisierung, Governance und 
Menschenrechte unterstützt die OSZE den Aufbau zuverlässiger demokratischer 
Strukturen und Institutionen im Kosovo. Darüber hinaus veranstaltet die OSZE 
viele Trainings, Seminare und Workshops für lokale Beamte, berät Behörden und 
überwacht den Transitionsprozess mit der Zielsetzung allen Einwohnern im 
Kosovo ein besseres, sichereres und menschenwürdigeres Leben zu 
ermöglichen.   
Nach der Erstellung des analytisch-theoretischen Rahmens versuchte ich in 
dieser Diplomarbeit die Rolle der OSZE in den Bereichen der Demokratisierung, 
Governance, Überwachung, Schutz und Förderung der Menschenrechte zu 
beschreiben, analysieren, evaluieren und zu vergleichen. Ich untersuchte die 
OSZE-Leistungen, Herausforderung und das Erbe, dass OSZE mit ihrer Arbeit, 
Aktivitäten und Aufgaben im Kosovo hinterlassen wird. 
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